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ABSTRACT
U.S. abortion restrictions diminish access and perpetuate a culture of hostility toward
abortion seekers. Support for restrictions is high—potentially, because restriction knowledge is
low and attitudes are complex. The current study focused on knowledge and support of
restrictions and empathy for abortions seekers among Arkansans. The purpose was to evaluate
the effectiveness of a video intervention intended to increase awareness of Arkansas abortion
restrictions and induce empathy for abortion seekers.
Using a randomized controlled trial with pre-, post-, and follow-up design, a sample of
Arkansans (N = 369) were randomly assigned to one of five video conditions--either a control or
an intervention, varying by actor’s race and pregnancy narrative. Data were analyzed across the
study with repeated-measures analyses of variance, chi-squared analyses, and hierarchical
regressions.
Manuscript 1: For knowledge of restrictions, there was a statistically significant
interaction between the effects of time and video condition. Specifically, post-test scores were
significantly higher than pre-test and follow-up scores. In terms of support for restrictions, the
time main effect was significant, but the group main effect was nonsignificant. Manuscript 2:
chi-squares indicated participants who watched a testimonial where the woman was raped had
higher empathetic feeling scores. Post-test empathy sum scores were a function of sex,
experience with abortion and sexual assault, baseline Empathic Concern, and video condition;
follow-up scores were a function of personal experiences with abortion and sexual assault, sex,
and Empathic Concern. The testimonial depicting a Black woman who was raped induced the
most empathy at post-test.

The intervention was effective in increasing awareness and decreasing support for myriad
Arkansas abortion restrictions. Knowledge scores were significantly higher among those who
watched a testimonial; this may be because information was repeated or because emotional
connections made the information more memorable. Support decreased across the study,
however, the intervention did not have the hypothesized effect on this outcome. Prior personal
experiences and internalization of abortion stigma can affect empathy induction. People were
more empathetic for the woman who was raped compared with the consensual narrative. The
hierarchy of abortion narratives may influence perceptions of abortion seekers.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Background
There are an estimated 6.2 million pregnancies per year in the United States, nearly half
(45%) of which are unintended (Guttmacher Institute, 2017a). Approximately 19% of all
pregnancies (i.e., intended and unintended) will end in abortion (Guttmacher Institute, 2017a),
with greater frequency among those who experience unintended pregnancy (i.e., 40%; Finer &
Zolna, 2016). The rate of abortion in the U.S. is 14.6 per 1000 women of reproductive age
(Dreweke, 2017) and less than 0.5% of women experience complications from abortion in the
first trimester (Guttmacher Institute, 2017a). Given these data, it is apparent that abortion is a
common and safe pregnancy outcome. Although abortion has been legal in the U.S. for over 45
years (with Roe v. Wade in 1973) and is safe and common, it remains a salient and contentious
public health issue and has spurred myriad legislative restrictions. The following sections will
discuss general restrictions in the U.S. and then will narrow scope to discuss restrictions in
Arkansas, a particularly “hostile” state toward abortion. Then I will briefly describe the impact of
these restrictions in both the U.S. and Arkansas, and offer a theoretical explanation of this
impact. Finally, I will discuss strategies for intervention aimed at reducing this impact and
describe the proposed study based on the aforementioned theoretical framework.
Abortion restrictions. In the last five years, there has been a significant increase in statelevel restrictions. For example, state legislatures passed approximately the same number of
legislative abortion restrictions from 2011 to 2016 as they had passed in the previous fifteen
years (Guttmacher Institute, 2016a). In 2016, a total of 50 new legislative restrictions were
passed at the state-level, resulting in 338 laws restricting abortion in 6 years and comprising 30%
of the total number of abortion laws passed since it became legal in 1973 (Nash et al., 2017). The
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Guttmacher Institute classifies abortion restrictions enacted across the U.S. into 10 specific
categories. Examples of these common state restrictions include mandatory waiting periods
between pre-abortion counseling and abortion provision, restricting insurance coverage, and
requiring providers to give information (much of which is false or misleading) during preabortion counseling. If a state has four or more of these restrictions, they are considered “hostile”
to abortion and if they have more than six, they are considered “extremely hostile.” In 2017,
twenty-two states were considered “extremely hostile” and nearly all were in the Southern region
of the U.S. (Nash et al., 2017). The number of restrictions in just ten of these states account for
60% of all new restrictions in the U.S. (Guttmacher, 2016b). Arkansas is among these ten
extremely hostile Southern states.
Abortion restrictions in Arkansas. Arkansas is among the top three states with the most
abortion restrictions (22) passed between 2011 and 2015 (Guttmacher Institute, 2016b). In
response to the expanding list of proposed restrictions, legal teams from nonprofit organizations
such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Center for Reproductive Rights
filed suit against these hostile states. For example, in 2017, the state of Arkansas passed a
restriction prohibiting the dilation and evacuation (D&E) procedure, a restriction enacted in only
seven states as of mid-February 2017 (Donovan, 2016). Soon thereafter, the ACLU initiated a
lawsuit that resulted in a judge blocking the restriction (DeMillo, 2017). Therefore, these new
restrictions change quickly and often. Despite the consistent challenging of new laws, restrictions
in eight of the ten major categories are enacted in Arkansas. Consequently, Arkansas’ myriad
restrictions have resulted in only three facilities in the entire state (Cartwright, Karunaratne,
Barr-Walker, Johns, & Upadhyay, 2018) able to provide abortion services for approximately
600,000 women of reproductive age (i.e., 15-44; March of Dimes, 2019). In addition, the
2

restrictions are an important part of the reason that 97% of Arkansas counties do not have a
facility that can offer abortions, leaving 77% of women in Arkansas without an accessible
facility in their county (Jones & Jerman, 2017a). Consequently, although abortions are
theoretically legal in all 50 states, recent increases in legislative abortion restrictions at the state
level (e.g., Arkansas) have limited practical abortion accessibility, especially for low-income
women and women of color.
Impact of restrictions. Deprivation of accessible facilities is a significant concern
because abortion is a common outcome of pregnancy. When women are denied abortion access,
they report increased negative mental health outcomes such as depression and anxiety compared
to women who obtained a sought-after abortion (Foster et al., 2015). Additionally, women who
may be forced into motherhood prematurely (by being denied a sought-after abortion) are less
likely to achieve future plans such as finish high school or secure higher paying employment,
and are more likely to live in poverty (Foster, Biggs, Ralph, Gerdts, Roberts, & Glymour, 2018;
Gipson, Koenig, & Hindin, 2008; Upadhyay et al., 2015). Further, research shows that being
denied an abortion has long-lasting effects related to economic hardship. Foster and colleagues
(2018) found that, six months following their pregnancy outcome, women who were denied
abortions and gave birth were less likely to be employed full-time, more likely to be on public
assistance (e.g., food stamps, WIC), and had lower personal income than those who were able to
obtain wanted abortions. The cohort of women who gave birth after being denied an abortion
continued to live in poverty four years later, by both subjective (i.e., reported they did not have
sufficient funds to cover basic living expenses) and objective (i.e., income was below the federal
poverty level) definitions (Foster et al., 2018). Thus, the significant influx of state-enacted
restrictions on abortion access is cause for alarm.
3

Impact of restrictions in Arkansas. Although overall abortion rates have decreased
nation-wide (Dreweke, 2017), rates in Arkansas have increased in recent years from 7.6 to 8.0
abortions per 1,000 women of reproductive age (Jones & Jerman, 2017a). At a national level,
most patients seeking and obtaining abortions are in their 20’s, low-income, and vary by
race/ethnicity (Jerman, Jones, & Onda, 2016). In Arkansas, a state that is 79.4% White, 15.7%
Black, and 7.3% Latino/a (United States Census Bureau, 2016), a disproportionate number of
low-income residents are people of color (i.e., 28.9% Black and 26.7% Latino, whereas only
14.1% White are low-income; Center for American Progress, 2017). Therefore, at a state level,
restrictions placed on abortion have the ability to affect Arkansan women of color
disproportionately, a segment of the population already at increased risk for experiencing
unintended pregnancy (Arkansas Department of Health, 2010).
Theoretical explanation for restriction impact. An intersectional paradigm (Crenshaw,
1989) offers an explanation as to why restrictions in Arkansas disproportionately affect lowincome women of color by addressing how multiple social identities relate to power (e.g.,
privilege) and oppression at a micro-level and a macro-level. That is, the combined micro-level
social identities (i.e., gender, class, race) of low-income women of color are the most
disadvantaged at a macro-level in society. According to this framework, oppression at a macrolevel compounds as more micro-level social identities intersect, a phenomenon that has been
applied to obstacles infringing on women’s abortion access (Price, 2011). For example, women
in general endure the most of the burden of an unintended pregnancy; women of color face
racism and social marginalization, and low-income women face a lack of resources including
limitation of Medicaid coverage (Boonstra, 2016; Jones & Kavanaugh, 2011). Thus, a lowincome woman of color in Arkansas must overcome obstacles that are associated with all three
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identities. These obstacles could infringe on her ability to afford or to use birth control correctly
and consistently, which could increase her risk of unintended pregnancy, therefore increasing the
possibility of abortion.
These oppressions affect all aspects of a woman’s unintended pregnancy, including how
others perceive her. For example, a woman’s social identities may change how others perceive
her responsibility for the situation in which a pregnancy occurred (e.g., consensual sex, rape). A
woman who is pregnant because of consensual sex will likely be judged more harshly for
seeking an abortion than a woman who was raped on the assumption that people will think the
woman who became pregnant because of consensual sex had some control over her risk of
pregnancy (Hans & Kimberly, 2014). Adding biases toward low-income women and women of
color (e.g., misconceptions such as laziness or lack of education) exacerbates those perceptions,
widening the gap between privileged and oppressed women with social minority statuses (e.g.,
low-income, not White) and women with social majority statuses (e.g., high-income, White).
Strategy to combat restrictions. In order to combat the influx of abortion restrictions
and their particular impact on low-income women of color, it is important to understand how
these restrictions are passed. First, legislators introduce a bill and it is assigned to a committee.
The committee reads the bill and either passes it (with or without amendments) and sends it to
the floor (for debate and vote) or another committee, or “kills” it by voting it down. If passed to
the floor for a vote, two-thirds of the house and senate must approve after which the governor
must sign it. If those steps are successfully completed, the bill becomes law (AAP, 2009).
Therefore, if the majority of state legislators (and the governor) are anti-choice, it is relatively
easy for bills restricting abortion to pass.
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Advocating for women’s reproductive choice by voting for “pro-choice” candidates is a
structural strategy that could significantly reduce the influx of abortion restrictions. In theory,
legislators are elected to represent the views of their constituents. The majority (80%) of
Americans support abortion access under at least under some circumstances (Smith & Son,
2013). When looking at the state-level in hostile regions, there also seems to be support for
abortion legality, regardless of the number of restrictions in place. According to a study assessing
a convenience sample of young adults from Arkansas and Oklahoma, approximately 67.7%
indicated support for abortion access (Jozkowski, Crawford, & Hunt, 2018). Similarly, according
to the Arkansas Poll (2017), a state-wide telephone survey of residents on political issues, about
60% of Arkansans thought abortion should be legal under at least some circumstances (Parry,
2017), which may suggest that Arkansans are not as “red” on abortion as state abortion
restrictions might suggest. Yet anti-choice legislators are still consistently elected to office and
propose legislation aimed at restricting abortion access (Wilson, 2017). Given that it appears
people believe women should have access to abortion when asked on surveys, yet state-level
legislation continues to restrict access, there seems to be a schism between constituents’ abortion
opinions and state legislatures.
A potential explanation for this schism could be because the 80% who support abortion
access under at least some circumstances fail to vote with abortion in mind or fail to vote at all
because they do not see it as an important or critical issue. It could be the case that people may
care about abortion but when weighing their values, consult different foundations of morality;
therefore, social justice issues (e.g., reproductive rights) may only occupy a portion of their
moral world and other values may take precedence (such as patriotism or divinity; Haidt &
Graham, 2007), resulting in a lack of civic behavior. This is especially true for Arkansans;
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although Arkansas is portrayed as a “red” state, and in the 2016 election, about 60% of
Arkansans voted Republican for president, senators, and house representatives (which tend to be
in favor of anti-choice legislation; New York Times, 2017), only 53.1% of Arkansans actually
voted (McDonald, 2016). Moreover, as a nation, only 20% of the population report abortion
views are “very important” regarding which candidate to support, and this 20% is predominantly
anti-choice (Bowman & Sims, 2017). Although people believe women should have access to
abortion, general knowledge of abortion legislation is low (Cockrill & Weitz, 2011; Lara et al.,
2015) and Arkansans’ feelings seem to be mixed with regard to women who seek abortions (i.e.,
22.5% feel extremely negative, 14.6% feel extremely positive and 62.9% fall somewhere in the
middle; Parry, 2017).
Another explanation for a disjunction between public opinion (e.g., general support for
abortion access under at least some circumstances) and the myriad abortion restrictions passed
by legislators could be related to this low knowledge and mixed feelings. Research indicates that
people may support abortion access and, simultaneously, favor laws that would restrict access
(Bowman & Sims, 2017). That is, they may report being in favor of legislation that restricts
abortion under the pretense that certain mandated steps (e.g., pre-abortion counseling,
ultrasound) improves safety for women, but lack the information about what anti-abortion
legislation really means for women who seek abortions (Weitz et al., 2008). Further, they may
vote for candidates who put forth such anti-abortion legislation by framing it as an effort to
protect women’s health without understanding the real-world implications of these restrictions.
As such, there is a need to increase awareness regarding what these restrictions actually
mean in terms of limiting women’s access to abortion and empathy for women who face these
limitations. Intervention is needed to address the majority of Arkansans that support abortion
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access under at least some circumstances but may support abortion restrictions because of a lack
of knowledge about which laws are in place and what the laws actually do. In order to decrease
support for abortion restrictions, we plan to intervene at a micro-level by 1) increasing awareness
of legislative abortion restrictions in place in Arkansas and 2) increasing empathy for Arkansan
women who must face these restrictive laws to get the care they seek.
Raising awareness and increasing empathy. General efforts to shift attitudes often
incorporate the use of persuasive messages, however the effectiveness of these messages depend
on message type (Ryffel & Wirth, 2016). That is, persuasion efforts aimed at shifting affectbased attitudes (e.g., emotions and feelings) and cognition-based attitudes (e.g., beliefs and
judgments) are most effective when there is a match between the message with the type of
attitude (i.e., emotional messages with affective attitudes and informational messages with
cognitive attitudes; Ryffel & Wirth, 2016). Attitudes toward abortion are unique in that they are
often both emotional (e.g., considering how the woman must feel) and cognitive (e.g., scientific
statements against existence of fetal pain, plausibility of being able to financially provide for a
child), which can lead to complex feelings about abortion and feelings of ambivalence (Alvarez
& Brehm, 1995; Craig et al., 2002; Hunt, Marcantonio, Jozkowski, & Crawford, in preparation;
Jozkowski, Crawford, & Hunt, 2018). Therefore, in order to decrease support for abortion
restrictions, one must address both aspects of these attitudes. To address the cognitive side, we
aim to increase extent to which people are aware of restrictions enacted in Arkansas and to
address the affective side, we aim to increase positive attitudes and empathy for women who
seek abortions by offering a testimonial from someone who has had to face these restrictions.
Previous work with knowledge. To address the cognition-based side of abortion attitudes,
our goal is to increase knowledge of abortion in general (i.e., that it is safe, legal, and common)
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and of legislative restrictions in Arkansas. Few studies have examined knowledge of abortion or
legislation with a general population, none specifically in a hostile state such as Arkansas. Many
studies examining knowledge of abortion or abortion legislation focus on health professionals in
the U.S. (e.g., Coles et al., 2011; Pace et al., 2008), general populations of outside of the U.S.
(e.g., Appiah-Agyekum et al., 2015; Assifi et al., 2016; Phillips, Eltherington, de Costa, &
Woods, 2012; Sydsjö et al., 2012; Thapa, Sharma, & Khatiwada, 2014), or health professionals
outside of the U.S. (e.g., Chong et al., 2009; Hammarberg et al., 2016). Of the few studies that
examine knowledge of abortion and abortion legislation in the U.S. with general populations
(e.g., Bessett et al., 2015; Kavanaugh, Bessett & Littman, 2013; Lara et al., 2015; White et al.,
2016), all revealed that knowledge among their samples was low and called for interventions to
increase such knowledge.
Previous work with empathy. To address the affect-based side of abortion attitudes, our
goal is to increase positive attitudes toward women who seek abortions and empathy for women
who seek abortions/face restrictions in Arkansas. One mechanism effective in shifting attitudes
regarding contentious social issues is empathy-based interventions. For example, empathy-based
interventions have been used to destigmatize highly stigmatized groups (persons with AIDS, the
homeless population, individuals who are incarcerated; Batson et al., 1997) and reduce
disparities in perception of patients’ pain based on race (Drwecki et al., 2011). Empathy-based
interventions have incorporated a variety of activities to increase people’s ability to relate to
others such as simulating disabilities (Lor et al., 2015) and conducting assessments to test
people’s ability to identify others’ emotional states (Drwecki et al., 2011; Sherman et al., 2015).
In particular, audio and video-based testimonials appear to result in longer lasting attitude
changes (Braverman, 2008; Batson et al., 1997; Blas et al., 2010; Parker, Stradling & Manstead,
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1996; Roberto et al., 2000). Presently, there are media campaigns that target abortion stigma by
trying to normalize abortion with anecdotal experiences similar to testimonials
(shoutyourabortion.com). However, research shows that people do not tend to seek out political
media content that opposes their views (Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng, 2009). As such, it is
unlikely that the majority of voting-aged adults, especially those with at least some opposition to
abortion, would seek out such media or be exposed to such media naturally (i.e., without
prompting). Therefore, a more targeted intervention is needed.
To date, no media-based interventions have attempted to address abortion knowledge and
empathy, specifically targeting perceived pregnancy responsibility, and the potential influence of
race. As such, the current study aims to test the effectiveness of an empathy-based, video
intervention via a randomized-controlled experiment with Arkansas residents to increase
awareness about abortion legislation in Arkansas and shift attitudes towards abortion access.
The Current Study
The current study consisted of several video interventions that addressed either the
cognitive side of abortion attitudes (i.e., knowledge of legislation) or the combination of
cognition and affect (i.e., empathy for women who seek abortions). The control video did not
include the affective component and consisted only of the knowledge portion (a “news anchor”
giving a news report about abortion legislation in Arkansas). The intervention videos, aimed to
increase empathy, followed the knowledge portion and depicted an actor delivering one of four
different testimonials from the perspective of a woman who faced abortion restrictions in
Arkansas. We manipulated two variables in the testimonial videos (i.e., race of the woman,
perceived pregnancy responsibility) to examine the effects of internalized biases on empathy
generated.
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We compared control vs. intervention video conditions by examining pre-test, post-test,
and follow-up differences of knowledge of current abortion restrictions in Arkansas, support for
those abortion restrictions, and empathy for women who seek abortions in Arkansas. We
explored the following research questions:
RQ1. Research question 1 aimed to test the effectiveness of the intervention videos
compared to the control video. That is, did watching a video with an empathy-inducing personal
story in addition to an informational component (cognitive/knowledge + affective/empathy)
induce significantly different outcomes than watching a video that only contained an
informational component (only cognitive/knowledge). To explore the effectiveness of the
affective/empathy component, we compared outcomes of those who received the control
condition to those who received the intervention conditions on two sub questions: 1) knowledge
gain/retention about abortion restrictions and 2) differences in support for abortion restrictions in
Arkansas.
H1. In general, we posited that those who received an intervention condition
(cognitive/knowledge + affective/empathy) would experience a decrease in support for abortion
restrictions compared to the control video and an increase in knowledge of abortion and abortion
restrictions similar to that of the control video. RQ1 and H1 are described in more detail in
Chapter 3.
RQ2. Research question 2 aimed to test if the variables manipulated in the intervention
testimonials (race and pregnancy responsibility) would produce different empathy outcomes.
Comparisons on empathic characteristic scores were made between the five different video
conditions (1) White woman, raped, 2) White woman, consensual sex, 3) Black woman, raped,
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4) Black woman, consensual sex, and 5) control (no testimonial). To explore the impact of these
variables, we made comparisons between the five condition groups on differences in empathy
characteristics after the video as separate scores and as a sum score.
H2. In general, we posited there would be differences in empathy scores by intervention
condition. In particular, between intervention conditions, we expected that empathy would be
highest among participants who watched a rape testimonial compared with those who watched a
consensual testimonial. We expected participants who watched a White testimonial would have
higher empathy than those who watched a Black testimonial. Additionally, we examined if other
personal experiences/traits contributed to empathy sum scores. we hypothesized that 1) females,
2) people with personal experiences with abortion, 3) people with personal experiences with
sexual assault, 4) higher level of baseline Empathic Concern, and 5) people who viewed the
video with a White woman who was raped would have the highest empathy sum scores. RQ2
and H2 are described in more detail in Chapter 3.
Research Design and Methods
Intervention. The intervention consisted of five video conditions; participants were
randomly assigned to one. A pre-test and two post-tests were administered to all participants (see
Figure 1 in Chapter 3 for flow diagram). As described above, the content of the videos were
guided by the idea of intersecting social identities and the effect of their combinations
(Crenshaw, 1989). That is, some social identities of the person in the video were controlled for
and some were manipulated. We controlled for social identities such as gender, socioeconomic
status, and age—all people in the video presented as women, indicated that they are low-income,
and appeared to be in their 20’s to parallel salient characteristics of the majority of abortion
patients (75% and 60% respectively; Jerman et al., 2016). Alternatively, we manipulated several
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variables: video content (control vs. empathy testimonial), race of the woman in the video (White
woman vs. Black woman), and degree of perceived pregnancy responsibility in the testimonial
(raped vs. consensual sex). All participants (control and intervention conditions) watched a video
clip about current restrictions in Arkansas to increase participants’ knowledge about abortion
restrictions in Arkansas. The control condition then immediately received a post-test. The
intervention conditions watched one of four testimonial video clips after the knowledge clip.
This clip depicted a woman speaking about her experience of how restrictions made obtaining an
abortion in Arkansas more difficult:
•

Control: Knowledge; no Testimonial

•

Intervention 1: Knowledge + Testimonial (White woman, Raped)

•

Intervention 2: Knowledge + Testimonial (White woman, Consensual Sex)

•

Intervention 3: Knowledge + Testimonial (Black woman, Raped)

•

Intervention 4: Knowledge + Testimonial (Black woman, Consensual Sex)

After the testimonial clip, the intervention condition received the post-test. Then, participants in
all conditions received a follow-up post-test 2 weeks later (Johansson-Love & Geer, 2003).
Procedures. Before the survey was distributed, the instrument was pilot tested with a
convenience sample of researchers (n=10) to assess clarity/readability. Once the instrument was
finalized, we conducted an online video-based randomized-controlled trial with Arkansas
residents (18+) (N=369) through Qualtrics survey software. A convenience sample of
participants were recruited through social media targeted toward Arkansans across the state (e.g.,
Arkansas specific Reddit threads and craigslist pages), word of mouth, email, and listservs.
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First, participants who received the survey link were directed to an introductory page
providing them with information about the study. After clicking to the next page, they were
directed to an informed consent form, which notified them that by completing the survey, they
were indicating their consent to participate. Interested participants clicked to the next page which
began the online survey, starting with a pre-test that included: 1) demographic information
(including a unique identifier to link participants from pre-test/post-test to follow-up), 2) political
behaviors (e.g., voting and media consumption), 3) general knowledge about abortion, 4)
knowledge of Arkansas abortion restrictions, 5) support for abortion restrictions in Arkansas, 6)
attitudes toward women who seek abortions (i.e., revised from Batson et al., 1997), 7) personal
beliefs about social dominance (Ho et al., 2015), 8) identification of Empathic Concern and
perspective taking (Davis, 1983), and 9) the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale-Short
Form (Ballard, 1992; Reynolds, 1982).
After completing the pre-test, participants were randomly assigned to a videointervention or control group (see Figure 1 in Chapter 3). After viewing the assigned video
(control or one of four intervention videos), a post-test with similar questions to the pre-test was
administered to assess effects, in addition to measuring empathy toward women who seek
abortions in Arkansas (i.e., 6 empathy characteristics from Batson et al., 1997)), modified IOS
scale (Aron, Aron & Smollan, 1992), and specific empathy toward the woman in the video for
intervention conditions.
Based on previous literature (Johansson-Love & Geer, 2003), a follow up post-test was
administered two weeks after the intervention to measure re-bound effects. The follow-up posttest included similar questions to post-test 1 in addition to 1) measuring participants’ evaluation
of credibility of the sources (e.g., actors) in their assigned video using the Source Credibility
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Scale (Ohanian, 1990) and 2) assessing what relevant media, if any, they consumed in the 2week period after post-test 1. Participants received one $10 e-gift card after Post-test 1 and
another one after the follow-up post-test to incentivize participation.
Analyses. Data were analyzed by several statistical tests (see Table 1 and 2) with
independent variables as assigned video condition and dependent variables as (RQ1) knowledge
of restrictions, and support for restrictions, and (RQ2) empathy for women who seek abortions.
Additionally, demographic characteristics (e.g., gender, age) and scores on the IRI subscales of
Empathic Concern (Davis, 1980) served as control variables. Group sample sizes were generated
from a power analysis using G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) with power (1 - β) set at 0.80 and α =
.05, two-tailed.
Potential limitations. As with all self-reported data, there is the possibility of selfselection, response, and social desirability biases, especially due to the sensitive nature of the
topic. However, to increase respondent honesty, all data were anonymous and participants
completed the survey in a private location of their choosing. Additionally, we checked for social
desirability using the Marlowe-Crowne Desirability Scale-Short Form (Ballard, 1992; Reynolds,
1982), a scale that assesses the degree to which participants’ self-report data may be susceptible
to social desirability bias. Lastly, the adult population of Arkansas cannot be generalized to the
entire U.S. population, though it may be an adequate representation of other hostile states (e.g.,
Kansas, Oklahoma). Thus, we are aware this intervention may not be applicable to all potential
voters. Alternatively, findings from this study may be most useful in states where access to
abortion is more restricted and where there may be more hostile attitudes towards abortion.
Although these findings will be preliminary, the current study has potential to inform
development of larger scale interventions to increase abortion empathy.
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Expected Outcomes
The purpose of the study was to examine a mechanism that could decrease support for
abortion restrictions by increasing knowledge and empathy in Arkansas residents. An applied
outcome of raising awareness and decreasing support for abortion restrictions could translate to
voting behaviors (e.g., voting for “pro-choice” candidates). It is important to note that even
though the majority of people support abortion access under at least some circumstances
(Jozkowski, Crawford, & Hunt, 2018; Smith & Son, 2013), they oppose access under others and
those oppositions may take precedence in terms of rationalizing voting for a candidate who is
anti-choice. Unfortunately, people with these attitudes may not realize that methods to restrict
access for some women often end up restricting access for all women, particularly those who are
most in need of an abortion. First, people may be unaware of restrictive laws in Arkansas and
second, people may be unaware of what these restrictions actually mean for women. Thus,
exposing participants to testimonials of individuals impacted by these regulations may assist in
decreasing support for these restrictions and subsequently motivating them to increase support
“pro-choice” candidates. Previous literature has shown testimonials to be more impactful than
other mechanisms (e.g., Roberto et al., 2000). The employed intervention could alleviate the
surrounding stigma of women who receive abortions by “applying a story to the statistics.”
Women may feel ashamed and thus do not share their abortion experiences freely (Norris et al.,
2011), further complicating the normalization of their experience and perpetuating stigma.
Therefore, negative attitudes toward abortion discourage women from feeling comfortable with
sharing their experiences with abortion, place women at a disadvantage, and allow restrictive
policies to prevail. Creating empathy for these women could initiate change.

16

Finally, this study aimed to incorporate differences in empathy by race and pregnancy
responsibility into the dialogue about social inequalities regarding abortion. Using an
intersectional approach in the analyses and discussion, this study may reveal underlying biases
that are addressed less often in discussions about abortion access. Scholars have made a
concerted effort to draw attention to the racial inequalities within reproductive access (e.g.,
Kumar, 2013; Price, 2011) and rape is a commonly accepted exception to abortion restrictions
(Guttmacher Institute, 2017d; Mikolajczak & Bilewicz, 2015; Nash et al., 2017; Smith & Son,
2013), however the intersection of race and perceived pregnancy responsibility has yet to be
explored. Although women of all races obtain abortions in the U.S. (Jerman et al., 2016), Black
women have a higher ratio of abortions (Jones & Jerman, 2017a), and are more likely to
underreport their abortions on survey data (Jagannathan, 2001). As such, there are social
inequalities that create invisible subsets of the population who are even more impacted. The
proposed study aimed to further illuminate these issues and assess a potential intervention
method that can ignite change.
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CHAPTER 2: SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE
Abortion is a salient and contentious public health issue in the U.S. Although researchers
have referred to abortion as a “common reproductive health event” (p. 224; Moreau, Trussell,
Desfreres, & Bajos, 2011) or a “common life circumstance” (p. 238; Steinberg & Russo, 2008),
unlike other common medical practices, abortion is deeply politicized. Therefore, abortion
discourse is steeped in controversy, misconception, and debate. I will discuss aspects of abortion
and its politicization in several subsequent sections. In section 1, I will discuss practices of
abortion (i.e., safety and prevalence in the U.S.). In section 2, I will discuss the politics of
abortion including legality and cognitive framing. In section 3, I will discuss the affect-based
component of abortion attitudes. In section 4, I will discuss current abortion legislation and how
knowledge and attitudes affect voting. In section 5, I will narrow the scope to a particular
population (i.e., abortion in Arkansas) and need for intervention. In section 6, I will discuss
different intervention strategies used in the past to change conditions of and attitudes toward
abortion. In section 7, I will describe the current study and in section 8, I will describe the
theoretical framework that will guide the methodology and hypotheses.
1. Practices of Abortion
To understand the succeeding sections about politics, attitudes, legislation and voting,
specific populations, intervention, and theory, one must first understand the basic concepts of
abortion: safety (i.e., what obtaining an abortion actually entails) and prevalence (i.e., who
obtains abortions).
Safety of abortion. An estimated 1.2 million abortions are provided in the U.S. per year;
the majority (88.8%) occur during the first 12 weeks of gestation or less), an estimated 10% of
abortions occur during 13 to 20 weeks of gestation, and about 1.3% occur at 21 weeks or later
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(Finer & Henshaw, 2003; Guttmacher Institute, 2017a; Jatlaoui et al., 2016; Jerman, Jones &
Onda, 2016). The risk of serious complications, such as infection or hemorrhage, from abortion
is very low at all gestational ages (experienced by less than 0.5% of women in the first trimester;
Guttmacher Institute, 2017a). In fact, a woman who continues a pregnancy to term compared to a
woman who terminates a pregnancy, is 5-25 times more likely to have serious complications and
14 times more likely to die from pregnancy or childbirth (Raymond & Grimes, 2012). Overall,
induced abortion has a mortality rate of 0.7 deaths per 100,000, which is the same rate for
spontaneous miscarriage (Hamoda & Templeton, 2010). Risk of death increases with length of
pregnancy; at 8 weeks’ gestation or earlier, the mortality rate is 0.03 deaths for every 100,000
abortions whereas at 18 weeks or later, it is 6.7 deaths per 100,000 abortions (Guttmacher
Institute, 2017a).
There are two main types of abortion methods; both are safe and effective (Kulier et al.,
2011). Method use depends on gestational age, physician expertise, and personal and physician
preference (Lee, Ng, & Ho, 2010). Though the two types are commonly referred to as “surgical”
and “medical” abortion, Weitz and colleagues (2004) argue these terms are confusing and
perpetuate inaccurate implications (i.e., “surgical” implies cutting and suturing, “medical”
implies physician-based procedures); instead they recommend using “aspiration” and
“medication” abortion to imply more accurate depictions of their protocols. Not all procedural
abortions include the use of aspiration, however, so “procedural” is a more inclusive term to
describe all abortions that are not medication. An additional terminological recommendation
discourages the use of describing termination of pregnancy in relation to “trimesters” and
instead, encourages using weeks’ or days’ gestation to be more precise (National Academy of
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Sciences, 2018). Therefore, I will use these terms as a commitment to accuracy of language in
abortion discourse.
Procedural abortion. The majority of abortions provided in the U.S. are procedural (also
referred to as surgical or in-clinic), accounting for approximately 68% of all abortions (National
Academy of Sciences, 2018), 72.4% of which are provided before or at 12 weeks and 8.3% of
which provided at 13 weeks or later (CDC, 2013). This type of abortion involves a minor
procedure to end a pregnancy using a combination of instruments to empty the uterus--the most
common instruments used are the curette (i.e., a small metal scraping instrument), dilators (i.e.,
methods to open the cervix), and vacuum aspiration (i.e., gentle suction). During the Dilation and
Curettage (D&C) procedure, a physician may use a combination of these two instruments to
empty the uterus. Modern D&Cs, which can be provided as early as 4-6 weeks (O’Connell et al.,
2009; National Academy of Sciences, 2018), often use vacuum aspiration instead of or in
addition to use of the curette (O’Connell, Jones, Simon, Saporta, Paul, & Lichtenberg, 2009),
hence the recommendation of name change to “aspiration” abortion by Weitz and colleagues
(2004). The use of vacuum aspiration is considered the safest method with the lowest rate of
complications (Hamoda & Templeton, 2010) and comprises two types: manual vacuum
aspiration (MVA; generally used during the first 12 weeks; Hamoda & Templeton, 2010) or
conventional vacuum aspiration (VA; generally used after 12 weeks; Hemlin & Moller, 2011).
Between the gestational weeks of 13 and 28, the most common method of abortion is a
Dilation and Evacuation (D&E) procedure, which often employs the use of VA in combination
with other instruments such as forceps (National Academy of Sciences, 2018; Strauss, Gamble,
Parker, Cook, Zane, & Hamdan, 2007) and accounts for less than 9% of all abortions (National
Academy of Sciences, 2018). D&Es comprise 98.6% of abortions between 13-15 weeks, 95.4%
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between 16 and 20 weeks and 85.1% at 21 weeks or later (Gamble et al., 2005). There are two
types of D&E procedures: nonintact and intact. These terms refer to the condition of the fetus
upon removal (Jones & Weitz, 2009). Intact D&E is sometimes referred to as Dilation and
Extraction (D&X) and though not often provided (i.e., about one in every 10,000 abortions; Levit
& Verchick, 2016) and typically only in cases of fetal abnormality, they are considered safe and
effective (Chasen et al., 2004). Although risk of complications increases as gestational age
increases, D&Es are considered very safe procedures and do not impact future fertility, or risk
for other pregnancy-related disorders (Jacot et al., 1993; National Academy of Sciences, 2018).
To understand common abortion protocols for aspiration procedures before and after 12 weeks,
O’Connell and colleagues (2008, 2009) surveyed hundreds of administrators and clinicians in the
National Abortion Federation (NAF) and found similarities across facilities; I have described
these procedures below:
Aspiration procedures. Prior to the procedure, patients will participate in pre-abortion
counseling, a pelvic exam, and methods to confirm pregnancy (e.g., most clinics offer or are
required to provide ultrasound; O’Connell et al., 2008; 2009). Prior to abortion, to reduce the risk
of complications (Hamoda & Templeton, 2010), clinics administer a cervical ripening agent
(e.g., misoprostol) to be taken at home or in-clinic (O’Connell et al., 2009). Choice of instrument
for the procedure depends on the physician’s preference and, often, when they received their
medical training (e.g., older physicians who received their training over 10-20 years ago, were
more likely report using a metal curette and less likely to report using MVA during a procedure
in the first 12 weeks; O’Connell et al., 2009). The method of anesthesia depends on the provider,
with the majority using local anesthesia or a combination of local and intravenous sedation
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during a D&C, and the majority using a combination of local and intravenous sedation or deep
sedation during a D&E (O’Connell et al., 2008; 2009).
Medication abortion. Scientists developed the abortifacient agent mifepristone (also
known as RU-486 or the brand name Mifeprex), a non-procedural abortion method, in the 1980’s
in France (Crandell, 2012; Hamoda & Templeton, 2010). Today, it is considered to be an
important advancement in fertility control (Hamoda & Templeton, 2010), though it was
approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 12 years after its approval in France.
In 2000, mifepristone was approved for abortions up to 7 weeks’ gestation (Hamoda &
Templeton, 2010; Guttmacher Institute, 2017a; Schaff et al., 2000) and in 2016, the FDA
approved a new label to include an additional 3 weeks of administration (i.e., up until week 10 of
pregnancy; Guttmacher Institute, 2017b). Medication abortions account for 45% of abortions
prior to 9 weeks (Guttmacher Institute, 2017a), though this rate is steadily increasing (National
Academy of Sciences, 2018). Medication abortion involves the combination of mifepristone and
a prostaglandin analogue (e.g., misoprostol; Hamoda & Templeton, 2010). Mifepristone inhibits
progesterone receptors, which causes the lining of the uterus and its contents to shed, and is
usually administered orally in-clinic or at home. Some states mandate that clinicians must be in
the physical presence of the patient when they take the medication (National Academy of
Sciences, 2018). Then a prostaglandin (misoprostol in the U.S.; Lee et al., 2010) is administered
1-3 days later, almost always at home, inducing uterine contractions and expelling the contents
of the uterus. Post-abortion, patients return to their physician for an exam to make sure the
abortion was complete. The risk of incomplete abortion is low (i.e., 2-4%; Kahn et al., 2000),
however, if the abortion is not complete at that time, another dose of misoprostol is administered
4 hours later to ensure all contents of the uterus are expelled (Hamoda & Templeton, 2010).
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Cost of procedures. Cost of these procedures are often influenced by gestational age,
insurance coverage, and legislative restrictions in the state. Without insurance coverage, the
median out-of-pocket cost of an abortion is $575 compared to median cost with insurance
coverage at a range of $0-18 (Roberts et al., 2014). Furthermore, the price for abortions increases
with gestational age--without insurance, an abortion up to 12 weeks costs an average of $497,
abortion between 14-20 weeks’ costs an average of $860, and after 20 weeks, an abortion costs
an average of $1874 (Roberts et al., 2014). Procedures at 13 weeks and beyond are more
expensive in general and, on top of the cost of the procedure, they often require additional costs.
These costs often result from legislative restrictions that delay abortion (requiring extra travel
and lodging) and increase charges (e.g., ultrasound; Bitler & Zavodny, 2001; Drey et al., 2006;
Jones & Weitz, 2009). Price related to gestational age applies to abortion services in all states.
However, additional costs to the procedure (e.g., ultrasound, services offered in a facility that
must adhere to Ambulatory Surgical Center standards, waiting periods that necessitate two trips
to the doctor) vary from state to state and depend on the type and amount of restrictions enacted
(see Section 4).
Prevalence of abortion. Approximately 1 in 4 women (of all demographic
characteristics) will have an abortion by the age of 45 (i.e., 14.6 abortions per 1000 women aged
15-44; Dreweke, 2017; Guttmacher Institute, 2017f; Jones & Jerman, 2017b). The largest groups
of abortion patients are in their 20’s (34% aged 20-24 and 27% aged 25-29), have never married
(46%), were using a contraceptive method (51%), have had at least one birth (59%), are poor or
low-income (75%), and over half (54%) of abortion patients report some religious affiliation
(17% as mainline Protestant, 13% as evangelical Protestant, 24% as Catholic, 38% no affiliation,
and 8% other; Guttmacher Institute, 2017a). When abortion rates are examined by race/ethnicity
23

(i.e., solely in terms of numbers), it appears they are fairly equally distributed with slightly more
White women reporting abortions (39% compared to 28% Black, 25% Hispanic, and 9% other;
Guttmacher Institute, 2017a). However, when abortion rates are examined proportional to the
subpopulation, White women’s abortion rates are the lowest (i.e., 10.0 per 1000) and Black
women’s rates are the highest (i.e., 27.1 per 1000; Jones & Jerman, 2017b), specifically those
who are low-income (Jones and Kavanaugh, 2011). Additionally, many studies indicate women
underreport their abortions in population-based surveys (Bajos et al., 2010; Trussell, 2008).
Accordingly, abortion rates are linked to socioeconomic status in the U.S., particularly poverty.
Yet, poverty is not the sole explanation for these rates--there are unequal rates among lowincome women of color (i.e., low-income Black women have higher rates of abortion than lowincome Hispanic women do; Jones & Kavanaugh, 2011).
Impact of finances. Paradoxically, low-income women of color, who have the highest
rates of abortion, also face the most barriers to access. Finances are simultaneously an indicator
of prevalence (i.e., reason for seeking an abortion) and a barrier to access for women. Threefourths of women cite seeking an abortion for reasons related to the financial impact an
unplanned child would have on their life and the life of their family (Boonstra, 2016; Guttmacher
Institute, 2017a; Jerman, Jones, & Onda, 2016). As low-income women compose the majority of
abortion patients, for more than half of women who seek abortions, provision and travel costs
comprise more than a third of their monthly income (Roberts et al., 2014). Although, two-thirds
of women report receiving some financial assistance, even with aid, most women pay out of
pocket for their abortions and report an average of $54 for travel with a range of $0-2200
(Roberts et al., 2014). Consequently, over half of women report that financial issues delayed
their care, which could include problems with insurance coverage or needing to raise money for
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the costs of provision and travel (Roberts et al., 2014; Upadhyay et al., 2014). Though cost may
delay care, women prove to endure many obstacles, and will often defer payments for rent,
groceries, and other bills, in order obtain an abortion (Dreweke, 2017).
2. Politicization of Abortion
Despite the safety and prevalence of abortion, the issue of women’s reproductive rights
(referred to by some as a “war” on women; e.g., di Mauro & Joffe, 2007; Harrison, 2016) has
been shrouded in politics (e.g., rhetoric, legislative restrictions) for decades in the U.S.
Fluctuations of sexually conservative and progressive movements throughout history have
influenced this “war” and resulted in a bipolar cognitive approach to the issue.
Legality of abortion. Abortion was not officially illegal in the U.S. until the Comstock
Act of 1873, which criminalized possession of items or information pertaining to contraception
and abortion (Levit & Verchick, 2016). This Act was passed in response to a combination of
sexist and racist attitudes such as the American Medical Association’s position that abortion was
in conflict with a woman’s martial duties and fears of the general public that upper-middle-class
White women were having lower birth rates than women of color (Levit & Verchick, 2016).
Roe v. Wade. A century later, the court cases Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton legalized
abortion in 1973 (Ellison, 2003). Scholars considered this advancement in reproductive rights to
be a major public health gain because it led to increased access to abortion and thus safer
provision (Cates, 1982). Roe v. Wade (sometimes referred to by researchers and activists as just
“Roe”) laid out a structure of legality by trimester so that 1) a woman and her practitioner had the
right to terminate the pregnancy through abortion in the first trimester without legal restrictions,
2) states were allowed to set conditions for second-trimester abortions, and 3) third-trimester
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abortions were illegal unless the woman’s life or health was in danger (Roe v Wade, 410 US
113, 1973). Legalizing abortion allowed for the systematic collection of epidemiological data,
which led to better recommendations, better training of physicians, and lower mortality and
morbidity rates (Cates, 1982, 2012). Before legalization, abortion provision was unregulated,
unsafe, and occurred in secrecy. For example, prior to Roe, in 1965, 17% of all deaths due to
pregnancy and childbirth were the result of illegal abortion (Gold, 1990). Despite these benefits
to legalization, anti-abortion activists worked to decrease access and discourage women from
seeking abortion.
Immediately following Roe, there was a period of optimism and liberation (Schoen,
2015). During this time, people created a network of freestanding clinics and abortion was
cheaper and more accessible than ever with the establishment of abortion fund organizations. In
addition, feminists were empowered and women were encouraged to learn about their
reproductive choices and options. However, this optimism was halted in the 1980’s with the
beginning of the current sexually conservative movement (i.e., the Religious Right), a “moral
panic” (p. 68) reaction to the women’s liberation and gay rights movements (di Mauro and Joffe,
2007).
A swell of Religious Right-affiliated groups (e.g., Focus on the Family, the Family
Research Council) activated in the 80’s during Ronald Regan’s administration (di Mauro &
Joffe, 2007). These anti-abortion activists used rhetoric to create a movement that perpetuated
fear, stigma, and misconception. In combination with politicians and legislatures, the antiabortion movement worked strategically to pass restrictions at a state and federal level to infringe
on the legal parameters set in 1973. Leaders of this movement created Crisis Pregnancy Centers
(discussed below) and drew on findings from a few anti-abortion physicians that declared
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abortion was detrimental to women’s health, causing infertility, increased risk of miscarriage,
uterine rupture, and hemorrhaging (Haugeberg, 2017). They worked to discredit medical
professionals who cited scientific evidence that opposed these declarations (i.e., that abortion
was safe with very few physical or psychological complications; di Mauro & Joffe, 2007;
Haugeberg, 2017). They spread anti-abortion messages with the use of graphic, bloody images of
fetuses and histrionic language, coining “junk science” terms (di Mauro & Joffe, 2007, p. 77)
such as Post Abortion Syndrome and “partial-birth” abortion (Esacove, 2004; Haugeberg, 2017).
This political climate facilitated construction of the dominant cognitive frames of abortion
stance.
Cognitive framing of abortion. The dichotomization of abortion framing (i.e., “pro-life”
vs. “pro-choice”) stemmed from the Religious Right’s use of tactics such as stigmatization
campaigning and language to create an “adversarial” relationship between fetal rights and
maternal rights (di Mauro & Joffe, 2007; Halva-Neubauer & Zeigler, 2010). This cognition is
based on knowledge, reasoning, and judgments relating to the relationship of the fetus and/or the
woman and how it relates to one’s construction of their moral values system.
Before further describing this dichotomization, a note on terminology used in this
section: there is discussion and criticisms on both sides that these labels may not accurately
reflect the values of their group. For example, out-group critics often equate the term “prochoice” to “pro-abortion” and therefore perpetuate that “pro-choice” individuals have a negative
stance against all pregnancies (Shamess, 1988). However, “pro-choice” individuals adopt the
term because it implies that women should have access to the full spectrum of pregnancy
outcome opportunities (choices), be that they decide to maintain their pregnancy or terminate it.
Additionally, as described below, in-group critics argue that the label of “pro-choice” is
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insufficient because it ignores the inequality of access to “choice” (e.g., for women of color; di
Mauro & Joffe, 2007; Smith, 2005). In attempts to move away from this rhetoric, some activists
on this side offer a more precise term such as “supporters of abortion rights” (Feree, 2003). On
the other hand, out-group criticism of the “pro-life” label argue its inaccuracy; focusing on the
wellbeing (i.e., “life”) of the fetus often ignores the wellbeing/life of the woman carrying the
pregnancy (Malik, 2018). “Pro-choice” individuals suggest that labels for those who oppose
abortion such as “anti-choice,” or “anti-abortion” are more precise.
While both labels may not be all-encompassing, for unification of language, I will refer to
the fetal-centric side as “pro-life” and the woman-centric side as “pro-choice,” as I will discuss
their ideologies with language from their rationalizations. While certain subgroups of each side
have acknowledged the need for shifting the rhetoric, these messages/labels have prevailed for
decades, which has been influential in social movements and affects who is heard, how they are
heard, and what ideas dominate the discourse (Feree, 2003).
The “pro-life”/fetal-centric frame. In the late 1980’s, these religious fundamentalist
groups began promoting the idea that life begins at conception, designating personhood to the
fetus and privileging its protection (Ellison, 2003). Under this stance, abortion is conceptualized
as an unjustifiable killing of the fetus and should be criminalized under the 14 amendment (i.e.,
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shall not deprive U.S. citizens of life, liberty, or property; Halva-Neubauer & Zeigler, 2010;
Smith, 2005). In their analysis of anti-abortion rhetoric, Halva-Neubauer and Zeigler (2010)
conclude that the “pro-life” movement is “vibrant [and] strategically sophisticated” (p. 117).
“Pro-life” groups furthered their cause by using the increased visibility of the fetus through
advancements in technology, generating language (e.g., unborn child), hypothesizing
consequences (e.g., fetal pain), and creating centers that disseminate their message.
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Technology. As pregnancy technology advanced over time (e.g., 4-D ultrasound, fetal
photography, post-birth care for premature fetuses, fetal analgesics), fetuses have been
conceptualized as an infant/person with emotional and cognitive response (Derbyshire, 2008;
Norris et al., 2011). In fact, because premature fetal care is so advanced, Kluge (2012) suggests
that, to avoid ethical violation, women who do not wish to carry their pregnancy should transfer
their fetuses to incubate in artificial wombs. To increase fetal personhood rhetoric, “pro-life”
activists have disseminated materials using high-tech images of in-utero fetuses, which some
scholars argue decontextualizes the fetus and exaggerates its independence by erasing the
pregnant woman from the picture (Halva-Neubauer & Zeigler, 2010; Taylor, 2008).
Language. Another strategy to perpetuate fetal personhood is the use of language in
government documents (e.g., bills) and media (e.g., “unborn child,” “preborn Americans,”
“unborn baby”; Harrison, 2016; Mikolajczak & Bilewicz, 2015). A study examined the impact of
language on attributing humanness to either a “zygote,” “embryo,” or “fetus” and found no
differences between the three terms (MacInnis et al., 2014). However, Mikolajczak and Bilewicz
(2015) conducted three studies in which they manipulated whether the participants would see the
word “fetus” or “child” in a short text; those who saw the word “child” were more likely
attribute human nature to it in follow-up questions. With the use of personified terms, antiabortion activists employed initiatives to perpetuate the concepts of fetal homicide (criminalizing
third-party killing of fetuses) and fetal pain (Halva-Neubauer & Zeigler, 2010).
Fetal pain. Whether or not a fetus can feel pain has been well debated. Kluge (2012)
argues that there is a difference between pain reception and nociception (neural coding in the
sensory nervous system that processes potentially harmful stimuli such as extreme temperature
or pressure; Dubin & Patapoutian, 2010); by comparing fetuses to non-human animals, who
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experience nociception, he presents evidence to support the position that fetuses have
nociceptive capacity as well (i.e., indicating that they process noxious stimuli). However,
Derbyshire (2008) presents a counter argument--even if fetuses experience nociception, they do
not have the brain development to code or label that noxious stimuli as pain. Fetal pain can be
divided into two components: neurobiology (i.e., pain processing via response to noxious
stimuli) and developmental psychology (i.e., self-location or “you know that it is you that hurts”;
Derbyshire, 2008, p. 118). Although neurobiological features that could respond to noxious
stimuli develop at 7, 18, and 26 weeks’ gestation, the fetus does not have a state of consciousness
at those development points to register stimuli as pain; this may not happen until at least 23
weeks (Derbyshire, 2008).
Crisis pregnancy centers. To disseminate these messages (e.g., fetal personhood, fetal
pain) and intercept pregnant women who are seeking abortions, the “pro-life” side created a
group of non-profits known as Crisis Pregnancy Centers (CPCs). CPCs are funded by a
combination of private donors (e.g., proceeds from the “Choose Life” license plates) and state
(Ludden, 2015) and federal funds (under the Title V funding for abstinence-only education
programs during the Bush Administration in 2010; di Mauro & Joffe, 2007; NARAL, 2010), and
currently under Title X funding during the Trump Administration. They pose as medical
facilities and attempt to confuse vulnerable women by using vague advertising (e.g., offering
“free and confidential services”; NARAL, 2010, p. 6) and situating their buildings within close
proximity to actual abortion clinics (Haugeberg, 2017; NARAL, 2010). The volunteers that run
CPCs may show gruesome images to pregnant women, warn them of the risks of abortion,
conduct pregnancy tests (usually bought over the counter) and ultrasounds, and lie about
gestational age results to keep women from going to real clinics (di Mauro & Joffe, 2007;
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Haugeberg, 2017). Often, they will collect sexual histories and emergency contact information
and inform partners and parents about women’s intention to seek an abortion because they are
not bound by patient confidentiality (Haugeberg, 2017).
The “pro-choice”/woman-centric frame. In contrast, the “pro-choice” position typically
maintains that the fetus is not a person/life capable of feeling pain and, therefore, is not entitled
to legal protection under the 14 amendment (Halva-Neubauer & Zeigler, 2010; Smith, 2005).
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“Pro-choice” activists assert that legislation to alleviate (e.g., with anesthesia) or avoid fetal pain
are just strategies to make abortion more expensive and create another barrier to access (HalvaNeubauer & Zeigler, 2010). Though some “pro-choice” individuals may knowledge the potential
personhood of the fetus, they advocate that women’s personhood should be prioritized, as
women’s autonomy and their “moral competence to make abortion decisions” are core tenets of
reproductive choice (Feree, 2003, p. 314). Under this stance, women’s bodies have been “sites of
extensive and extended biopolitical contestation” (Ellison, 2003, p. 338) and activists prioritize
the need to protect a woman’s right to the choice to control her own body (Smith, 2005);
abortion is a means to control reproductive outcomes.
Public messaging and policy efforts of the “pro-choice” side pale in comparison to the
strategy, organization, and visibility of “pro-life” activists. For example, there are hundreds of
websites and sources of media dedicated to women who regret their abortion whereas only a few
to “pro-choice” narratives (Ludlow, 2008). This lack of transparency could be because the
reproductive rights movement has been forced into a defensive approach, simply to maintain
legality instead of focusing on larger, more emphatic goals (di Mauro & Joffe, 2007). The
ultimate “pro-choice” goal is affordable, unrestricted access to abortion at any gestational age,
free of criticism or stigma (which has been denigrated to the anti-abortion phrase of “abortion on
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demand,” implying heartlessness and sterility; Ludlow, 2008). In order to eventually achieve this
goal, “pro-choice” activists have, at times, had to pick their battles and rely on politically
acceptable reasons for abortion (e.g., rape, incest, health) to relate to those who are undecided or
oppose abortion. Instead of putting effort into keeping abortion legal for everyone at every
gestational age (e.g., even the less acceptable reasons for abortion such as a woman simply not
wanting children), they must water down their arguments so as not to turn people off or stir up
controversy (Ludlow, 2008).
Being strategic with “pro-choice” discourse relates to Feree’s (2003) work designating
the two sides of the feminist abortion narrative: resonance and radicalism. She argues that “prochoice” feminists are selective in different “discursive opportunities” (p. 306), choosing to be
resonant “for the purposes of influencing policy, gaining public support, and forestalling
countermovement attacks” (p. 306) and radical in situations “whose success implies more
fundamental change” (p. 306). She goes on to compare these approaches of abortion-rights
activists in the United States and Germany and emphasizes the influence of societal context on
success of abortion discourse. That is, the individualism of American societal values creates a
more successful context for the “pro-choice” argument of women’s right to privacy, whereas the
collectivism of German society better receives the argument of social protection of individual
rights (Feree, 2003).
Moreover, some of the strategies of the “pro-choice” side intended to help facilitate
access to abortion ended up having an opposite effect. For example, “pro-choice” activists
originally created freestanding abortion clinics to give women a separate and gender-congruent
facility (Creinin, 2000; Jones & Kooistra, 2011). In theory, these clinics should have had the
impact for the “pro-choice” side that CPCs have had for the “pro-life” side. However, separating
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abortion facilities into freestanding clinics has hurt the reproductive rights cause by
marginalizing those who obtain and provide services (Norris et al., 2011). Additionally, there has
been criticism from within the “pro-choice” movement about its framing and approach, namely
that “choice” excludes those that do not have free control over their reproductive options (e.g.,
poor women, women of color; di Mauro & Joffe, 2007; Smith, 2005). For example, women of
color, working class women, and lesbian women indicated a lack of identification with the
message of the “pro-choice” movement because the impact of homophobia, racism, and classism
is often left out of the conversation (e.g., research, statistics, and activism) regarding obstacles to
women’s reproductive health care (Price, 2011). These within-group criticisms create a divided
front and leave room for “pro-life” activists to criticize the “pro-choice” side as well
(Vanderford, 1989). However, those on the “pro-choice” side have expressed optimism for
younger generations of Americans’ heightened “social justice mindedness” in the hope that a
“pro-choice” position will become so commonplace, those on the “pro-life” side will have to
defend their outdated view (Rovner, 2016).
Conceptualization of the “pro-life”/“pro-choice” rhetoric. The dichotomy of abortion
framing has resulted in two polarized sides that hinge on whose protection should take
precedence in a pregnancy: “pro-life” individuals believe that protection of the fetus/child should
take precedence whereas “pro-choice” individuals believe that protection of a woman’s bodily
autonomy should be prioritized. Some say the polarization between to the two sides will never
result in compromise, whereas others point to their similarities of conceptualization of their
attitudes (Smith, 2005; Vanderford, 1989).
Similarities in conceptualization. In Vanderford’s (1989) examination of large, organized
“pro-life” and “pro-choice” groups in Minnesota (i.e., Minnesota Concerned Citizens for Life
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and Abortion Rights Council of Minnesota), she found that both sides conceptualized the other
as simultaneously “powerful and vulnerable” (p. 175). That is, they surmised that the other side
was the minority in their beliefs but had un-checked power from powerful resources (i.e., “prochoice” elites in media, government, and businesses and “pro-life” elites in the church).
Moreover, both sides used the same four strategies to vilify the other: 1) they articulated the
other as a specific adversarial force, which clarifies the target, 2) they cast the other in an
exclusively negative light, 3) they attributed “diabolical motives” to the other, and consequently,
4) they magnified the other’s power (Vanderford, 1989).
Another conceptual similarity in the “pro-life”/“pro-choice” rhetoric is that both sides
cite marginalization of women of color, poor women, and women with disabilities perpetuated
by the opposing side (Smith, 2005; Vanderford, 1989). For instance, the “pro-life” side argues
that “pro-choice” individuals (especially White, liberals) are paternalistic in their views, see poor
Black women as lacking the intelligence or morals to be chaste, and therefore, encourage
abortion as a form of population control for people of color (Smith, 2005; Vanderford, 1989).
Further, critics argue that the “pro-choice” side’s emphasis on “free choice” and “reproductive
rights” obscures the fact that not all women have the same ability to make reproductive decisions
(Smith, 2005). For example, some women who seek abortions are more stigmatized than others
because of internal biases (Norris et al., 2011) such as women who test positive for fetal
abnormalities might experience relief from stigma because of the social norm that children with
certain disabilities will have “worthless” lives and can be acceptably aborted (Smith, 2005).
In contrast, the “pro-choice” side argues that the “pro-life” stance restricts abortion
access, which disproportionately affects low-income women of color and perpetuates a cycle of
poverty and systems of inequality (Vanderford, 1989). Smith (2005) postulates that supporting
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the criminalization of abortion would perpetuate white supremacy and capitalism via the prison
system. That is, if Roe is overturned, as the “pro-life” side favors, women who have abortions
will be prosecuted and be incarcerated. This criminalization will heavily impact poor women of
color because 1) the prison system disproportionately incarcerates people of color and 2)
proportionately, women of color have the most abortions. In fact, there has been a growing
movement that focuses on women of color organizing for reproductive justice, as they are
disproportionately affected by the outcomes of this debate (Ross, Gutierrez, Gerber, & Siliman,
2016). Smith (2005) contends that women of color activists should develop alternate paradigms
to replace the “pro-life”/“pro-choice” rhetoric and address these systems of oppression.
Differences in conceptualization. Both sides see abortion as a socially and morally
important issue to be legislated (“either by restrictive or protective measures,” Vanderford, 1989,
p. 166). However, both sides may have different foundations for defining and conceptualizing
morality and therefore, may never see eye-to-eye (Haidt & Graham, 2007). Haidt and Graham’s
(2007) Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) describes five foundations of morality (i.e., 1)
harm/care, 2) fairness/reciprocity, 3) ingroup/loyalty, 4) authority/respect, and 5) purity/sanctity)
and posits that different groups of people value these foundations to varying degrees, potentially
resulting in disjunctive views on social issues. Their analysis of these foundations by political
ideology compares moral motivation of liberals and conservatives; they conclude that the first
two foundations (i.e., harm/care, fairness/reciprocity), which make up the tenants of autonomy,
motivate liberals. In contrast, conservatives are motivated by all five foundations and value
autonomy to a point, but also factor in tenants of community (i.e., ingroup/loyalty,
authority/respect) and divinity (i.e., purity/sanctity).
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These differences in moral foundations can apply to the “pro-life”/“pro-choice” rhetoric
as well. There has not been specific research to examine these polarized sides on the difference
in their moral foundations. However, “pro-choice” individuals often align with a liberal school of
thought whereas “pro-life” individuals often align with conservatives (Begun et al., 2016; Hess
& Rueb, 2005; Smith, 2016; Strickler & Danigelis, 2002). Accordingly, “pro-choice” people are
motivated by (women’s) autonomy, which concern the first two foundations of morality and
“pro-life” people are motivated by all five foundations. For example, regarding foundation 1)
harm/care, “pro-choice” and “pro-life” individuals have sensitivity to cruelty and harm but, as
stated earlier, they differ on whose harm they prioritize. To “pro-choice” people, forcing a
pregnancy on a woman who does not wish to be pregnant is mentally and physically harmful
whereas “pro-life” people view abortion as cruelty to a helpless fetus. Regarding foundation 2)
fairness/reciprocity, “pro-choice” individuals, who often identify as feminists (Levit & Verchick,
2016), are people who prioritize social justice and reproductive rights. Therefore, they deeply
value the second foundation of justice and fairness for women. “Pro-life” people may value
justice as well but, as Haidt and Graham (2007) point out, “these virtues [related to fairness and
justice] can, of course, be overridden by moral concerns from the other four systems” (p. 104).
Arguably, “pro-life” individuals endorse foundations related to community and divinity with
more weight, which apply to the next three foundations. Regarding these last three foundations
3) ingroup/loyalty, 4) authority/respect, and 5) purity/sanctity, similar to Haidt and colleagues’
(2009) MFT application of conservatives’ moral aversion to homosexuals, “pro-life” people have
a moral aversion to women who seek abortions. They are more likely to see women who seek
abortions as violating the norms and roles of traditional femininity (e.g., ingroup femininity as
purity dictated by the church and the three components of womanhood: sex for procreation,
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aspiration for motherhood, and nurturing of vulnerable persons; Kumar et al., 2009). These
violations may override a “pro-life” person’s valuing of autonomy (i.e., the first two
foundations).
Knowledge of abortion. Beliefs and knowledge about what abortion entails (and how
that affects their conceptualization of the fetus) affects part of these cognitive attitudes toward
the fetus. As education level links to attitudes (e.g., Kelly & Gauchat, 2016; Smith & Son, 2013;
Wang, 2004), some studies have specifically examined knowledge of abortion and/or abortion
laws in relation to view or behaviors, although few studies have examined a general U.S.
population. Of the few studies that examine knowledge of abortion and laws with general
populations in the U.S. (Bessett et al., 2015; Kavanaugh, Bessett, & Littman, 2013; Lara et al.,
2015), all revealed that knowledge of abortion (e.g., safety, legality, prevalence) among their
samples was low and called for interventions to increase such knowledge.
Moreover, these American studies found evidence of misinformation among participants,
including beliefs that abortion is illegal, causes negative health consequences, and confusing the
abortion pill and emergency contraception (Bessett et al., 2015; Hickey, 2009; Kavanaugh et al.,
2013; Stone & Waszak, 1992). These misconceptions could certainly influence the cognitive side
of abortion attitudes. Additionally, scholars have investigated participant characteristics that
predict abortion knowledge. Studies indicate that greater knowledge of abortion is predicted by
abortion experience (either those who knew someone who had an abortion or those who had had
an abortion themselves; Bessett et al., 2015; Lara et al., 2015), more liberal attitudes toward
abortion (Bessett et al., 2015; Kavanaugh et al., 2013), less conservative political ideology
(Bessett et al., 2015), and higher knowledge of non-abortion sexual health topics (e.g.,
contraceptives, pregnancy, birth; Kavanaugh et al., 2013). To that end, it is not surprising that
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general abortion knowledge is low considering that basic level of sexual health knowledge is low
among adults in the U.S. (Frost et al., 2012; Kavanaugh et al., 2013; Volck et al., 2013). As level
of sexual health knowledge is often related to states’ sex education policies, Bessett and
colleagues (2015) examined whether knowledge of sexual health and abortion was predicted by
where participants lived (e.g., red state, blue state). However, they found that it was not a
significant predictor, indicating that lack of abortion knowledge is not necessarily linked to
living in a conservative or liberal state.
In addition to lack of knowledge affecting how attitudes are developed, it can also affect
seeking abortion services; many women experience delays in abortion care because they didn’t
recognize the pregnancy (e.g., lack of reproductive health knowledge) or they didn’t know where
to find abortion care (either a provider in general or one with proper training; Doran &
Nancarrow, 2015; Upadhyay et al., 2014). The combination of abortion identity (i.e. cognitive
framing), moral foundation, and lack of knowledge can create cognitive dissonance and take an
emotional toll on women who seek abortions (e.g., the affect-based side of abortion attitudes).
3. Attitudes toward Abortion
When examining demographic correlates and identification with these cognitive frames,
as one incorporates more social identities (e.g., gender, education level), people do not fall as
neatly into one side. Thus, asserting that people can only be “pro-choice” or “pro-life” may
oversimplify attitudes. Although equal percentages of the U.S. population report identifying as
“pro-life” and “pro-choice” (46% and 49% respectively; Gallup, 2017), research indicates that
the public is deeply ambivalent (e.g., simultaneously think abortion is murder and a personal
choice) and can identify with both or neither of the “pro-life” and “pro-choice” aspects (Bowman
& Sims, 2017). In fact, scholars posit that attitudes are multifaceted and discuss an affective
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component in addition to a cognitive component (e.g., Breckler, 1984; Breckler & Wiggins,
1989; Ryffel & Wirth, 2016). Affect-based attitudes include emotions and feelings whereas
cognition-based attitudes include beliefs and judgments (Ryffel & Wirth, 2016). Generally,
attitudes are based in one component or the other (Ryffel & Wirth, 2016) but attitudes toward
abortion are unique in that they include both components. In fact, simplifying a person’s attitude
toward abortion based on their identification with a cognitive frame (e.g., “pro-life,” “prochoice”) would ignore the affective/emotional side of people’s abortion attitudes, or the conflict
between the “head and the heart” (Kimport et al., 2012; Ryffel & Wirth, 2016). Balancing those
components leads to ambivalence and the more influential component often depends on the
circumstance.
For example, a cognition-based attitude about abortion may relate to one’s belief about
whether the fetus is a person. If an individual does not believe that the fetus is a person, then
different circumstances of pregnancy (e.g., poverty, health) may be irrelevant because their
cognitive belief will take precedence and will result in support for a woman’s right to choose her
pregnancy outcome. In contrast, if an individual believes that the fetus is a person, the
circumstances of pregnancy may be irrelevant because their cognitive belief will result in
opposition to abortion. However, there are circumstances that may be highly emotional and may
create caveats to these cognitive beliefs. Circumstances such as rape or if the woman’s life is at
stake generally elicit high support for abortion in the general population (Mikoajczak &
Bilewicz, 2015; Smith & Son, 2013) and, therefore, could override cognitive belief about the
fetus. Rape and life endangerment elicit both an affective (e.g., emotions for the woman’s safety)
and cognitive response (e.g., believing that, to a degree, she was not responsible for her
pregnancy or had no choice but to abort). On the other hand, there are circumstances in which
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public support is low, such as second- and third- trimester abortions and “elective” reasons (e.g.,
circumstances not conceptualized as “traumatic”; Cook, Jelen, & Wilcox, 1992; Jones & Weitz,
2009). These circumstances could override cognitive beliefs about the fetus as well. For
example, “pro-choice” individuals often have reservations about abortion support after a certain
gestational age (Ludlow, 2008).
Indeed, people have always conceptualized “good” abortions (e.g., women who have a
“good” reason for abortion; rape, fetal malformation, first time abortion) and “bad” abortions
(e.g., women who have a “bad” reason for abortion; selfish women, later gestational age; Norris
et al., 2011). These reasons are based on cognitive beliefs (or misbeliefs about fetal development
at a certain point) but elicit very emotional responses in some people. Kumar and colleagues
(2009) indicate that “suitability for motherhood and acceptability of pregnancy termination is
determined by a host of individual characteristics including socio-economic status, occupation,
race or ethnicity and age” (p. 628) and Osborne and Davies (2012) denote that supporting these
“good” abortions but not “bad” abortions is based on internalized sexism. In fact, even women
who have had abortions will distinguish themselves from other abortion patients as having a
“good” reason compared to others (Cockrill & Weitz, 2010). The truth is that abortions that stem
from “good” reasons are rare; 1% of abortions in the U.S. are from rape or incest, less than 1%
are from fetal anomalies, and less than 20% of patients are under the age of 19 (Ludlow, 2008).
More often, abortion is because of financial reasons, or lack of readiness, which may not fall
under perception of “good” reasoning (Ludlow, 2008).
Affect-based attitudes toward abortion. In addition to how certain pregnancy
circumstances make an individual feel, the affective side of abortion attitudes (e.g., emotions and
feelings) addresses how individuals conceptualize “good” and “bad” abortions based on their
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feelings toward women who seek abortions (e.g., effect of stigma). Additionally, it addresses the
perception of the emotional toll abortion and abortion restrictions may or may not take on
women.
Feelings towards individuals involved with abortion. A well-studied component of the
affect-based side of abortion attitudes involves how people view individuals involved with
abortion, specifically regarding stigma. In order to stigmatize a group, others must identify (e.g.,
label/distinguish) that group’s differences (separating “us” from “them”), link those differences
to perception of negative characteristics, and then members of the group with those perceived
characteristics experiences a loss of status or discrimination (Goffman, 1963; Kumar et al., 2009;
Link & Phelan, 2001). Therefore, stigma can result in negative mental health outcomes such as
depression, anxiety, or feelings of isolation (Kumar et al., 2009; Macdonald, 2003) and can
perpetuate secrecy and shame. These feelings can lead to delays in seeking an abortion,
underreporting of abortions, reduction of the number of physicians who opt into training, and
increase of unsafe abortions (Kumar et al., 2009; Norris et al., 2011).
Norris and colleagues (2011) point out that abortion stigma is slightly different from
other stigmas because it is “concealable” (p. S50). A safe and complete abortion allows for some
invisibility because there are no obvious lasting outcomes, which permits women to keep it to
themselves (Kumar et al., 2009). Although abortion stigma is concealable to some end, its effects
are wide reaching and can apply to many people, whether primary or secondary to the
experience. Norris and colleagues (2011) lay out categories of abortion stigma as it affects three
populations: individuals who work in abortion provision, women who have abortions, and
supporters of women who have abortions.
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Individuals who work in abortion provision. Providers and individuals who work in
abortion provision experience affiliate stigma, some that is less concealable because it is external
(Lipp, 2011; Norris et al., 2011). This external stigma is perpetuated by anti-abortion activists’
use of picketing, intimidation, harassment, threats, and acts of violence (e.g., clinic bombings,
arson) in attempts to decrease the number of providers (Medoff, 2015). In fact, 84% of clinics
have reported at least one instance of harassment, 53% have reported incessant picketing, and
3% have reported bomb threats (Guttmacher Institute, 2017a). Many studies show that those who
work in abortion provision worry about the effect of this external stigma on their safety and
consequently, it has affected the number of health professionals that are willing to work in
abortion provision (Doran & Nancarrow; 2015; Medoff, 2015; Norris et al., 2011). Additionally,
for those that work in abortion care, there are internal stigmas among providers, depending on
what kind of abortion they are willing to provide (Norris et al., 2011).
A study by Lipp (2011) that examined nurses’ and midwives’ perceptions of coping with
stigma within the context of abortion care, found an importance in providing the impression of
normality and discretion within their facility so as to keep from spreading this external stigma to
women. Norris and colleagues (2011) point out that even supportive environments, such as
abortion clinics, may unintentionally perpetuate these stigmas to women because they are
stigmatized environments. Women may feel less comfortable to ask about procedures (e.g., what
to expect) and may internalize these stigmas so deeply that they feel even those who work in
abortion care are judging them. Kimport, Weitz, and Freedman (2016) discuss how patients may
perceive varying support from their physicians based on their own performance of the right
normative reactions to their decision (e.g., embracing responsibility, displaying vulnerability).
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Physicians experience an unconscious conceptualization of the “legitimacy” of abortions, which
can affect the care they provide (Kimport et al., 2016).
Women who have abortions. Women who have abortions face unique stigma. Lipp (2011)
parses the sources of a woman’s stigma into two parts: stigma she feels about herself (guilt,
shame) and internalization of societal prejudice. In an attempt to avoid societal prejudice, some
women become stigmatizers of other abortion patients to distance themselves from women who
have abortions for “bad” reasons (Norris et al., 2011). In fact, Ellison (2003) argues that
stigmatizing women who have abortions and keeping them silent is a form of “structural
violence” (p. 323) and therefore perpetuates the idea that there are “good” and “worthy” women
(e.g., married women who become pregnant and have babies) and socially deviant women (e.g.,
those who are not married, those who end their pregnancies). Likewise, Kumar and colleagues
(2009) posit that women who get abortions are marked “as inferior” (p. 628) by violating the
three ideals of womanhood/femininity: women must have sex only for procreation, women must
aspire to become mothers, and women must act on their instinct to nurture the vulnerable.
Two-thirds of women report anticipating they would feel stigma if others knew that they
had an abortion (Norris et al., 2011), therefore they go to great lengths to conceal their abortions,
such as paying out of pocket instead of reporting it to their insurance (Jones, Finer, & Singh,
2010) or self-sourcing abortion-inducing drugs (Grossman et al., 2010). When women conceal
their experiences, they must cope without a support system; despite the fact that support systems
alleviate the effects of abortion stigma so keeping it from others often does more harm than good
(Bradshaw & Slade, 2003; Kumar et al., 2009; Norris et al., 2011).
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Supporters of women who have abortions. As many women conceal their abortions from
their support systems, the stigma felt by partners, friends, and family is understudied (Norris et
al., 2011). However, Norris and colleagues (2011) posit these parties may also feel affiliate
stigma --male partners of women who have abortions feel many of the same emotions that
women feel (e.g., guilt, anxiety, ambivalence). There has been some research exploring the effect
of partner pressure to have or not have an abortion and social abandonment on women’s reported
abortion experiences (Kimport et al., 2011). However, literature on why partners left often
focuses on feelings about parenting or finances instead of stigma they felt about being associated
with abortion (Kimport et al., 2011). Additionally, Norris and colleagues (2011) speak about the
effect stigma has on abortion scholars and activists when attempting to secure funding—they
often face difficulty or rejection because of negative associations with abortion and the
perception of people who study/support it.
Mechanisms of stigma. Experience of social deviation applies to all three groups; Kumar
and colleagues (2009) discuss behaviors/language at every level of an ecological model that
perpetuate these stigmas and keep providers, support systems, and women scared and silent.
Ecological models are composed of several concentric circles that represent factors/determinants
of an issue. The outermost circle includes societal mechanisms that frame discourse, cultural
norms, and mass media. At this level, Kumar et al. (2009) discuss the global language of
pregnancy termination (e.g., lost, dropped), conflation of fetus and baby, and terms for abortion
providers (e.g., abortionists, murderers). The next circle consists of governmental/structural
factors such as policies and laws (e.g., global “gag” rules) that perpetuate the deviancy of
abortion. Third, the organizational/institutional circle includes the separation of abortion care
from other medical procedures, lack of systemic training in medical schools, and problems with
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insurance coverage. The second to last circle includes community factors which comprise the
loss of community networks for women who have abortions and being labeled negatively (e.g.,
as promiscuous or worse). Finally, the innermost circle includes individual factors of shame,
guilt, feeling selfish or immoral, and the struggle to make sense of an abortion (because of norms
of femininity).
Affect-based outcomes after an abortion. Research indicates that women who have had
an abortion are at no higher risk of negative mental health outcomes (e.g., anxiety, depression)
than levels endemic to the general population; they even report an increase in psychological
well-being (e.g., quality of life, life satisfaction, self-esteem) after an abortion (Biggs, Upadhyay,
McCulloch, & Foster, 2016; Bradshaw & Slade, 2003; Crandell, 2012; Westhoff, Picardo, &
Morrow, 2003). Despite evidence from myriad studies that abortion does not routinely cause
negative mental health outcomes, anti-abortion activists assert the opposite in their discourse visà-vis Post Abortion Syndrome (PAS); this phenomenon alleges women who have had abortions
suffer negative mental health outcomes such as depression, loss of self-esteem, and thoughts of
suicide (Haugeberg, 2017). While, the majority of women report neutral or positive post-abortion
experiences, there are women who report feeling distress about their decision. Qualitative
research with a small sample of women who experienced regret or distress indicated several
social factors contributed to these negative feelings; these factors included feeling a lack of
decisional autonomy (e.g., influenced or pressured by another person to get the abortion), a lack
of social support, and loss of relationships (Kimport, 2012; Kimport, Foster, & Weitz, 2011).
These women’s narratives align with previous research that indicates perceived abortion stigma
or low social support strongly predicts pre-abortion feelings of depression, anxiety and stress
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symptoms (Rocca et al., 2015; Steinberg et al., 2016). However, these accounts are rare and
contradict much of the literature on pre- and post- abortion mental health outcomes.
Although post-abortion psychological outcomes are generally positive, the factors leading
up to making a decision (e.g., unplanned/unwanted pregnancy, partner communication, social
deviance) and gaining access to abortion are stress-inducing (Weitz et al., 2008). To examine the
extent of these factors on mental health outcomes, Steinberg and colleagues (2016) point out that
research is approached from a framework of either 1) abortion is trauma (e.g., examining
common risk factors for psychological health such as history of intimate partner violence or
mental health conditions) or 2) abortion is a stressful situation (e.g., examining how one copes,
sociocultural context, protective factors such as support system or self-esteem, perception of
stigma). There are studies that indicate if women do experience negative psychological outcomes
(e.g., anxiety, depression), levels are highest right before an abortion and then dissipate or return
to endemic levels after the abortion (Bradshaw & Slade, 2003; Rocca et al., 2015; Steinberg et
al., 2016). Anti-abortion activists have capitalized on the pre-abortion influx of complicated
feelings and stress and use it to perpetuate the looming threat of Post Abortion Syndrome (PAS)
with the intention that women will change their minds about having an abortion (Haugeberg
2017).
Some research indicating women experience post-abortion negative mental health
outcomes (and confirming the existence of PAS) has been systematically reviewed and found to
be methodologically flawed. Typical flaws include failing to incorporate a comparison or control
group, incorporating an inappropriate comparison group, or failing to control for confounding
variables (Charles, Polis, Sridhara, & Blum, 2008). Methodologically sound studies that examine
mental health and abortion often involve a comparison group; that is, they compare women who
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have had abortions to women who have carried their pregnancy to term or experienced other
pregnancy events such as miscarriage or stillbirth. In these sound studies, overwhelmingly, there
were no differences or a very slight decrease in examined psychological outcomes (e.g., anxiety,
depression, affect, distress) between the comparison groups (Bradshaw & Slade, 2003; Crandell,
2012; Posavac & Miller, 1990; Steinberg & Russo, 2008; Steinberg et al., 2016). Moreover, for
decades, literature has found that women unequivocally report being sure they made the right
decision (Rocca et al., 2015) and the most common post-abortion feeling was relief (Bradshaw &
Slade, 2003).
Post-abortion attitudes by gender. Though many studies focus on a woman’s pre- and
post- abortion feelings, some literature examines the feelings of both women and their male
partners. In these studies, feelings of distress often differ by gender. In a study examining
sources of pre-abortion anxiety in men and women, the main source for women was anticipation
of pain (these feelings dissipated after the abortion); however, for men, the main source of
anxiety was moral dilemma (Lauzon, Roger-Achim, Achim, & Boyer, 2000). Moreover, male
partners of women who have abortions tend to experience negative post-abortion feelings. Coyle
and Rue (2015) found that male partners of women who had an abortion reported feeling like a
victim or helpless in the decision; many men spoke about loss or grief for their “baby” and
looked to religion for forgiveness or healing. It is important to note that this sample was recruited
online from Crisis Pregnancy Center websites, likely resulting in a biased sample. That is, men
who were feeling distraught by their partner’s decision may have sought out opportunities to
express their negative feelings, whereas men who felt neutral or experienced feelings of eustress
may not have thought to participate in such a study.
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Affect-based outcomes after a denied abortion. Although research indicates that women
who have abortions are not at a higher risk to experience negative mental health outcomes,
women who are denied a wanted abortion are at an increased risk of depression and anxiety
(Foster et al., 2015). Women who are forced to raise children from unintended pregnancies after
being denied a sought-after abortion are more likely to be economically and educationally
disadvantaged and their children are more likely to experience negative health consequences
(Foster et al., 2018; Gipson, Koenig, & Hindin, 2008; Joyce, Kaestner, & Korenmen, 2000;
Korenman, Kaestner, & Joyce, 2002; Monea & Thomas, 2011). In contrast, women who seek
and obtain wanted abortions compared to those who seek them but are turned away/forced to
continue the pregnancy, are more likely to achieve short-term aspirational plans (e.g.,
educational, employment, change in residence; Upadhyay et al., 2015), more likely to have fulltime employment, and less likely to be on public assistance months to years after the pregnancy
(Foster et al., 2018). Upadhyay and colleagues (2014) estimate that more than 4000 women in
2008 carried unwanted pregnancies to term because they were denied a wanted abortion.
However, it is probable that number has grown in current years given the influx of state-level
abortion restrictions.
4. Legislation and Voting
These different attitudinal components toward abortion are core to legislation and voting
in response to this perception. Cognition-based attitudes about legislation involve
beliefs/knowledge of the law’s status, what it entails, and how it practically affects women who
seek abortions. The affective side of abortion legislation concerns the emotional aspect for
women who seek abortions in states with these restrictions. First, this section will describe a
brief timeline of important court cases that led to the current legislative climate for abortion.
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Next, I will describe the most common types of abortion restrictions enacted across the nation by
detailing the what it entails and in how many states, and the impact it has had on women’s access
of each restriction category. Then, I will discuss literature that explores general knowledge of
these abortion laws. Last, I will discuss practices of and attitudes toward voting on abortion.
Post-Roe abortion legislation. In the last five years, there has been a significant increase
in state-level restrictions on abortion; in 2016, 50 new restrictions were passed, resulting in 338
laws restricting abortion in 6 years (Nash et al., 2017). These restrictions were gradually made
possible by a series of court cases in the years since Roe, which weakened the trimester
parameters originally set for abortions in 1973. Only a few years later, in 1977, congress passed
the Hyde Amendment, which Boonstra (2016) refers to as the “grandfather of all abortion
restrictions” (p. 46). Essentially, this amendment banned federal funding for abortion for women,
yet it maintained funds for sterilization and birth expenses (Boonstra, 2016; Ellison, 2003). This
action resulted in making reproductive choice a privilege that could not (and still cannot) be
easily afforded by women who are low-come, have disabilities, are of Native American descent,
prison inmates, or military personnel (Boonstra, 2016; Guttmacher Institute, 2017a).
As time went on, in the late 80’s/early 90’s, two major court cases changed the nature of
abortion access in the U.S. In 1989, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services replaced Roe’s
trimester framework with a focus on viability of the fetus (i.e., interest in potential life; Levit &
Verchick, 2016); in 1992, Planned Parenthood v. Casey set a new standard that allowed for any
restriction of abortion as long as it did not place an “undue burden” (e.g., obstacle) on women
(Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey, 505 US 833, 1992). Together, court
decisions asserted that the states’ interests were in protecting fetal life and opened the door for
abortion restrictions (Halva-Neubauer & Zeigler, 2010). Although in 2016, Whole Woman’s
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Health v. Hellerstedt clarified Casey’s standards so that courts must strike down proposed
restrictions “that do not have tangible benefits” (Guttmacher Institute, 2017a), legislators have
still managed to pass restrictions at the state level in multitudes. In fact, during the 2017
legislative session, politicians introduced over 400 bills restricting access to reproductive
options, passing 57 of them (Center for Reproductive Rights, 2018).
Types of restrictions. There are several types of restrictions; Medoff (2015) describes
them as either affecting the supply-side (e.g., facilities, providers) or the demand-side (e.g.,
women who seek services) of abortion. Most restrictions aim to delay abortion so that it is either
too inconvenient, expensive, or logistically/legally impossible for women to obtain an abortion
(Bitler & Zavodny, 2001; Jones & Weitz, 2009). For example, some restrictions drag out the
time between pre-abortion counseling and abortion provision, involve parents, require expensive
testing (e.g., ultrasound), or supply misleading information to discourage women from their
decision (Bitler & Zavodny, 2001; Jones & Weitz, 2009; Vandewalker, 2012). In a national
examination of the effect of restrictions intended to delay abortion, Bitler and Zavodny (2001)
found that the number of post-12 week abortions increased. This is concerning because abortions
13 weeks and later have a higher risk of complications and death and are more expensive than
those before 12 weeks (Roberts et al., 2014).
Conversely, other restrictions actually try to make abortion impossible for women by
restricting insurance coverage or requiring burdensome changes to the physical brick and mortar
facility (Jones & Weitz, 2009). The Guttmacher Institute classifies 10 major types of abortion
restrictions that are enacted across the U.S. (Nash et al., 2017). If a state has four or more of
these restrictions, they are considered “hostile” to abortion and if they have more than six, they
are considered “extremely hostile.” In 2017, twenty-two states were considered “extremely
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hostile” and nearly all were in the Southern region (Nash et al., 2017). These ten restrictions will
be discussed as they stood in 2017; they typically restrict abortion via requiring parental
involvement, pre-abortion counseling, waiting periods, or ultrasounds, prohibiting federal
funding, inhibiting private funding, regulating medication abortion and abortion facilities, or
restricting abortions based on viability, and preparing for the overturn of Roe.
Parental involvement. These restrictions require a minor to obtain permission (i.e.,
consent) or notification from a parent before an abortion (Bitler & Zavodny, 2001; Guttmacher
Institute, 2017c). Twenty-one states require parental consent, 12 states require parental
notification, and 5 states require both (Guttmacher Institute, 2017c). Although, minors often do
involve parents in their medical decisions, Blasdell (2002) points out that if a minor decides not
to involve their parents, they probably have a good reason (e.g., threat of domestic violence,
getting kicked out).
There are instances where a minor can petition the court for a judicial bypass (i.e.,
permission to have the abortion without involving parents) but it is not an intuitive or easy
process (Bitler & Zavodny, 2001; Blasdell, 2002). Judicial bypasses are time-consuming and
minors face unique burdens with respect to time and transportation (e.g., they would have to skip
school, they may not have a car; Blasdell, 2002). Additionally, in order to be granted a judicial
bypass, the minor has to demonstrate, via a test, that she is sufficiently mature to have an
abortion. Blasdell (2002) points out that if she fails this maturity test, her punishment is denying
her an abortion and potentially saddling her with motherhood (an experience that certainly
requires maturity). Regardless, in many cases, it is impossible for minors to obtain a judicial
bypass (Blasdell, 2002). As for the affect-based side of parental involvement laws, in the end,
they either delay or prevent the majority of abortions among minors. Although, in the years
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following the implementation of these laws, the overall number of teen abortions decreased
dramatically (Blank et al., 1996), rates of abortions 13 weeks and after increased in these states,
as did rates of teens traveling to another state to obtain an abortion (Blasdell, 2002). Therefore,
these laws often result in increased financial and logistical burden on minors to obtain an
abortion while avoiding involving their parents or forced pregnancy.
Pre-abortion counseling. Thirty-five states require pre-abortion counseling and 29
require specific information be disseminated (Guttmacher Institute, 2017g). These restrictions,
sometimes referred to as “biased counseling laws” (Vandewalker, 2012), mandate that during
pre-abortion counseling, physicians must inform patients about the risks of abortion, often with
medically inaccurate or misleading information (Nash et al., 2017; Vandewalker, 2012).
Depending on the state, physicians are required to inform patients about risk associated with
abortion: infertility, psychological or emotional consequences such as PTSD or thoughts of
suicide, or possible link of breast cancer; medical and/or empirical evidence supporting these
risks is largely lacking (Vandewalker, 2012). In some states, instead of alleged side effects for
women, physicians may be required to describe the developing fetus or embryo using
characteristics that apply to development much later in the pregnancy, describe fetal pain, or
simply use biased language such as referring to the fetus as the “unborn child” (Vandewalker,
2012). Many outcomes of mandatory counseling laws are discussed in conjunction with the
impact of waiting periods (discussed next) as a means to require women to make a separate trip
for the abortion after the counseling trip (Joyce et al., 2009). Regarding the outcome of
mandating clinics to give certain information to women, some clinics are required to disseminate
this information via pamphlet or mail, which clinics report as financially burdensome (Joyce et
al., 2009). Additionally, four states require physicians to tell patients in pre-abortion counseling
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that a medication abortion can be reversed after the first dose of pills, a statement that is not
evidenced by medical research (Guttmacher Institute, 2019; National Academy of Sciences,
2018).
Waiting period. Mississippi enforced the first waiting period law after Casey in 1992,
which required women to receive (potentially biased; see above) information about abortion and
alternatives and then wait a period to “reflect” or “fully weigh their options” before the abortion
could be provided (Bitler & Zavodny, 200; Karasek, Roberts, & Weitz, 2016; Vandewalker,
2012). Twenty-seven states have waiting period requirements; most dictate a period of 24 hours
but some states require as many as 72 hours to pass between pre-abortion counseling and
abortion provision (Guttmacher Institute, 2017g; Vandewalker, 2012). As for the real-world
impact of these laws on women, when this waiting period is combined with a restriction that
requires pre-abortion counseling to be conducted in person (i.e., ban on “telemedicine” or
consultation via video conference), abortion becomes a two-visit process (Vandewalker, 2012),
which increases financial and logistical obstacles (Karasek, Roberts, & Weitz, 2016). Joyce and
Kaestner (2000) analyzed the years of data preceding and following Mississippi’s 24-hour
waiting period and found effects of a delay in abortion services. The proportion of abortions 12
weeks and before decreased whereas abortions 13-24 weeks increased by 45%. Moreover,
women who lived closest to an in-state provider compared to those who lived closest to a
provider outside of Mississippi, had an average increased gestational age by 4 days at abortion
and the number of women who traveled to an out-of-state provider (where there was no waiting
period) increased.
Ultrasound. Although an ultrasound can be used to confirm pregnancy in the exam prior
to abortion (O’Connell et al., 2008; 2009), these restrictions require a “non-medically indicated”
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ultrasound before an abortion (Nash et al., 2017) to significantly add to the costs of provision
(Guttmacher Institute, 2017h). In the 26 states that regulate the provision of ultrasound, some
require physicians to show or describe the image (and/or the developing fetus) and some must
provide the opportunity to view their image (Guttmacher Institute, 2017h; Kimport, Weitz, &
Foster, 2014). “Pro-life” activists hoped these images would inspire maternal-fetal bonding
(Kimport, Weitz, & Foster, 2014). Further, some states require the use of transvaginal ultrasound
because it provides a clearer picture of the uterine contents (Vandewalker, 2012).
As for the emotional impact of these laws, research examining women’s reported
emotions, perceptions, and experiences viewing their ultrasound before an abortion found
conflicting results; some research indicated that women found it to be a positive experience
because they were relieved that it didn’t “look like a baby” and confirmed their decision (Wiebe
& Adams, 2009). In contrast, some research found that women had mixed feelings: some were
positive, some neutral, and some negative. A study by Kimport and colleagues (2014) noted that
women who went to clinics where they were required to offer an ultrasound viewing were more
likely to report negative feelings; women may have seen the offer as a recommendation instead
of an option and felt that practitioners were imposing their beliefs onto them. Despite restrictions
that intend to use ultrasound to discourage women from having an abortion, research shows that
this tactic is generally ineffective in changing women’s minds (Wiebe & Adams, 2009) but
substantially increases financial barriers for women (Guttmacher Institute, 2017h).
Federal funding. Restriction on coverage of abortion by federal funding has been in
effect since the implementation of the Hyde Amendment in 1977. Although at a federal level,
public funding, such as Medicaid, for abortions (with the exceptions of life endangerment, rape,
or incest) is restricted, states are allowed to opt in with their own, nonfederal funds; only
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seventeen states have these opt in policies that allow for Medicaid funding for abortion (Bitler &
Zavodny, 2001; Guttmacher Institute, 2017d; Nash et al., 2017; Roberts et al., 2014). However,
research examining the practicality of these exceptions to restrictions on Medicaid coverage
(e.g., implementation of state subsidized funds, coverage in the event of rape, incest, or life
endangerment) reveal substantial barriers.
For example, Bessett and colleagues (2011) conducted interviews with women who tried
to use these state subsidized funds to cover their abortions and found that the majority of women
were not able to access the funds in a timely manner, causing delays on provision and limiting
women’s ability to obtain a medication abortion. Similarly, Dennis, Blanchard, and Cordova
(2011) found in their interviews with individuals who were eligible for the exception (e.g.,
experienced rape, incest, or life endangerment) and attempted to get their abortion covered by
Medicaid, that women had to navigate a complicated process of paperwork and filing claims.
They estimated that of the 1165 women who reported that they should have qualified, only 429
women were reimbursed. Of these women who received reimbursement, they described
employing strategies that they perceived to influence their success, such as developing
relationships with Medicaid staff and facility staff that were experienced in billing processes, and
participating in legal action to force Medicaid to pay. However, these strategies are more timeconsuming and are not an option for all low-income individuals, thereby limiting their options to
use Medicaid to cover abortions, regardless if they experienced rape, incest, or risk of life
endangerment (Dennis et al., 2011).
Dissimilar to other research examining effects of abortion restrictions, there are fewer
recent research studies that clearly examine pregnancy outcomes as a result of Medicaid
coverage restrictions. Some research shows that these restrictions delay abortions or decrease
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abortions among teenagers, but long term effects are difficult to elucidate (Henshaw, Joyce,
Dennis, Finer & Blanchard, 2009). Older data suggests an estimated 20-25% of abortions will
simply not take place among women who receive public assistance who cannot afford provision
and its associated costs (Blank et al., 1996). Instead, woman will be forced into carrying the
pregnancy to term; this is more likely to be the case among young, low-income, women of color
(Blank et al., 1996; Cook et al., 1999). However, as Henshaw and colleagues (2009) point out in
a literature review of studies addressing outcomes of Medicaid restrictions, many studies on this
subject were conducted 30-40 years ago and had weak methodology because there are myriad
confounding variables.
Private funding. In addition to restrictions on federal funding, 25 states prohibit private
insurance from covering abortion or require companies to charge for an extra plan or higher
premium to cover abortion (Guttmacher Institute, 2017d; Nash et al., 2017; Roberts et al., 2014).
In 2010, under the Affordable Care Act, the Obama administration designated state-level
assistance for individuals and small businesses to buy private health insurance for themselves
and their employees (which covered an array of medical procedures that theoretically included
abortion). However, some states responded to this action by passing laws that restricted private
insurance coverage to make sure no federal funds went to abortion. In states with these
restrictions, private insurance is either not allowed to cover abortion at all (some states exclude
the exception of rape, incest, life endangerment), or members must pay a separate premium,
referred to by some anti-choice legislators as an “abortion surcharge” (Guttmacher Institute,
2017d; Hasstedt, 2015).
Medication abortion. Some restrictions impose medically inappropriate regulations on
medication abortion protocols in attempts to make them inconvenient or less accessible for
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women, especially those who live in rural areas (Nash et al., 2017; Guttmacher Institute, 2017b).
Thirty-four states require a licensed physician (i.e., not an advanced practice clinician such as a
nurse practitioner) to prescribe abortifacient medication (e.g., mifepristone and misoprostol) and
19 states require the pre-abortion counseling be conducted in person (Guttmacher Institute,
2017b). That is, some states prohibit the use of “telemedicine” with medication abortion, which
requires women who do not live close to a facility (women in 87-90% of U.S. counties;
Guttmacher Institute, 2017a; Jones & Kooistra, 2011) to make two trips to the clinic or stay extra
days in the clinic’s vicinity (Guttmacher Institute, 2017b; Vandewalker, 2012). Grossman and
colleagues (2011) investigated success of medication abortions comparing those who met with
their doctor via telemedicine versus face-to-face and found no differences in efficacy.
Additionally, during pre-abortion counseling, four states require physicians to tell patients
inaccurate information about the medication abortion (i.e., that it can be reversed after the first
dose of pills; Guttmacher Institute, 2017g). Claims of reversal using a progesterone treatment
were initially based on results from a small number of patients (n = 7) that received varied sizes
of doses; research investigating the efficacy of these claims found a lack of consistency in these
treatments (Grossman et al., 2015; National Academy of Sciences, 2018). Most recently,
Delgado et al. (2018) published a larger study claiming successful reversal of the effects of
mifepristone. Grossman and White (2018) rebutted this article maintaining that this treatment is
inconsistent and laws promoting it “essentially encourage women to participate in an
unmonitored research experiment” (p. 1491).
Abortion facilities. In an effort to diminish the “supply-side” of abortion (Medoff, 2015)
and drive out abortion providers (Medoff & Dennis, 2011), some states have enacted very
specific and medically unnecessary regulations for abortion facilities; these are often referred to
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as TRAP laws (Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers; Guttmacher Institute, 2017i; Nash et
al., 2017). For example, some states require providers to have admitting privileges or be within a
certain distance to a hospital. These procedures seem to exist only to create barriers because less
than 0.03% of patients experience major complications that would require a hospital
(Guttmacher Institute, 2017i). In order to have admitting privileges, many hospitals require
clinics to admit a certain number of patients per year. This minimum is difficult to impossible for
clinics to reach because of the low risk of abortion provision (Gold & Nash, 2013).
In addition to admitting privileges, many TRAP laws require facilities to adhere to
Ambulatory Surgical Center (ASC) standards (Jones & Weitz, 2009). An ASC is appropriate for
“sophisticated” surgical procedures and overnight hospital stays--neither of which often apply to
common abortion provision (especially medication abortions, the majority of which occur at
home, yet ASC standards apply to facilities that offer this option in 17 states; National Academy
of Sciences, 2018). These standards include specific augmentation of: hallway and doorway
width, rate of airflow, number of parking spaces, staffing (e.g., there must be 1 registered nurse
(RN) to oversee all nursing staff and another RN for every 6 patients in the facility), and other
costly regulations such as specific outdoor landscaping (di Mauro & Joffe, 2007; Jones & Weitz,
2009). Regarding the impact of these laws on abortion practices, there have been no differences
in abortion outcomes (e.g., safety, efficacy) between facilities that are up to ACS standards
compared to those that are not. Instead, in order to adhere to the new requirements, services at
ASC clinics are more expensive (Jones & Weitz, 2009). Additionally, TRAP laws caused many
clinics to close because they could not keep providers on staff with hospital admitting privileges
or find locations within the required vicinities (Guttmacher Institute, 2017i). However, when
Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstadt was passed in 2016, laws such as these that caused clinics
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to close were ruled unconstitutional and therefore courts were able to temporarily block them
from being enacted (Center for Reproductive Rights, 2018). Though this was a monumental step
in retaining reproductive options for women across the country, it remains to be seen what the
long-term impact will be.
Viability. Many states have passed an unconstitutional ban on abortion before viability
(i.e., “the point at which a fetus can survive outside the uterus”; Guttmacher Institute, 2017a) or
limit abortion after viability (Nash et al., 2017). Many of these restrictions apply to late-abortions
but several states are currently trying to ban the dilation and evacuation procedure in its entirety;
four states have passed a ban on D&E procures (Nash et al., 2017). Forty-three states have
imposed prohibitions after a certain point in pregnancy (e.g., fetal viability, third trimester) and
22 states require the involvement of a second physician (i.e., attendance or certification of
medical necessity) during a late-abortion (Guttmacher Institute, 2017j).
Preoccupation with late-abortions gained attention with the use of “partial birth”
discourse when describing these abortions in the 2000’s (di Mauro & Joffe, 2007). In 2000, the
court case Sternberg v. Carhart attempted to ban the “intact” dilation and evacuation/dilation and
extraction (D&X) procedure but the Supreme Court ruled the ban as unconstitutional and,
therefore, the procedures remained legal (Stenberg v. Carhart 530 U.S. 914, 2000). However, the
appointed judges of George W. Bush reheard the case in 2007 as Gonzales v. Carhart and ruled
that it was not unconstitutional, resulting in a ban on “intact” procedures with the exception of
life/health endangerment, rape, or incest depending on the state (di Mauro & Joffe, 2007;
Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S.Ct. 1610, 2007; Guttmacher Institute, 2017j). These exceptions to the
ban, such as the health exception, are often rare occurrences, meaning that most women will not
be able to obtain a late-abortion (Ludlow, 2008). However, scholars in countries where abortion
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is banned altogether (with exceptions such as health and life of mother), have discussed the
health exception as a gateway to more liberal interpretation. That is, having this loophole could
improve access if physicians were to apply the exception to any physical, mental, or social “risk”
to women’s health instead of waiting until harm has occurred (Gonzalez & Velez, 2012).
Regardless, some “pro-choice” activists argue that limiting abortion to “emergencies,” such as
victims of rape or violence, re-victimizes those women (Ludlow, 2008).
Overturn of Roe v. Wade. With the current presidential administration’s ideology on
abortion, some states have enacted restrictions of abortion in preparation for an event in which
Roe v. Wade could get overturned (Nash et al., 2017). Eighteen states have declared their intent
to ban abortion in virtually all circumstances or retain bans that were in place before Roe,
whereas eight states assert that if Roe falls, they would operate under the same parameters they
are operating under now such as the trimester framework dictated by their state (Guttmacher
Institute, 2017e). That is, some states have passed these laws to protect women from interference
with their reproductive decisions at the state level, regardless of the status of the federal
precedent (Center for Reproductive Rights, 2018).
States that have passed policies that would protect the right to abortion in the absence of
Roe include states on the west and east coasts (i.e., California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii,
Maine, Maryland, Nevada, and Washington; Guttmacher Institute, 2017e). Those who support
overturning Roe may rationalize their stance by telling women who seek abortions to go to states
where it is legal. However, these laws would increase travel and costs for women who live in
states in the middle of the country that would prohibit abortion in a post-Roe world. Not
coincidentally, these states that would ban abortion if Roe fell, coincide with states that have
conservative laws on sexual education and lack of access to contraceptives (Fey, 2018), which
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would mean women would not have an accessible way to keep from getting pregnant or to
terminate a pregnancy.
Currently, the dangers of overturning Roe v. Wade or imposing numerous restrictions
such that abortion is not practically accessible can be observed in countries where abortion is still
not legal. Women will continue to seek abortions despite status of legality as demonstrated in
other countries; almost 20 million women a year undergo unsafe abortions worldwide, the
majority of which live in the developing world (Sedgh, Henshaw, Singh, Ahman, & Shah, 2007;
World Health Organization, 2007). Untrained providers provide illegal abortions in unclean
conditions and many women must go to a hospital afterwards to complete the abortion or treat
heavy bleeding, sepsis, or intra-abdominal injury (Kitulwatte & Edirisinge, 2015).
Even now in the U.S., reports of women self-sourcing abortion have increased, especially
in places where abortion is heavily restricted (e.g., ban on telemedicine) or stigma/harassment is
rampant (Grossman et al., 2010). Almost 10 years ago, Grossman and colleagues (2010)
conducted a qualitative examination of women who reported a self-induction attempt which
indicated that they did so by taking medications or substances (oral contraception, injections,
laxatives, beverages, plants), inserting objects into or using force to damage the uterus, and
increasingly, using non-prescribed misoprostol to induce uterine contractions. Of the 30 women
interviewed in the study, only 3 were successful in their attempt (all successful completions used
misoprostol) and the rest experienced a range of bleeding, and injury, resulting in hospital
admittance (Grossman et al., 2010). Experimenting with different substances (e.g., laxatives) and
inserting objects into the uterus to induce abortion are dangerous strategies and can result in
negative health outcomes; these cases will only increase if the U.S. Supreme Court rules to
overturn Roe.
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However, there has been an increase in research to examine self-sourcing or selfmanaging of medication abortions (i.e., women purchasing misoprostol or misoprostol in
combination with mifepristone online to terminate their pregnancies). Recent research analyzed
the efficacy of many websites that offer abortion pills (i.e., by buying said pills, examining
intactness of packaging, and sending them to a lab to test for chemical makeup) and determined
that the majority of the websites and pills were legitimate (Murtagh, Wells, Raymond, Coeytaux,
& Winikoff, 2018). Murtagh and colleagues (2018) concluded that self-sourcing was a viable
option and could result in successful abortions (as many women do not need an ultrasound or
clinician to take the pills and many do so at home anyway; Jelinska & Yanow, 2018). While,
Aiken (2018) expresses wariness that some of these websites may not have adequate information
to understand risks or recognize complications and do not offer sources of support, advocates
and researchers realize that this could be a new realistic frontier for access, especially in a postRoe world (Aiken, 2018; Jelinska & Yanow, 2018; Murtagh et al., 2018).
Restrictions for physicians. Abortion restrictions that target physicians who provide
abortions are not technically on the Guttmacher Institute’s list of 10, however, these laws in
conjunction with the aforementioned restriction categories affect the provision of abortion in
many states. Legislation regulates how, when, and where abortions may be provided.
Additionally, there are “physician-only” laws that limit who can administer services. Several
states prohibit both procedural and medication abortions from provision by advanced practice
clinicians (i.e., certified nurse-midwives, nurse practitioners (NP), and physician assistants
(PA)). There is limited to no medical basis for these restrictions given that these providers have
the necessary and relevant skills to administer these procedures with the same risk of
complications compared to physicians (Taylor et al., 2009; Weitz et al., 2013). Allowing these
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health professionals to provide abortions would improve access, especially for low-income and
women of color, as they are more likely to be cared for by NPs and PAs in public health
departments or community health centers (Grumbach, Hart, Mertz, Coffman, & Palazzo, 2003;
Schacht, 2008; Taylor et al., 2009; Weitz et al., 2013). Further, many states have given
physicians an out with “conscientious objection” laws, which dictate that physicians can refuse
to administer medical processes (e.g., filling prescriptions for birth control, abortions) if they cite
“a moral, ethical, or religious objection” (Meyers & Woods, 1996, p. 115), decreasing the pool
of willing providers. Forty-five states have these laws that allow health care providers to refuse
to provide abortion services (Guttmacher Institute, 2018a) There has been much debate regarding
these laws and Savulescu (2006) argues that physicians who cite these objections must ethically
ensure that there are sufficient doctors willing to provide the service they are refusing. Given the
scarcity of abortion providers, there is little room for objecting physicians.
According to Vandewalker (2012), moral opposition is at the heart of all abortion
restrictions. He argues that abortion patients face infinitely more regulations that patients who
undergo other procedures with similar “risk profiles” (p. 7) and these restrictions are a form of
gender discrimination in that they only apply to women. Moreover, Vandewalker (2012) argues
that restrictions which require or encourage physicians to be paternalistic and impose their own
morality onto a woman’s decision (e.g., biased counseling laws, conscientious objection) violates
the tenets of informed consent (a patient should have access to all of the correct information prior
to deciding a procedure) and the three principles of health care: respect for autonomy,
beneficence, and justice.
Knowledge of abortion laws. In addition to low knowledge of abortion, many studies
have found low awareness of U.S. abortion laws (Cockrill & Weitz, 2010; Gondor et al., 1996;
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Lara et al., 2015; Stone & Waszak, 1992; White et al., 2016). A qualitative study about women’s
knowledge of state abortion laws revealed that even those who had had an abortion in that state,
did not have an increased awareness of the laws (Cockrill & Weitz, 2010). Lara and colleagues
(2015) explored low-income immigrant women of color’s knowledge of abortion laws and found
significant effects on correct knowledge by their recruitment city (i.e., New York, Boston, San
Francisco), higher education level, generational status (i.e., second or third generation), and the
language spoken at home (i.e., English). Another study examined Texas women’s awareness of
Texas abortion laws and found that the majority of women (75%) were not aware of the laws; of
the women who were aware, only 19% supported them and 46% were not sure how they felt
(White et al., 2016). A large public opinion poll by PerryUndem and Vox Media asked 1,060
registered voters across the country about various aspects of abortion and found that the majority
(60% and over) were not sure if the listed abortion legislations applied to the U.S. (insurance
coverage, who could provide them, clinic standards, ultrasound). Further, almost half of the
sample (46%) reported they did not think there was a law that would make doctors give
medically inaccurate information, demonstrating that awareness of laws is low and knowledge is
inaccurate.
Knowledge of abortion and laws is low, yet, the majority of Americans (59%) also think
abortion laws should be made much more or somewhat more strict (Bowman & Sims, 2017).
Large national polls (e.g., Gallup) show that the majority of people (70% and higher) favor 24hour waiting periods, parental consent for minors, and doctors informing patients of alternatives
or “possible risks.” However, regarding the latter, it is possible that when answering these
questions, they assume that physicians would only inform them of “possible risks” grounded in
medical evidence. Given the low level of abortion and legislation knowledge, people likely do
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not know that these “risks” (e.g., breast cancer, negative psychological health outcomes) are not
supported with medical evidence. To that end, polls that ask about support for “partial birth”
abortions should be subject to the same critique as they are potentially capturing attitudes based
on inaccurate information. In large national polls, 60-70% of the samples reported they thought
“partial birth” abortions should be banned, but only 45-50% reported support for “bans at 20
weeks” (Bowman & Sims, 2017). While these percentages are still high, it remains to be seen
whether or not the general population are aware of what fetal development looks like around 20
weeks and if their attitudes would stay the same if they did.
Weitz and colleagues (2008) comment that some people report being in favor of certain
laws (e.g., mandatory counseling laws) because they believe they benefit women’s health (e.g.,
lessens the harm of abortion on women’s mental health outcomes). Weitz et al. (2008) give the
example of mandatory waiting periods and how someone people may think it gives women time
to make an informed decision when actually it delays abortion, makes the experience more
expensive (e.g., travel, lodging), and may even result in seeking illegal abortion instead.
Therefore, support for abortion restrictions may not be because people oppose abortion- but
because they are not privy to the affect-based side of abortion restrictions (i.e., what they really
mean for women).
Voting on abortion. With a lack of knowledge on abortion and abortion laws but, in
some cases, an overestimation of knowledge (Kavanaugh et al., 2013), studies have examined
how attitudes and knowledge are intertwined with voting behaviors. Voting on abortion has been
examined through the lens of political party, characteristics of legislators, and comparing the
views of constituents and legislators.
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Political party. In the 80’s, national political parties formalized their “issue ownership”
of abortion resulting in democrats as the “pro-choice” party and republicans as the “pro-life”
party (Highton, 2004; Jelen & Wilcox, 2003) but Adams (1997) points out that these have not
always been each party’s stance. In fact, in years’ prior, republican masses were more “prochoice” and democratic masses were more “pro-life” in their ideology. He posits that, gradually,
“elites” in politics (e.g.., candidates, political staff) dictated their party’s abortion view regardless
of their corresponding constituency’s stance, indicating that views on abortion run from elites to
masses instead of elites representing their constituencies (Adams, 1997; Jelen & Wilcox, 2003).
Legislator characteristics. In most cases, partisanship dictates a legislator’s issue
position but abortion attitudes seem to be less predictable. Studies have indicated that legislators
often divorce their party’s position on abortion and vote based on their own characteristics (e.g.,
religious affiliation, gender) instead of characteristics of the constituencies or national party
(Highton, 2004; Jelen & Wilcox, 2003; Richardson & Fox, 1972; Schecter, 2003). For instance,
male legislators are more likely to vote “pro-life,” legislators from an urban area are more likely
to vote “pro-choice,” and Catholic and Jewish legislators are more likely to vote “pro-choice”
(Oldmixon & Hudson, 2008; Schecter, 2001).
Additionally, morality could be a foundation for voting behaviors related to social issues.
Haidt and Graham’s (2007) Moral Foundations Theory posits that liberals and conservatives
differ on social issue stance because they consult different components of morality. That is,
autonomy (harm/care and fairness/reciprocity) motivates liberals and therefore social justice is
half of their moral motivation. Conservatives are motivated by autonomy, community
(ingroup/loyalty and authority/respect), and divinity (purity/sanctity) and therefore social justice
is one-fifth of their moral motivation and may be obscured by other values. Haidt and Graham
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(2007) discuss what these motivations mean for each political group’s issue stance and, for
example, suggest that “avoidance of carnal pleasures” (p. 101) as a principle of purity/sanctity is
an equal factor in morality for conservatives. As abortion is an outcome of pregnancy, which is a
result of sex, this principle might be a source of conflict for conservatives when considering their
abortion stance.
Despite the influence of these personal characteristic, Schecter (2003) postulates
“legislators are in a constant balancing act concerning constituent influences, private influences,
and how they perceive their own roles as state representatives” (p. 62). To explore these
influences, Medoff and Dennis (2011) analyzed predictors of TRAP law enactments and found
that they were not enacted as a result of high abortion rates in the state, religious make-up of the
constituency, public anti-abortion attitudes, or state ideology. Instead, the political ideology of
the legislators was a significant predictor of whether TRAP laws were in effect (i.e., republican
was positively associated with TRAP law enactment and democrat was negatively associated;
Medoff & Dennis, 2011). Therefore, even though they may be balancing influences from many
parties, research indicates that legislators’ own interests often weigh in the most dominant. Given
that it appears the majority of people (80%) believe women should have access to abortion under
at least some circumstances when asked on surveys (Bowman & Sims, 2017; Smith & Son,
2013), yet state-level legislation continues to restrict access, there seems to be a schism between
constitutes’ abortion opinions and state legislatures. Either legislators are not listening to
constituents’ attitudes toward abortion or certain constituents are failing to vote with abortion
views in mind, or failing to vote at all.
Legislator vs. constituents. Interestingly, the most mobilized people in America on the
subject of abortion are those who are opposed to it, a phenomenon that began in the 70’s around
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the time of Roe, often through church congregations (di Mauro & Joffe, 2007). Still, only a small
to moderate portion (27-43%) of the population report abortion views are “very” or “extremely”
important regarding which candidate to support and this portion tends to be predominantly antichoice (Bowman & Sims, 2017). One might assume that abortion is a “woman’s issue,” which
may have an impact on the fact that women are more likely to factor their stance into voting
behaviors (Simon et al., 2010). Regardless, abortion is considered by national polls conducted by
Pew Research Center a “lower tier issue for both men and women” with 52% of women and 38%
of men considering it an important issue (Chaturvedi, 2016) . Even if people report that it is in an
important issue, only 5% said it was the single most important factor for candidate selection
(59% indicated “the economy” as the most important issue) and only 20% reported they would
only vote for a candidate that shared their abortion view, with more “pro-life” respondents
reporting this than “pro-choice” (Bowman & Sims, 2017). Interestingly, in a recent Gallup Poll,
63% of “pro-life” adults reported that were unfamiliar with Donald Trump’s abortion views
(Saad, 2016).
Even though attitudes about abortion are generally supportive under at least some
circumstances, the majority of people think it should be restricted in some way. Yet, knowledge
of abortion and laws are low indicating that they may think abortion restrictions are good in
theory but lack the understanding of their impact on women, especially low-income women of
color, who have to adhere to these laws. For example, parental consent laws have high
endorsement in large national polls (Bowman & Sims, 2017) but to our knowledge, no studies
have explored whether people are aware of factors/consequences that go into a minor being
required to tell a parent they are pregnant and ask for their permission to get an abortion. We
wonder if endorsement would be as high if people factor these consequences into their stance.
68

Therefore, we aim to test whether residents know what restrictions are in their states and whether
they approve of those restrictions in an “extremely hostile” state (i.e., Arkansas) with myriad
restrictions to choose from; then, after an intervention that educates them on restrictions on their
implications for women, we aim to test if their knowledge and attitudes change.
5. Abortion in Arkansas
Although overall abortion rates have decreased nation-wide (Dreweke, 2017), rates in
Arkansas have increased in recent years from 7.6 to 8.0 abortions per 1,000 women of
reproductive age (Jones & Jerman, 2017a). Yet, Arkansas is among the top three states in the
U.S. with the most abortion restrictions (22) passed between 2011 and 2015 (Guttmacher
Institute, 2016b) and introduced more anti-abortion bills than any other state during the 2017
legislative session (Center for Reproductive Rights, 2018). It is considered an “extremely
hostile” state with restrictions in 8 of the 10 major categories (Guttmacher Institute, 2017k; Nash
et al., 2017):
•

Parental involvement: Yes, Arkansas minors must provide consent from a parent
prior to abortion.

•

Pre-abortion counseling: Yes, Arkansas physicians must give information on
fetal pain to women who are 20 weeks’ gestation or further (which is prohibited
with exception of life endangerment, rape, or incest).

•

Waiting period: Yes, women must wait 48 hours between pre-abortion
counseling and abortion provision in Arkansas.

•

Ultrasound: No, Arkansas does not require a non-medically indicated ultrasound
before an abortion.
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•

Federal funding: Yes, Medicaid funding of abortion in Arkansas is banned
except in cases of life endangerment, rape, or incest. Additionally, Arkansas does
not use state funds to cover low-income women enrolled in Medicaid.

•

Private funding: No, Arkansas does not restrict abortion coverage in private
health insurance plans.

•

Medication abortion: Yes, Arkansas imposes medically inappropriate
restrictions on medication abortion such as physicians must give inaccurate
information on reversing medication abortion and pre-abortion counseling must
be provided in person (i.e., ban on telemedicine).

•

Abortion facilities: Yes, Arkansas enacted a law that requires ASC standards of
their facilities, however they are temporarily blocked while in litigation (Center
for Reproductive Rights, 2018).

•

Viability: Yes, Arkansas prohibits abortion after 20 weeks except in cases of life
endangerment, rape, or incest and if such an exception occurs, a second physician
must be present at viability during the abortion. This law is currently blocked
while it is in litigation (Center for Reproductive Rights, 2018).

•

Overturn of Roe v. Wade: Yes, Arkansas has expressed intent to limit abortion to
the maximum extent permitted.

Consequently, Arkansas’ myriad restrictions have resulted in only three facilities in the entire
state (Cartwright, Karunaratne, Barr-Walker, Johns, & Upadhyay, 2018) able to provide abortion
services for approximately 600,000 women of reproductive age (i.e., 15-44; March of Dimes,
2019). In addition, the restrictions deprive 97% of Arkansas counties the ability to maintain
facilities that can offer abortions, and leaves 77% of women in Arkansas without an easily
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accessible facility in their county (Jones & Jerman, 2017a). Facilities are only available in
Washington County (i.e., Planned Parenthood- Fayetteville Health Center, which only offers
medication abortion) and Pulaski County (i.e., Little Rock Family Planning Services, Planned
Parenthood- Little Rock Health Center).
In Arkansas, a state that is 79.4% White, 15.7% Black, and 7.3% Latino/a (United States
Census Bureau, 2016), a disproportionate number of low-income residents are people of color
(i.e., 28.9% Black and 26.7% Latino, whereas only 14.1% White are low-income; Center for
American Progress, 2017). Therefore, at a state level, restrictions placed on abortion have the
ability to disproportionately impact Arkansan women of color, a segment of the population
already at increased risk for experiencing unintended pregnancy (Arkansas Department of
Health, 2010). Research examining Arkansans’ knowledge and attitudes toward abortion
restrictions (and their impact on low-income women of color) is lacking. A qualitative study with
Midwestern and Southern women recruited from facilities that offer abortion suggested that they
had high concern for women’s equality and did not approve of restricting abortion for poor
women (Cockrill & Weitz, 2010). However, a more representative national sample through the
Gallup poll indicated that 40% favored prohibiting health clinics from receiving “federal funds,”
which directly affects poor women (Bowman & Sims, 2017).
Although Arkansas is portrayed as a “red” state, and in the most recent election, about
60% of Arkansans voted republican for president, senators, and house representatives (New York
Times, 2017), only 53.1% of Arkansans actually voted (McDonald, 2016). Further, according to
a study assessing a convenience sample of young adults from Arkansas and Oklahoma,
approximately 67.7% indicated support for abortion access (Jozkowski, Crawford, & Hunt,
2018), which is similar to national rates of abortion support (Smith & Son, 2013). Similarly,
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according to the Arkansas Poll (2017), a phone survey of residents from across the state on
political issues, about 60% of Arkansans thought abortion should be legal under at least some
circumstances (Parry, 2017), which may suggest that Arkansans are not as “red” on abortion as
state abortion restrictions might suggest. Yet, data on voting according to abortion stance
indicates that many Arkansans fail to see it as important or critical. Furthermore, no studies have
explored Arkansan’s knowledge and/or support for abortion restrictions in their state, which may
affect importance of abortion as a voting issue. Therefore, there is need to examine baseline
knowledge of and support for abortion restrictions in Arkansas, particularly for the majority of
Arkansans that support abortion access under at least some circumstances but may fail to see it as
an important issue in candidate selection or lack the knowledge to make an informed decision.
6. Interventions with Abortion
With much public scrutiny and legislative opposition, many facets of abortion require
intervention or improvement at either a macro-level (e.g., waning number of providers, barriers
to access due to restrictions) or a micro-level (e.g., reducing abortion stigma, increasing abortion
importance in candidate selection, increasing knowledge of restrictions). Researchers and
advocacy groups have certainly enacted interventions at both levels.
At a macro-level, there are initiatives that focus on training new providers, awareness
campaigns and petitions to repeal certain restrictions, and strategies at a legal level. For example,
organizations such as the Family Planning Fellowship, Society of Family Planning, and National
Abortion Federation provide abortion support, training, and scientific examination of abortion to
improve conditions of provision (as very few medical schools require abortion training in their
preclinical curriculum; Espey, Ogburn, Chavez, Qualls, & Leyba, 2005; Norris et al., 2011).
Creating new generations of abortion providers combats the growing fear that abortion providers
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are aging and there will be no one to replace them—providers decreased by 38% between 1982
and 2005 (Jones & Kooistra, 2011). Centers such as the University of California San Francisco
(UCSF) Bixby Center have trained over 5,200 providers with their Fellowships and training
programs (Bixby Center for Global Reproductive Health, 2018). With these training programs,
the demographic of abortion providers is changing (ten years ago, the majority of abortion
providers in the U.S. were White men over the age of 55 who had been practicing for over a
decade; O’Connell et al., 2008). More recently, research examined demographics of private
practice obstetrician-gynecologists (ob-gyns) who provide abortions and found that young
female physicians were more likely to provide them if encountering a patient who sought one
(Stulberg, Dude, Dhalquist, Farr, & Curlin, 2012). However, the majority of abortion providers
are not private practice physicians and research shows that 97% of the ob-gyns in Stulberg and
colleagues’ sample (2012) reported having been solicited for abortion services by patients but
only 14% provided them. Another study examining abortion provision and referrals among obgyns in the United States revealed that of the physicians who reported they would not provide
abortions, 35% also said they would not provide a referral for a physical who would (Desai,
Jones, & Castle, 2018). Therefore, these training programs for physicians are continually needed.
Another example of macro-level interventions is the All* above All (2013) petition and
social media campaign to raise awareness about the harmfulness of the Hyde Amendment
(Boonstra, 2016). A third example is the “Voices Brief,” a document consisting of women’s
abortion narratives submitted to the Supreme Court by the National Abortion Rights Action
League (NARAL Pro-Choice America) to convey the reality of abortion in women’s lives.
Although the Supreme Court has never publicly cited this brief, Levit and Verchick (2016) point
to evidence that this brief may have prompted empathetic insight in some of the justices. These
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macro-level initiatives (e.g., changing policy and practices) have the ability to impact individual
attitudes as well (Lipp, 2011).
Scholars have discussed strategies at an interpersonal or intrapersonal (micro-) level to
increase normalization and decrease stigmatization. Examples of these strategies include
changing the way “pro-choice” people distance themselves from “good” and “bad” abortions,
making an effort to use plain and simple language in social interactions (e.g., “products of
conception”), and forming groups to empathize with others who have had abortions (Link &
Phelan, 2001; Lipp, 2011; Norris et al., 2011). Empathy has been well studied as a mechanism to
change affect-based attitudes; however, few studies have examined empathy building with a
general population to increase knowledge of and decrease support for abortion restrictions.
Changing affect-based attitudes with empathy. In general, empathy is a result of
perspective-taking that “occur[s] when people can seemingly understand the underlying reasons
for the behavior of someone other than themselves” (Plumm & Terrance, 2009, p. 191). Scholars
have examined two primary types of empathy: trait and state (Batson, Turk, Shaw, & Klein,
1995; Haegerich & Bottoms, 2000; Plumm & Terrance, 2009). One cannot manipulate trait
empathy easily, as it results from an individual’s similarity with the population in question (e.g.,
personal characteristics such as gender and race). State empathy is a result of an individual’s
ability to put themselves in the shoes of another person (i.e., perspective-take) based on
presented situational factors; it can be induced and, therefore, experimentally manipulated
(Plumm & Terrance, 2009). Trait and state empathy are linked in that if a person has trait
empathy (similarities with the target population), one will be more likely to induce state empathy
(i.e., put themselves in the shoes of another; Plumm & Terrance, 2009). Research suggests that
certain personal experiences (e.g., having faced discrimination, having daughters, knowing
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someone who has experienced rape) lead to higher levels of state empathy (Glynn & Sen, 2015;
Moyer & Haire, 2015; Wiener, Felman Wiener, & Grisso, 1989). Moreover, women are
generally more likely than men to have higher levels of empathy (Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983;
Hoffman, 1977), but there has been effective experimental induction of state empathy for men
regardless of trait empathy (Plumm & Terrance, 2009).
In addition to studying what characteristics are more conducive to empathy building,
literature has elucidated different types of responses to empathy (e.g., cognitive, attitudinal, or
behavioral; Davis, 1996). Behavioral response to empathy has been studied in the legal system,
such as examining empathy’s effect on judges’ decisions on who to side with in gender-related
cases (Glynn & Sen, 2015; Moyer & Haire, 2015) and mock jurors’ rating of homicide defendant
responsibility (Plumm & Terrance, 2009). These studies have shown that empathy shifted
cognition and therefore resulted in the reevaluation of the stigmatized party (e.g., the woman).
For example, with an increase in empathy, mock jurors were more likely to understand why a
battered woman would kill her abusive husband and consequently, be more likely to shift blame
off the defendant and onto the system that failed her (Plumm & Terrance, 2009).
The role of perspective-taking. More empathy research has focused on the role of
perspective-taking on attitudes toward and engagement with stigmatized populations. Research
shows that perspective-taking is an effective strategy to decrease stereotyping, reduce prejudicial
evaluation, and allow people to see themselves in others (Batson et al., 1997; Galinsky &
Moskowitz, 2000). Batson and colleagues (1997) proposed three steps that explain how empathy
can improve feelings toward a stigmatized group as a whole: first, adopting a person’s
perspective leads to empathetic feelings; second, those feelings lead to the perception of
increased valuing of their welfare; and third, increased valuing should generalize to the group as
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a whole. Wang and colleagues (2014) found that perspective-taking increased the degree of
engagement with stigmatized groups (e.g., sitting in close proximity or willingness to meet
homeless individuals and Ah Beng individuals (stigmatized population in Singapore)). Another
study found that prosocial conformity affected empathy induction (Nook, Ong, Morelli, Mitchell,
& Zaki, 2016). That is, participants that observed others having high empathy toward a homeless
population were more likely to increase their own feelings of empathy and behavioral response
(i.e., donate to a homeless shelter).
Empathy and abortion. Many of the studies on perspective-taking and stigmatized
populations have been conducted with homeless individuals (Batson et al., 1997; Nook et al.,
2016; Wang et al., 2014), individuals who have committed homicide (Batson et al., 1997; Plumm
& Terrance, 2009), individuals with illness or disability (Batson et al., 1997; Lor et al., 2015).
Whereas the few empathy interventions that have focused on abortion, have targeted either
health professionals or populations (e.g., Pace et al., 2008; Turner and colleagues, 2008) or
specifically aimed for conflict resolution among “pro-life” vs. “pro-choice” populations
(LeBaron & Carstaphen, 1997), but not the individuals who experience abortion. These
interventions, however, have been successful in changing attitudes and knowledge toward
abortion.
For instance, “values clarification” workshops conducted in Vietnam, Nepal, and South
Africa with health care providers, community members, and policymakers aimed to get
participants to examine their moral reasoning and values around abortion and achieve empathy
for women who had second-trimester abortions (Turner and colleagues, 2008). These workshops
found a positive impact on participants’ attitudes but, perhaps, generated less defined change
(e.g., increase of empathy and knowledge) than interventions that involve interacting with and
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hearing the narratives of women and people in abortion care. For example, members of Medical
Students for Choice have the opportunity to participate in an annual Reproductive Health
Externship (RHE) program where they spend time working in facilities that provide abortion,
sitting in on counseling and procedures, and talking with providers and patients. Pace and
colleagues (2008) indicated that following their RHE, students’ support for abortion increased, as
did their knowledge and empathy for patients and intention to become providers.
Sharing stories and hearing others’ perspectives has been effective with more general
populations as well, such as in self-identified “pro-life” and “pro-choice” community members
who participated in workshops run by conflict resolution practitioners (LeBaron & Carstaphen,
1997). These workshops, designed to break down stereotypes of the other side and find common
ground, resulted in fostering empathy and relationship building. In addition to knowledge and
attitudes about abortion in general, the effect of empathy can extend to feelings about
restrictions. A qualitative study by Cockrill and Weitz (2010) explored women’s perceptions of
abortion regulations and found that participants who expressed empathy for women seeking an
abortion were more likely to argue against restrictions that would make it harder to get one (e.g.,
require travel long distances). It is important to note that this study was done with a small sample
size with women who were recruited at facilities that offer abortion. We are aiming to examine
further these links between empathy, knowledge, and support for restrictions with a more general
population, specifically, in a hostile state.
Manipulating empathy and knowledge. As there are cognitive and affective
components to abortion attitudes, targeting both sides with empathy induction and education
could stand to make an impact. Many methods and limitations have been discussed in order to
manipulate these attitudinal components via intervention. Batson and colleagues (1997) mention
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several limitations to their three steps of improving attitudes toward stigmatized groups with
empathy that are important to consider with our chosen population. They mention the possibility
that empathy induction could be successful for the individual in the experiment but could fail to
generalize to the population because there are subgroups within a population that could
experience more or less stigmatization. For example, within the AIDS community, gay men,
drug users, women, and children are stigmatized at different levels and one could empathize with
a child with AIDS but not with the rest of the group. Batson et al. (1997) also caution for victim
responsibility (i.e., participants thinking the population has brought their plight upon
themselves). We aim to test if there are differences in empathy between subgroups by
manipulating the race of the woman who delivers a testimonial about her personal abortion
experiences. Additionally, we aim to test victim responsibility by manipulating perceived
pregnancy responsibility. That is, the woman in the intervention video will either report
becoming pregnant because of rape or because of consensual sex. We expect there to be
differences in empathy and support for abortion restrictions based on these aspects and an
increase in knowledge about abortion and restrictions.
With increased knowledge, one can better take a person’s perspective and even change
attitudes (Currier & Carlson, 2009). Plumm and Terrance (2008) state that in order to take
another person’s perspective, one must also learn about the “contextual and structural
constraints” that contribute to that person’s perspective (p. 189). A qualitative study of abortion
providers that examined their approach to training medical students illustrates the power of the
combination of knowledge and empathy. Participating providers indicated that, even for medical
students who were opposed to abortion, by simply learning about the practice of abortion in
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addition to observing patients, students developed empathy and an increased appreciation for
providers (Freedman et al., 2010).
In order to induce empathy, some studies have included activities such as disability
simulations (e.g., engaging in a classroom with loss of dominant hand, vision, or speech; Lor et
al., 2015) and assessments testing ability to decipher facial expressions (Drwecki, Moore, Ward,
& Prkachin, 2011; Sherman, Lerner, Renshon, Ma-Kellams, & Joel, 2015). Other empathy
experiments have had success by having participants watch, listen to, or read a testimonial and
then instructing them to think about how the other person might be feeling (Davis, 1996;
Haegerich & Bottoms, 2000; Plumm & Terrance, 2009). In order to increase knowledge,
experiments that involve video-based interventions have been effective (Conceicao, Pedro, &
Martins, 2017; Blas et al., 2010; Parker, Stradling, & Manstead, 1996; Roberto, Meyer, Johnson,
& Atkin, 2000; Warner et al., 2008). Specifically, the use of audio or video-based testimonials to
increase knowledge and/or empathy appear to result in longer lasting attitude changes than
written testimonials or education initiatives alone (Batson et al., 1997; Blas, et al., 2010;
Braverman, 20008; Parker et al., 1996; Roberto et al., 2000). Therefore, we plan to test the effect
of a video intervention aimed to increase knowledge of abortion restrictions, paired with an
(state) empathy-inducing video testimonial to decrease support for said restrictions and increase
empathy for women who have abortions.
7. The Current Study
In order to increase knowledge of and decrease support for restrictions, we administered a
video intervention containing persuasive messages. However, the effectiveness of these
messages depend on type (Ryffel & Wirth, 2016). That is, persuasion efforts aimed at shifting
affect-based attitudes (e.g., emotions and feelings) and cognition-based attitudes (e.g., beliefs
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and judgments) are most effective when there is a match between the message with the type of
attitude (i.e., emotional messages with affective attitudes and informational messages with
cognitive attitudes; Ryffel & Wirth, 2016). Attitudes toward abortion are unique in that they are
often both emotional (e.g., considering how the woman must feel) and cognitive (e.g., scientific
statements against existence of fetal pain, plausibility of being able to financially provide for a
child), which can lead to complex feelings about abortion and feelings of ambivalence (Alvarez
& Brehm, 1995; Craig et al., 2002; Hunt, Marcantonio, Jozkowski, & Crawford, in preparation;
Jozkowski, Crawford, & Hunt, 2018). Ambivalent attitudes are relatively unstable and may be
easier to change (Ryffel & Wirz, 2014).
Therefore, in order to persuade a person to decrease support for abortion restrictions, one
must address both the affective and cognitive sides of these attitudes. To address the cognitive
side, we aimed to raise awareness regarding the extent of restrictions enacted in Arkansas as a
baseline intervention. In addition, as a manipulated variable, to address the affective side, we
aimed to increase empathy for women who seek abortions by offering a testimonial from
someone who has had to face these restrictions.
The current study consisted of several video interventions that addressed either the
cognitive side of abortion attitudes (i.e., knowledge of abortion and legislation) or the
combination of cognition and affect (i.e., empathy for women who seek abortions). The control
video consisted of the knowledge portion only (i.e., a news anchor giving information about
abortion and restrictions in Arkansas) and the intervention videos consisted of four different
testimonials from actors portraying women who sought out abortion in Arkansas. We
manipulated several variables (i.e., race of the woman, perceived pregnancy responsibility) in the
testimonial videos to examine the effects of internalized biases on empathy generated.
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We compared control vs. intervention video conditions by examining pre-test, post-test,
and follow-up differences of knowledge of current restrictions in Arkansas, support for those
restrictions, and empathy for women who seek abortions in Arkansas. We explored the following
research questions (described in further detail in Chapter 3):
RQ1. Does watching a video with an empathy-inducing personal story in addition to an
informational component (intervention) induce significantly different outcomes than watching a
video that only contains an informational component (control) on pre-test, post-test, and followup scores for 1) knowledge of abortion restrictions and 2) support for abortion restrictions?
RQ2. Do the variables manipulated in the intervention empathy-inducing testimonials
(race and pregnancy responsibility) produce different empathy characteristic scores between the
five different video conditions (White woman, raped; White woman, consensual sex; Black
woman, raped; Black woman, consensual sex; control (no testimonial))?
8. Theoretical Framework
Intersectionality
Conceptually, the theory of Intersectionality offers an explanation as to why abortion is
highest among young low-income women of color (particularly residing in rural areas) and
simultaneously, they are the most vulnerable to restrictions (Boonstra, 2016; di Mauro & Joffe,
2007; Jones & Kavanaugh, 2011). Intersectionality is a Black feminist theoretical framework
credited to Kimberle Crenshaw (1989) but additionally developed by other scholars in the late
1980s/early 1990s such as Debarah King, Patricia Hill Collins, Cherrie Moraga, Gloria
Anzualdua, and Nira Yuval-Davis (Gamson & Moon, 2004; McCall, 2005; Nash, 2008; Price,
2011). This framework addresses how multiple social identities relate to power (e.g., privilege)
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and oppression at a micro-level and a macro-level. It further dictates that oppressions at a macrolevel compound as more micro-level social identities intersect (Crenshaw, 1989).
Dhamoon (2011) discusses the different terminologies used across intersectionality
scholars and emphasizes Collins’ (2000) key notion that systems of oppression (e.g., patriarchy,
racism, sexism, capitalism) are “interlocking.” She posits that it is rare to find a “pure” victim or
oppressor because an individual can be a member of an oppressed group and a group of
oppressors at the same time (Collins, 1990; Nash, 2008). Dhamoon (2011) stresses that in order
to study an issue with an intersectional lens, one cannot only focus on the micro-level identities,
and one must acknowledge the associated systems of oppression.
Price (2011) discusses some methods to approaching research methodology with an
intersectional approach. She says, “Researchers have shown that race is an important predictor in
abortion behavior, but this only skims the surface of an intersectional analysis. We still have to
figure out why race is such a strong predictor and how it may be mitigated by other factors, such
as socioeconomic status and cultural norms” (p. S56). We aim to study the effect of race and
perceived pregnancy responsibility with low-income women. Kumar (2013) points out that
“socially excluded” (e.g., low-come women, women of color) experience already stigmatization
and discrimination so scholars should be careful not to lump every inequality in as “abortion
stigma.” However, we acknowledge that the women who are already at a social disadvantage
when they “enter the abortion landscape” (Kumar, 2013, p. e330) and that their obstacles are
exacerbated as they navigate an abortion experience. To apply this framework to our population,
we will describe each micro-level identity with respect to abortion and discuss examples of the
compounding oppressions and barriers.
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•

Gender: The intervention videos only depicted women in the testimonials, as the
vast majority of people who have abortions are women. (It is important to note
this is not always the case, however, there is a lack of data collection and
discourse around trans* men and women, gender queer, or non-binary individuals
who have abortions. Therefore, there is need for specifically focused research in
the future to elucidate unique issues that arise with these populations). Abortionseeking women experience sexist oppressions stemming from the patriarchy
(which privileges men over women). First, women experience a sexual double
standard which encourages women to limit their sexual partners for fear of social
repercussions (whereas men are encouraged to have many sexual partners; e.g.,
Wiederman, 2005) and discourages the use of birth control because of its inherent
negative connotation with sexual activity and promiscuity (Campbell, ShinHodoglugil, & Potts, 2006). Even if women were to overcome these norms, they
experience a lack of comprehensive sex education and contraceptive access,
which leads to an increased likelihood of unintended pregnancy. Prevention of
and responsibility for pregnancy falls inevitably on women (Kimport et al., 2011)
and when deciding which outcome to choose, women face stigma (shame, guilt)
of failing their societal expectations as a woman (e.g., wanting motherhood;
Kumar et al., 2009) and of needing a “good” reason for abortion (Norris et al.,
2011). Although, Kumar and colleagues (2009) point out that not all women face
stigma and discrimination, and that social inequality is the root of abortion
discrimination.
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•

Age + Gender: The intervention videos only depicted young women in their 20’s
as they represent the majority (60%) of abortion patients (Jerman et al., 2016).
Young women experience an aspect of sexism that enables society to scrutinize
and police their sexuality (United Nations, 2004). For example, adults can feel
paternalistic toward young women’s sexuality and make reproductive health
decisions for them via legislation (e.g., parental consent laws; Blasdell, 2002) or
conscientious objection by health professionals (e.g., pharmacists refusing to refill
young women’s birth control pills; Savulescu, 2006). Additionally, they are
particularly vulnerable to a structural lack of resources such as education,
(reproductive) health, and experience higher rates of sexual assault and violence
(United Nations, 2004), which can increase risk of unintended pregnancy and,
therefore, increase abortion rates.

•

Class + Age + Gender: The intervention videos only depicted low-income young
women as they represent the majority (75%) of abortion patients (Jerman et al.,
2016). In addition to sexism, low-income women experience classist oppressions
stemming from capitalism in the U.S. (which privileges the wealthy). With an
increased incidence of unintended pregnancy among low-income women (i.e.,
more than 5 times that of women with an income at or above 200% of the poverty
level; Finer & Zolna, 2016), more low-income women are in a position where
they are seeking abortions and have to find ways to pay for an abortion. Lowincome women already lack financial resources and if they are on public
assistance, the Hyde Amendment restricts insurance coverage for abortion. Due to
restrictions or in an attempt to avoid stigma, three-fourths of women end up
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paying for their abortion out of pocket (Henshaw & Finer, 2003; Jones, Finer, &
Singh, 2010). If they come up with the money for an abortion (often by deferring
payment on rent, bills, or groceries; Dreweke, 2017), state restrictions that
increase travel distance and procedural regulations (e.g., ultrasound) necessitate
two trips to the facility, which further increases the financial burden. As
mentioned above, if they are unable to come up with the money, they will often
be forced to carry the pregnancy to term, which propagates the cycle of poverty
because of worse educational and economic outcomes (Boonstra, 2016; Upadhyay
et al., 2015).
•

Race + Class + Age + Gender: The intervention videos examined the extent to
which race (White women in comparison to Black women) plays a role in the
testimonial portion. White women have the lowest rates of abortion and
experience racial privilege and Black women have the highest rates of abortion
and experience racial marginalization (Jones & Kavanaugh, 2011). To add to
sexism and classism, low-income young women of color experience prejudice and
discrimination as a result of racism (which privileges White individuals). First,
low-income women of color have an elevated incidence of unintended pregnancy
because of disparities in access to health care and therefore, they are less likely to
have health care, have gone to a health provider in the last year, or use
contraceptives (Lara et al., 2015; Levit & Verchick, 2016). Second, the Hyde
Amendment overwhelmingly affects low-income women of color because, due to
socioeconomic inequality stemming from racism, women of color are more likely
to be on Medicaid (i.e., 30% of Black women and 24% of Hispanic women aged
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15–44 are enrolled in Medicaid, compared with 14% of White women; Boonstra,
2016; Frohwirth, 2014). Because of racial prejudice, people see women of color
as less worthy of protection and in need of intervention on behalf of fetuses and
children (Harrison, 2016). Women of color uniquely face the concurrent
problematizing of their sexuality (e.g., hypersexual; Gamson & Moon, 2004) and
criminalizing of their pregnancies (Smith, 2005). Thus, they lack support before
they become pregnant, as pregnant women, or in terminating their pregnancies.
Finally, we examined circumstance of pregnancy in addition to race (controlling for class, age,
and gender). These oppressions affect all aspects of a woman’s unintended pregnancy, including
how others perceive her. This last aspect could or could not be considered an identity. That is,
depending on the situation in which a pregnancy occurred (e.g., consensual sex, rape), a woman
could take on the identity of “rape victim” but some women who experience rape never label
themselves as such (Koss, Gidycz, & Wisniewski, 1987). Other people perceive these
“identities” differently based on their moral foundation; how one conceptualizes morality is
important to abortion attitudes and can influence whether people think certain women should
have access (Haidt & Graham, 2007). Specifically, the pregnancy circumstance can affect how
others perceive her responsibility based on internalized sexism, racism, and classism. A woman
who is pregnant as a result of consensual sex will likely be judged harsher for seeking an
abortion than a woman who was raped on the assumption that people will think the woman who
became pregnant as a result of consensual sex had some control over her risk of pregnancy (Hans
& Kimberly, 2014). Adding biases toward young low-income women and women of color (e.g.,
misconceptions such as laziness or lack of education) exacerbates those perceptions, widening
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the gap between privileged and oppressed women with social minority statuses (e.g., lowincome, not White) and women with social majority statuses (e.g., high-income, White).
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY
The Current Study
Abortion is safe (Guttmacher Institute, 2017a; Kulier et al., 2011), but there is discourse
perpetuating misconceptions (e.g., abortion leads to negative health outcomes). Abortion is legal
(Ellison, 2003; Roe v Wade, 410 US 113, 1973), but there are numerous restrictions that limit
access. And abortion is prevalent (Dreweke, 2017; Guttmacher Institute, 2017f; Jones & Jerman,
2017b), but low-income women of color have the highest rates and are the most vulnerable to
restrictions (Jones & Jerman, 2017b). Given this environment, abortion remains a contentious
social issue. Knowledge of abortion and abortion restrictions is low (Bessett et al., 2015;
Kavanaugh, Bessett, & Littman, 2013; Cockrill & Weitz, 2010; Gondor et al., 1996; Lara et al.,
2015; White et al., 2016), but attitudes toward abortion are complex (e.g., Hans & Kimberly,
2014; Jozkowski, Crawford, & Hunt, 2018), and may lead to unfounded or misled support for
abortion restrictions (Weitz et al., 2008). Previous interventions have attempted to improve
conditions of abortion at a macro-level (e.g., Boonstra, 2016; Levit & Verchick, 2016) and
attitudes toward abortion at a micro-level (e.g., Link & Phelan, 2001; Lipp, 2011; Norris et al.,
2011) using empathy building strategies. Many studies that use empathy induction strategies
have had success with video testimonials (Blas, et al., 2010; Braverman, 20008; Parker et al.,
1996; Roberto et al., 2000). Intervention is particularly needed to raise awareness of restrictions
and increase empathy for women who seek abortions in extremely hostile southern states, such
as Arkansas.
To date, no media-based interventions have attempted to address abortion knowledge and
empathy in a hostile Southern state, specifically targeting perceived pregnancy responsibility,
and the potential influence of race. As such, the current study aimed to test the effectiveness of
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an empathy-based, video intervention via a randomized-controlled experiment with Arkansas
residents to increase awareness about abortion legislation in Arkansas and decrease support for
restrictions.
The current study consisted of several video interventions designed to increase empathy
for women seeking abortion by either only increasing knowledge of abortion and abortion
restrictions (control- cognition only) or increasing knowledge combined with increasing empathy
for a woman telling a personal story about how restrictions affected her experience getting an
abortion (intervention- cognition + affect). There were four different testimonials given for the
affective portion of the intervention condition. The testimonial was either delivered by a White
woman or Black woman. Both told a story of obtaining an abortion in Arkansas after becoming
pregnant as result of rape or consensual sex. Participants assigned to the intervention condition
received one of the four testimonial versions. We compared control and intervention video
conditions by examining pre-test, post-test, and follow-up differences of knowledge of current
restrictions in Arkansas, support for restrictions, and empathy for women who seek abortions in
Arkansas. Additionally, we compared outcome scores between all five conditions (control and
four interventions) to examine the effects of potential internalized biases on empathy generated
(based on manipulated variables: race and perceived pregnancy responsibility).
Research Design
The intervention was a randomized-controlled design and participants were randomly
assigned to one of five videos. A pre-test and two post-tests were administered to all participants
(see Figure 3.1 for flow diagram). All participants (i.e., control and intervention conditions) took
the same pre-test and watched a video clip about current restrictions in Arkansas
(cognitive/knowledge portion) aimed at increasing participants’ knowledge about Arkansas
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abortion restrictions. The control condition then immediately received a post-test. The
intervention conditions watched one of four testimonial video clips (affective/testimonial
portion) after the knowledge clip of a woman speaking about her experience of how restrictions
made obtaining an abortion in Arkansas more difficult:
•

Intervention 1: Knowledge + Testimonial (White woman, Raped)

•

Intervention 2: Knowledge + Testimonial (White woman, Consensual Sex)

•

Intervention 3: Knowledge + Testimonial (Black woman, Raped)

•

Intervention 4: Knowledge + Testimonial (Black woman, Consensual Sex)

After the testimonial clip, the intervention condition received the post-test. Two weeks later, both
conditions received a second post-test to test for rebound effect (Johansson-Love & Geer, 2003).
All conditions received one $10 e-gift card after post-test 1 and another one after the follow-up
post-test as incentives to participate and improve attrition rate. All procedures were approved by
the Institutional Review Board at the institution of data collection.
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Figure 3.1. Flow diagram for randomization and allocation to groups.
Videos. The content of the videos (e.g., casting, script, visual aids) were guided by
persuasion in media literature (e.g., establishing credibility, using second-person pronouns to
create personal relevance; Burnkrant & Unnava, 1989; Petty & Priester, 1994) and
Intersectionality (Crenshaw, 1989). Evidence-based reasoning in video content development is
detailed in Appendix A.
Cognitive (knowledge) portion. In this portion, a news anchor briefly informed
participants about the safety and legality of abortion. Then they outlined the rules (i.e., legislative
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restrictions) patients and doctors must follow in order for abortion in Arkansas (see Appendix A
for a table of script language and corresponding survey questions).
Affective (testimonial) portion. Using an intersectional approach to analyses and
discussion, we manipulated variables based on social identities of the person in the video. We
controlled for social identities such as gender, socioeconomic status, and age—all people in the
video presented as women, indicated that they are low-income, and appeared to be in their 20’s
to parallel salient characteristics of the majority of abortion patients (75% and 60% respectively;
Jerman et al., 2016). Alternatively, we manipulated three variables: video content (control vs.
empathy testimonial), race of the woman in the video (White woman vs. Black woman), and
degree of perceived pregnancy responsibility in the testimonial (raped vs. consensual sex). In the
video, the woman described her experience becoming pregnant and the obstacles that made
obtaining an abortion in Arkansas more difficult (see Appendix A for script language and
corresponding Chapter 2 abortion topic). We counterbalanced the two intervention scripts in
terms of length and content (Ryffel & Wirth, 2016).
Procedures
Before the survey administration, we pilot tested the instrument with a convenience
sample (n=10) of researchers to assess for clarity/readability. After the instrument was finalized,
we administered an online video-based randomized-controlled trial with Arkansas residents
(18+) (N=369) through Qualtrics survey software. A convenience sample of participants were
recruited through specialized social media (e.g., Arkansas specific Reddit and craigslist pages,
Facebook), word of mouth, email, and listservs. Group sample sizes (n=90) were generated from
a power analysis using G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) with power (1 - β) set at 0.80 and α = .05,
two-tailed.
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First, participants who received the survey link were directed to an introductory page
providing them with information about the study. After clicking to the next page, they were
directed to an informed consent form which notified them that by completing the survey, they
were indicating their consent to participate. Interested participants clicked to the next page,
which began the online survey (see Appendix B for all online survey materials). The participants
started with a pre-test that included: 1) demographic information (including three initial
screening questions on age, residency, and native language that automatically ended the survey
for those that are younger than 18, not currently living in Arkansas, or non-native English
speakers that did not attend primary education in an English speaking school), 2) political
behaviors (voting and media consumption), 3) general knowledge about abortion, 4) knowledge
of Arkansas abortion restrictions, 5) attitudes toward people who seek abortions (i.e., revised
from Batson et al., 1997), 6) Social Dominance Orientation (Ho et al., 2015), 7) identification of
Empathic Concern and Perspective-Taking (Davis, 1983), and 8) the Marlowe-Crowne Social
Desirability Scale-Short Form (Ballard, 1992; Reynolds, 1982). After completing the pre-test,
participants were randomly assigned to an intervention or control group (see Figure 3.1 flow
chart).
After viewing the assigned video (control or one of four intervention videos), a post-test
with similar questions to the pre-test was administered to assess effects. In addition, the post-test
included assessments of empathy for women who seek abortions in Arkansas (i.e., 6
characteristics from Batson et al. (1997) and a pictorial scale based on the IOS scale (Aron, Aron
& Smollan, 1992). Based on previous literature (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992; Johansson-Love
& Geer, 2003), a follow up post-test was administered two weeks after the intervention to
measure re-bound effects. A two-week time period between post-test 1 and the follow-up post93

test was chosen to model a methodologically similar study by Johansson-Love and Geer (2003).
They conducted a study using a pre-test, post-test, follow-up (PPF) design to administer a videobased intervention. This intervention used a testimonial (control vs. experiment) to shift attitudes
toward a contentious social topic (e.g., rape myths) and found consistency in responses between
the first post-test and follow-up post-test, arguing reliability of the data over the two-week
period.
The follow-up post-test included similar questions to the post-test 1 in addition to 1) an
assessment of source credibility (the actors in the video) (Ohanian, 1990) and 2) an inquiry about
any media consumption related to abortion or abortion restrictions in the 2-week period between
post-test 1 and follow-up post-test. See Figure 3.2 for a diagram of study protocol.

Figure 3.2. Diagram for study protocol and summary of administered measures.
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Measures
The pre-test survey (see Appendix C) will include the following measures:
Demographic questions. The demographic section included questions on age, state
residency, native-language, zip code (current and of hometown), length of Arkansas residency,
gender, race/ethnicity, household income (i.e., in relation to the Arkansas poverty line ~ $16,000;
United States Census Bureau, 2016), relationship status, education, employment, sexual
orientation, religious attendance and importance, religious denomination, political ideology (i.e.,
social issues and economic issues) and party, and abortion experience (e.g., self, others). We also
asked about abortion identity via two questions: identification with “pro-life”/“pro-choice” labels
and to what extent they think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal
abortion on a 6-point Likert scale (Hunt, Marcantonio, Jozkowski, & Crawford, forthcoming).
Voting behaviors. The voting behaviors section included Gallup Poll questions
regarding registered voter status, perception of the extent to which they follow politics,
frequency of voting behaviors, likelihood of voting and importance of abortion for candidates in
the next state election. We chose to slightly augment Gallup’s language (from presidential
elections to state elections) because our intervention concerns restrictions that apply specifically
to Arkansas.
Media consumption behaviors. We asked two questions that assess the consumption of
different types of political media participants. Participants were asked to specify from where they
get their information on current events (e.g., television, print, websites, podcasts). After, they
were asked how they would describe those sources from Strongly Liberal to Strongly
Conservative.
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SDO7 scale. The Social Dominance Orientation7 scale (Ho et al., 2015) is a measure of
“support for inequality between social groups and has been shown to play a central role in a
range of intergroup attitudes, behaviors, and policy preferences” (Ho et al., 2015, p. 1004). It
includes 16 items about group-based inequality on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1
(strongly oppose) to 7 (strongly favor). Example items include “Some groups of people must be
kept in their place” and “It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other
groups are at the bottom.” Higher scores indicate higher endorsement of inequality between
groups.
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI). The IRI (Davis, 1980) is a 28-item “self-report
measure consisting of four 7-item subscales, each tapping some aspect of the global concept of
empathy” (Davis, 1983, p. 113) The current study only used two subscales that relate to our
aims: Empathic Concern which “assesses ‘other-oriented’ feelings of sympathy and concern for
unfortunate others” (p. 114) and Perspective-Taking which “assesses the tendency to
spontaneously adopt the psychological view of others” (p. 113). Each subscale is 7 items and is
rated on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (does not describe me well) to 5 (describes me
very well). An example of an item on the Empathic Concern subscale is “I often have tender,
concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me” and an example item on the PerspectiveTaking scale is “I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both.”
Abortion restrictions in Arkansas. The abortion restrictions section included questions
assessing perceptions of legality and difficulty of access to abortion and support for
permissiveness of restrictions (e.g., more strict, less strict) in the U.S. and Arkansas.
Additionally, we offered a list of possible abortion restrictions in the 10 major restriction
categories (Nash et al., 2017) and asked participants to indicate 1) which restrictions apply to
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Arkansas (to measure knowledge) and 2) to what extent do they agree or disagree (on a 5-point
Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree)) with each restriction.
Knowledge of abortion. To measure general knowledge of abortion, we used Bessett
and colleagues’ (2015) knowledge questions on risks and prevalence of abortion but updated
some of the information (i.e., 24% of women will have an abortion by the age of 45 instead of
the original answer of 33%, which was true at the time of publishing). We also included a
question to assess participants’ knowledge of types of abortion and wrote questions guided by
information from Guttmacher Institute (2017a) and Jones and Jerman (2017b) that assess
participants’ knowledge of common abortion patient characteristics.
Attitudes toward women who seek abortions. To assess attitudes toward women who
seek abortions, we modeled our questions after Batson and colleagues’ (1997). Originally, they
wrote 7 items each to assess empathy for three populations: individuals with AIDS, individuals
who are homeless, and “convicted murderers” modeled off McConahay’s (1986) 7-item
“Modern Racism Scale.” Our scale includes 12 items on a 9-point Likert scale and examples of
items include: “Women who seek an abortion have no one to blame but themselves for getting
pregnant” (1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree) and “How much do you personally care
about the well-being of women who seek an abortion?” (1 = not at all, 9 = very much).
Marlowe-Crowne desirability scale-short form. This scale (Ballard, 1992; Reynolds,
1982) assesses the degree to which participants’ self-report data may be susceptible to social
desirability bias. The short form is 11 items rated “true” or “false” as it pertains to the
participant. Low scores indicate that participants may be more willing to answer truthfully even
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when answers might meet social disapproval, whereas high scores may mean participants are
highly concerned with social approval.
The post-tests (see Appendix C) include selected questions from the pre-test and the
following measures:
Empathy for women seek abortions in Arkansas. To measure empathy induced for
women who have abortions in Arkansas, participants indicated to what extent they experienced
six specific feelings (Batson, 1991; Drwecki et al., 2011) after viewing their assigned video.
Feelings include “tender,” “softhearted,” “warm,” “compassionate,” “moved,” and
“sympathetic” on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). Additionally,
participants were asked in an open-ended follow-up: what aspect of the video caused you to feel
the way you did while watching it?
Inclusion of Other in the Self (IOS) scale. The IOS scale (Aron, Aron, & Smollan,
1992) is a “single-item, pictorial measure of closeness” (p. 598) to assess to what extent
participants experienced self-other overlap (an important component of perspective-taking;
Decety & Jackson, 2004). Participants in both control and intervention conditions indicated
“which picture best describes how you feel about yourself (self) in relation to a woman who has
had an abortion (other)?” Participants in the intervention condition who receive the testimonial
video portion completed the scale again in relation to “the woman you watched in the video who
told her story about seeking an abortion.” Additionally, both conditions were asked to describe
why they picked the picture they did in an open-ended response.
Source-Credibility scale (Ohanian, 1990). In the follow-up post-test, participants were
asked to evaluate the actor(s) in the video they watched 2-weeks prior using the Source98

Credibility scale, 15 items on a 9-point bipolar scale assessing the attractiveness, trustworthiness,
and expertise of the source. An example of an attractiveness item is assessing the source from
“Attractive” to “Unattractive” on a 9-point scale. An example of a trustworthiness item is rating
the source from “Dependable” to “Undependable” and an example of an expertise item is rating
the source from “Qualified” to “Unqualified.” Lower scores indicate more credibility of the
source.
Confounding factors. In the 2 weeks between post-test 1 and the follow-up post-test, we
asked participants if they sought out any media relevant to abortion or abortion restrictions.
Additionally, participants were asked if they knew anyone who sought an abortion in the last two
weeks and if they knew anyone (actors) in the videos they watched to account for biases related
to familiarity.
Reading checks. There were two reading checks in the pre-test -- one in the IRI in the
pre-test and one in the Knowledge of Abortion Restrictions scale in post-test 1 and the follow-up
post-test. These checks instructed participants to select a certain answer (e.g., “please select 3”)
to assess attention to reading.
Videos
Production. The investigators sent out a casting call seeking three actors (i.e., one news
anchor and two testimonial women- one White and one Black) to the Theater department listserv
at the institution of data collection. Interested parties responded with their headshot and resume
and were chosen based on appearance (e.g., met specific characteristics of the role) and acting
experience. The selected actors were given instruction on visual aesthetic choices (e.g., clothing,
hairstyle) and tone of the script delivery. The news anchor character looked professional and
99

wore a navy blazer and natural make-up with her hair down. The two testimonial women were
instructed to wear their hair down with natural make-up as well. Additionally, they were told to
wear clothing with no visual brands or logos. The script and tone instruction for the
informational portion was intended to be neutral (e.g., facts only) whereas the testimonial portion
was intended to be more emotional, inducing empathy for the woman telling the story.
We hired a freelance video production specialist from the institution of data collection to
shoot, edit, and produce the video content. The news portion was shot in a meeting room with a
“news” desk at the institutional of data collection. The testimonials were shot outside in to
simulate an on-site interview. All four associates were compensated for their time and expertise.
Content. Several media persuasion strategies guided the development of the content of
five versions of the intervention videos (e.g., casting, script development, visual aids). For
example, to establish credibility of the news anchor as a source of information (Petty & Priester,
1994), she opened the segment stating that she was a graduate student in public policy at the
institution of data collection who is an expert in reproductive health policy. By tying her to the
well-known institution of data collection, as well as delivering the story about the state in which
participants currently live, the audience is more likely to pay attention to the information
(Devereux, 2007; Golding & Elliott, 1979; Wahl-Jorgensen & Hanitzsch, 2009). Furthermore,
she used second-person to create personal relevance when explaining restrictions in Arkansas,
(e.g., “if you’re under 18, you have to get permission from a parent…”; Burnkrant & Unnava,
1989). To enhance comprehension (e.g., Lee, Lee, Liao, & Wang, 2015) and break up the
monotony of information delivery in the news story, the first author created visual aid graphics,
which were projected with each restriction. The graphics were reviewed by 12 research assistants
and two colleagues and rated on design and perception of political lean (e.g., on a scale of 1-5
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with 1 as “pro-choice,” 3 as neutral, and 5 as “pro-life”). Graphics that were rated as having poor
design (e.g., color, font) or leaning too far “pro-choice” or “pro-life” were augmented. The script
was reviewed by a team of five experts (in media effects, women’s reproductive health,
sociology, and public health) for clarity and wording.
Informational portion. The informational portion consisted of a news story aimed to
increase awareness of the myriad abortion restrictions in Arkansas. The news anchor introduces
herself and briefly informs participants about the safety, legality, and types of abortion (e.g.,
“Abortion, which is when a pregnancy is ended so that it does not result in the birth of a child,
has been legal in all 50 US states for over 40 years”). She describes the magnitude with which
restrictions have burdened states, particularly Arkansas, in recent years (e.g., “Arkansas is in top
three states with the newest laws restricting abortion access”). Then she describes the nine
legislative restrictions in the ten major categories of restrictions (Nash et al., 2017) that apply to
Arkansas (e.g., “If you’re under 18, you have to get permission from a parent. Research shows it
delays the procedure or teens may travel to states without these laws to get an abortion”), each
with an accompanying visual graphic. Finally, the news anchor ends the clip describing how
these restrictions have affected accessibility in Arkansas (i.e., “Now there are only 4 clinics in 2
cities in the state that can offer abortion services to the 1 million women that live in Arkansas”).
Testimonial portion. All four versions of the testimonial portion began with an
introduction by the news anchor (e.g., “The largest group of women who get abortions in the US
are in their 20’s and low-income like Mia, who is here to tell us a personal story about her
experience with these Arkansas laws”). The four versions varied by race of the woman giving the
testimonial (i.e., Black or White) and incidence of pregnancy (e.g., pregnancy as a result of rape
or consensual sex). All versions of the intervention were similar in terms of length and wording
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(Ryffel & Wirth, 2016). The testimonial begins as the woman, “Mia,” describes her experience
becoming unexpectedly pregnant and seeking an abortion. In the both pregnancy circumstance
versions, she states that she did not know the person with whom she became pregnant and
“didn’t tell anyone about it for a long time.” In the rape version, she begins with “last year, I was
raped. I was coming out of work being attached in the parking lot” and in the consensual sex
version, she begins with “last year, I became pregnant.” She outlines the time it took for her to
realize she was pregnant (i.e., “You count from the first day of your last period so by the time you
find out you’ve missed a period, you’re already 4-5 weeks pregnant. I rarely get my period on
time so I didn’t even know I was pregnant until I took a test around 8 weeks”). She details the
obstacles that made obtaining an abortion in Arkansas more difficult because of restrictions in
place (e.g., lack of insurance coverage, necessitated travel and waiting period increasing costs).
She described her economic troubles such as “living paycheck to paycheck” and struggling to
afford rent and groceries and having to use all of the money in her bank account to pay for the
abortion—so much that she had to ask a friend for money for the bus ride to the clinic 3 hours
away and having to sleep in the bus station for two nights since “they make you wait 48 hours.”
She concludes with the video by stating that these restrictions made it harder for her (i.e., “I was
sure of my decision and just wanted to get this taken care of as soon as possible, in the safest
way possible. But these laws made everything go so much slower and so much more expensive
because I had to take time from work and stay extra days”) and saying that she doesn’t regret it
and felt relieved afterward. In the consensual version, she says “it wasn’t the right time” and in
the rape version, she says “I just wanted to put the rape behind me.”
Research Questions and Hypotheses
We explored the following research questions:
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RQ1. Research question 1 aimed to test the effectiveness of the intervention videos
compared to the control video. That is, does watching a video with an empathy-inducing
personal story in addition to an informational component (cognitive/knowledge +
affective/empathy) induce significantly different outcomes than watching a video that only
contains an informational component (only cognitive/knowledge). To explore the effectiveness
of the affective/empathy component, we compared outcomes of those who received the control
condition to those who received the intervention conditions on three sub questions:
RQ1.1. Does knowledge of abortion restrictions differ between experiment and control
video conditions across the time points? We hypothesized that H1.1) disregarding video
condition, all participants will experience an increase in Arkansas abortion restriction
knowledge; all participants received the same informational component.
RQ1.2. Does support for abortion restrictions differ between experiment and control
video conditions across the time points? We hypothesized that H1.2) there would be a larger
decrease in support for abortion restrictions for those in an intervention condition compared to
the control video. Those who hear a personal story may be influenced by learning about the
negative effect on those who seek abortions in Arkansas (Currier & Carlson, 2009; Plumm &
Terrance, 2009).

Figure 3.3. Illustration of hypotheses 1.1-1.2.
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RQ2. Research question 2 aimed to test if the variables manipulated in the intervention
empathy-inducing testimonials (race and pregnancy responsibility) produced different empathy
outcomes. Comparisons of empathy characteristic scores were made between the five different
video conditions (White woman, raped; White woman, consensual sex; Black woman, raped;
Black woman, consensual sex; control (no testimonial)). To explore the impact of these
variables, we compared empathy outcomes in all five condition groups on three sub questions:
RQ2.1. Do scores on the six empathy characteristics differ depending on the race of the
woman in the video? We hypothesized that people who viewed the Black woman’s testimonials
would have lower scores on the six empathy characteristics than those who viewed the White
woman given internal racial biases against women of color.
RQ2.2. Do scores on the six empathy characteristics differ based on perceived pregnancy
responsibility? We hypothesized that participants who viewed the testimonial where the woman
became pregnant as a result of rape would have higher scores on the six empathy characteristics
than participants who heard the woman became pregnant as a result of consensual sex.

Figure 3.4. Illustration of hypotheses 2.1-2.2.
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RQ2.3. Does watching a certain testimonial produce different empathy sum scores
compared with the other videos? What other personal experiences/traits contributed to empathy
sum scores? The variables we evaluated were participants’ sex, previous experience with
abortion, previous experience with sexual assault, baseline Empathic Concern (how naturally
empathetic one is), social desirability score (to what degree participants feel pressure to act
according to what is socially acceptable) and assigned video condition. Specifically, we
hypothesized that 1) females, 2) people with personal experiences with abortion, 3) people with
personal experiences with sexual assault, 4) higher baseline Empathic Concern, 5) people with
higher social desirability scores, and 6) people who viewed the video with a White woman who
was raped would have the highest empathy sum scores. We examined participants’ race in
another model but it was not significant and was not included in the final model.

Figure 3.5. Illustration of Hypotheses 2.3.
Data Analyses
Data were downloaded from Qualtrics Survey Software into SPSS. Data were analyzed
by several statistical tests (see Table 1 and Table 2) with the following dependent variables:
knowledge of abortion restrictions in Arkansas, support for restrictions in Arkansas, and empathy
characteristic scores. Specific comparisons were made in two separate manuscripts.
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Manuscript 1 (RQ1) examined the effectiveness of an intervention that included
knowledge and testimonial components compared to the control, which only included a
knowledge component. We examined differences in pre-test, post-test 1, and follow-up post-test
scores for knowledge, and support for restrictions (RQ1.1-1.2) by conducting repeated-measures
analyses of variance (ANOVA) with a multivariate approach were used to examine differential
changes across times on KAR scores (RQ1.1) and SAR scores (RQ1.2) between intervention and
control groups. When the interaction was significant, we explored the simple effects by
examining differences between time points (i.e., pre-test and post-test, post-test and follow-up,
pre-test and follow-up) with a Bonferroni correction. When the interaction effect was not
significant and the main effects were significant, we conducted a post-hoc univariate tests to
assess simple effects. Variables and analyses are depicted in Table 3.1.
Manuscript 2 (RQ2) specifically examined differences in empathy for women who have
abortions by the manipulated variables in the four testimonials (race, perceived pregnancy
responsibility. To measure empathy scores, an aggregated score was calculated post-video from
Batson et al.’s (1997) scale assessing the extent to which participants experienced six different
empathy-related characteristics. To account for baseline tendency for empathy, the Empathic
Concern subscale score on the IRI scale (Davis, 1983) was calculated from the pre-test and
controlled for during these comparisons.
To examine each of the six empathy characteristics (sympathetic, moved, compassionate,
tender, warm, soft-hearted) by the manipulated variables in the testimonials (i.e., race, perceived
pregnancy responsibility), we conducted chi-squared analyses (RQ2.1-2.2). We conducted a chisquare for each emotion by race and by perceived pregnancy responsibility. For race, we
compared White woman’s testimonials vs. Black woman’s testimonials. For perceived
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pregnancy responsibility, we compared testimonials in which the woman was raped vs.
testimonials in which the woman had consensual sex. Additionally, we conducted post-hoc
pairwise Fisher’s exact tests.
To assess what factors contributed to empathy sum scores toward women who seek
abortions, we conducted two hierarchical regressions testing six predictors (i.e., video condition,
sex, abortion experience, sexual assault experience, social desirability, and baseline Empathic
Concern)—one at post-test and one at follow-up (RQ2.3). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons were
conducted to assess significant differences in our factors of interest. Variables and analyses are
depicted in Table 3.2.
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Appendices
Table 3.1
Manuscript 1 Analyses
RQ

Description

DV (dependent variable)

Analytic Plan

IV (independent variable)
1.1

1.2

Does knowledge of
abortion restrictions differ
between experiment and
control video conditions
across the time points?

DV: Knowledge of Abortion
Restrictions (KAR) Score

Does support for abortion
restrictions differ between
experiment and control
video conditions across the
time points?

DV: Support for Abortion
Restrictions (SAR) Score

IV: Control or Intervention
Video

IV: Control or Intervention
Video
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*Descriptive Statistics
*ANOVA on pre-test scores to
check for differences by IV
*repeated-measures ANOVA
to assess significant differences
in KAR scores between those
who watched the Control vs.
Intervention video at pre-test,
post-test 1, and post-test 2
*Descriptive Statistics
*ANOVA on pre-test scores to
check for differences by IV
*repeated-measures ANOVA
to assess significant differences
in SAR scores between those
who watched the Control vs.
Intervention video at pre-test,
post-test 1, and post-test 2

Table 3.2
Manuscript 2 Analyses
RQ

Description

DV (dependent variable)

Analytic Plan

IV (independent variable)
2.1

Are there differences in the
six empathy characteristic
scores by the race of the
woman in the video?

DV: Six Empathy characteristic
scores (tender, softhearted, warm,
compassionate, moved, and
sympathetic)

*Descriptive Statistics
*Chi-square analysis per
empathy characteristic at
post-test and follow-up

IV: Testimonial with Black
woman vs. White woman
2.2

Are there differences in the
six empathy characteristic
scores by perceived
pregnancy responsibility?

DV: Six Empathy characteristic
scores (tender, softhearted, warm,
compassionate, moved, and
sympathetic)

*Chi-square analysis per
empathy characteristic at
post-test and follow-up

IV: Rape testimonial vs.
Consensual testimonial
2.3

Does watching a certain
testimonial affect empathy
sum scores compared to the
other videos? Do other
personal experiences/traits
contribute to empathy sum
scores?

DV: Empathy Sum Score
IV: sex, previous experience with
abortion, previous experience with
sexual assault, baseline Empathic
Concern, social desirability, video
condition
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*Two hierarchical
regressions testing six
predictors—one at post-test
and one at follow-up

CHAPTER 4: MANUSCRIPT 1
Effectiveness of a video-based media intervention to address knowledge and support of abortion
restrictions in Arkansas: A randomized-controlled trial
Abstract
CONTEXT: U.S. abortion restrictions diminish access and perpetuate a culture of hostility
toward abortion seekers. Support for restrictions is high—potentially, because knowledge of
restrictions is low. We implemented an empathy-based intervention to increase awareness of
abortion legislation and decrease support for abortion restrictions among residents in Arkansas, a
particularly restrictive state with regard to abortion. The purpose of this study was to evaluate the
effectiveness of this intervention.
METHODS: Using a randomized-controlled trial with a pre-, post-, and follow-up design, a
convenience sample of Arkansas residents (N = 369) were randomly assigned to view a control
(describing abortion legislation) or intervention (including a scripted abortion testimonial) video.
Data were analyzed across the study with repeated-measures analyses of variance.
RESULTS: For knowledge of restrictions, there was a statistically significant interaction
between the effects of time and video condition. Specifically, post-test scores were significantly
higher than pre-test and follow-up scores. In terms of support for restrictions, the time main
effect was significant, but the group main effect was nonsignificant.
CONCLUSIONS: The intervention was effective in increasing awareness for Arkansas abortion
restrictions. Knowledge scores were significantly higher among those who watched a
testimonial; this may be because information was repeated or because emotional connections
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made the information more memorable. Support for restrictions decreased across the study,
however, the intervention did not have the hypothesized effect on this outcome.
Key words: abortion, abortion legislation, video intervention, Arkansas
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Abortion is a prevalent, safe, and legal reproductive event in the U.S. (Dreweke, 2017;
Guttmacher Institute, 2017a; Guttmacher Institute, 2017f; Jones & Jerman, 2017b). Despite the
ubiquity of abortion, there has been a significant increase in legislative restrictions at the statelevel (Center for Reproductive Rights, 2018; Nash et al., 2017). These restrictions are harmful in
two main ways. First, they may delay abortions by making it more expensive or
logistically/legally challenging for women to obtain them (Bitler & Zavodny, 2001; Jerman,
Frohwirth, Kavanaugh, & Blades, 2017; Jones & Weitz, 2009; Roberts et al., 2018). This
outcome is a significant public health concern; women who are forced to keep a pregnancy after
seeking an abortion experience hardships compared to women who were able to obtain an
abortion (e.g., Foster, Biggs, Ralph, Gerdts, Roberts, & Glymour, 2018; Foster, Steinberg,
Roberts, Neuhaus, & Biggs, 2015; Upadhyay, Biggs, & Foster, 2015). Second, abortion
restrictions perpetuate and normalize misleading information (e.g., that abortions are unsafe for
women), creating a culture of hostility toward women who seek abortions. Given these
consequences, the significant influx of state-enacted restrictions on abortion access is cause for
concern.
According to public polls, support for restrictions is high (Bowman & Sims, 2017; Perry
Undem & Vox Media, 2016). The majority of U.S. residents (59%) think abortion laws should
be made somewhat or much stricter (Bowman & Sims, 2017). One reason there is high support
for restrictions is because people think that abortion is morally unacceptable (Bowman & Sims,
2017) and thus believe it should be restricted. Another reason for such high support could be
related to lack of knowledge. People have a limited understanding of abortion and legislative
restrictions, even among those who have had abortions (e.g., Bessett et al., 2015; Cockrill &
Weitz, 2010; Kavanaugh, Bessett, Littman, & Norris, 2013; PerryUndem & Vox Media, 2016;
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White et al., 2016). They may be unfamiliar with their state’s abortion legislation or they may
believe that abortion restrictions protect women’s safety—the latter of which is not supported by
scientific evidence (Grossman et al., 2015; Jones & Weitz, 2009).
Accordingly, there is need for intervention to educate the public about what restrictions
are in place and their potential impact on abortion access. Through intervention, people’s
attitudes can be shifted--especially in areas like the South with many restrictions and misleading
messages about abortion. A review of the literature suggests that interventions administered
through media platforms and empathy induction techniques have been successful in increasing
knowledge and shifting attitudes (e.g., Braverman, 2008; Batson et al., 1997; Blas et al., 2010;
Roberto et al., 2000). As such, the current study aimed to test the efficacy of an empathy-based
media intervention in increasing knowledge and decreasing support for abortion restrictions in
Arkansas, a state categorized as hostile toward reproductive health access (Nash et al., 2017). We
hypothesized that watching an empathy-inducing testimonial video in addition to an
informational video would decrease support for restrictions compared to only watching the
informational video.
Abortion Restrictions in Arkansas
Although every state has at least some legislative regulation of abortion (Guttmacher
Institute, 2018b), the Midwest and Southern regions of the U.S. are considered highly hostile to
abortion (Jones & Jerman, 2017a). The restrictions in these areas have an additive effect;
collectively, abortion legislation has resulted in declines in the number of available clinics and
providers and an increase in travel time and costs associated with obtaining an abortion
(Guttmacher Institute, 2017l; Jones & Jerman, 2017a).
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Arkansas is among the top three states with the most abortion restrictions passed between
2011 and 2015 (Guttmacher Institute, 2016b) and the Arkansas state legislature introduced more
anti-abortion bills than any other state during the 2017 legislative session (Center for
Reproductive Rights, 2018). At the time of the study, Arkansas had laws that restricted abortion
access by mandating parental involvement, pre-abortion counseling, waiting periods, prohibiting
coverage from federal funding (e.g., Medicaid), regulating medication abortion and abortion
facilities beyond what is medically necessary or appropriate, and restricting abortions to previability. Additionally, in the event Roe v. Wade is overturned, Arkansas declared its intent to
limit abortion to the maximum extent (Guttmacher Institute, 2017k; Nash et al., 2017). Currently,
there are only three facilitates in the state of Arkansas able to provide abortion services
(Cartwright, Karunaratne, Barr-Walker, Johns, & Upadhyay, 2018) for approximately 600,000
women of reproductive age (i.e., 15-44; March of Dimes, 2019).
Despite numerous legislative restrictions in the state, there is a lack of targeted research
exploring Arkansans’ support for and knowledge of these restrictions. Based on the little public
opinion research conducted with Arkansans, constituents’ attitudes toward abortion may not be
as conservative on abortion as their state laws might suggest. Approximately 68% of young
adults from Arkansas and Oklahoma indicated support for abortion access under all or at least
some circumstances (Jozkowski, Crawford, & Hunt, 2018).
Similarly, according to a state-wide Arkansas telephone survey poll conducted in 2017,
about 60% of Arkansans thought abortion should be legal under at least some circumstances
(Parry, 2017). However, Arkansans’ general feelings seem to be mixed with regard to women
who seek abortions. Approximately twenty-two percent of the sample reported feeling extremely
negative toward these women, 14.6% felt extremely positive, and 62.9% fell somewhere in the
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middle (Parry, 2017). There is no research to date exploring Arkansans’ knowledge of
restrictions in their state. Arkansans’ attitudes toward abortion restrictions may not actually align
with those legislators who passed these laws. Instead, potentially because of lack of knowledge,
support for these restrictions may be high among Arkansans. Therefore, intervention is needed to
address support for abortion restrictions in their state. This can be done by providing education
about the potential impact of these laws in terms of limiting women’s access to abortion.
Knowledge and Support of Restricting Abortion Access
Research suggests that U.S. residents are conflicted in terms of their feelings on abortion
restrictions and abortion access. Public opinion data show that the majority of people report they
believe abortion should be legal under all or at least some circumstances, without burden or
logistical difficulty, and informed by medically accurate and unbiased information (PerryUndem
& Vox Media, 2016; Smith & Son, 2013). At the same time, they exhibit high support for laws
such as 24-hour waiting periods, parental consent for minors, and doctors informing patients of
alternatives or possible risks of obtaining an abortion (no matter if they are scientifically
evidenced; Bowman & Sims, 2017; PerryUndem & Vox Media, 2016). These laws directly
conflict with people’s reported beliefs about abortion access. It seems as though people either do
not understand that such restrictions are burdens or result in logistical difficulty.
According to PerryUndem and Vox Media’s (2016) probability-based public opinion
poll, almost half (46%) of the sample reported they did not think there was a law that would
require doctors to provide medically inaccurate information about abortion. In reality, twentynine states require physicians to follow a script warning patients about the potential risks and
side effects of abortion (e.g., breast cancer), which are medically inaccurate or misleading (Nash
et al., 2017; Vandewalker, 2012).
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Yet, the issue of abortion restrictions is more complex than simply understanding the
laws. Even when people have some awareness of the laws in their areas, it does not equate to
understanding their impact on abortion care. In a sample of Texans who reported they were
aware of and supported current Texas abortion laws, 42% expressed the main reason for their
support was because they believed the regulations made abortion safer (White et al., 2016).
This support is perpetuated by the pretense that restrictions protect women’s safety or
ensure they have time to deeply consider their decision (Weitz, Moore, Gordon, & Adler, 2008).
First, researchers indicate there are no differences in the safety or success of abortions when
conducted in facilities that must adhere to extensive Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers
(TRAP) laws compared to those that do not (Grossman et al., 2011; Jones & Weitz, 2009). Thus,
the idea that restrictions protect women’s safety is false. Second, legislation requiring a waiting
period or biased counseling prior to an abortion increase financial and logistical obstacles
(Guttmacher Institute, 2017h; Karasek, Roberts, & Weitz, 2016). These restrictions result in a
patronizing or paternalistic effect, delaying abortion and infringing on bodily autonomy. Further,
in most cases, these laws rarely change women’s decisions to terminate their pregnancy, because
women have already deeply considered their decision (Blasdell, 2002; Wiebe & Adams, 2009).
Therefore, inhibiting women’s ability to obtain an abortion, not health or safety, seems to be the
primary goal of such restrictions.
With continued misunderstanding and unawareness of the laws, people who support
abortion access will continue to support restrictions under the impression that they improve
abortion experiences. There is little research on Arkansans’ knowledge and support for abortion
restrictions. If Arkansans’ knowledge about abortion is similar to U.S. adults’ knowledge
according to national polls, they may also demonstrate high support for restrictions, potentially
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based on misinformation. That is why there is a need to increase awareness of how these laws
affect people who seek abortion care. This is especially crucial for people who live in highly
restrictive regions of the U.S.
The Current Study
The purpose of the current study was to create a video intervention to decrease support
for abortion restrictions in Arkansas. To do this, we aimed to increase awareness about current
legislation and its effect on Arkansan women who seek abortions. One of the best mechanisms to
increase knowledge with sexual health topics is to include information in digital form (e.g.,
social media, films; Blas et al., 2010; Conceicao, Pedro, & Martins, 2017; Downs, Murray, de
Bruin, Penrose, Palmgren, & Fischhoff, 2004; Guse et al., 2012). When knowledge is increased,
people are more inclined to empathize for another person’s situation and struggles (Currier &
Carlson, 2009; Plumm & Terrance, 2009). With this in mind, we aimed to decrease Arkansas
residents’ support for abortion restrictions by increasing their knowledge of the abortion
landscape in their state via a video news story and several testimonials of women seeking
abortions in Arkansas.
The intervention was administered as a randomized-controlled video-based experiment,
with a pre-test, post-test, follow-up design. There were five versions of the administered videos:
one control condition and four intervention condition versions. Those in the control condition
watched the short informational video (a “news anchor” giving a news report about abortion
legislation in Arkansas). Those in the intervention conditions watched the same informational
portion followed by an actor delivering one of four different testimonials. The actor described
the barriers she faced as a result of Arkansas legislative restrictions. For the purposes of this
paper, we tested whether adding a personal story was more effective in inducing the
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hypothesized outcomes than watching a video that only contained an informational component.
As such, we compared the control to all combined intervention video conditions at pre-, post-,
and follow-up. The research questions and hypotheses were as follows:
RQ1. Does knowledge of abortion restrictions differ between experiment and control
video conditions across the time points? We hypothesized that H1) disregarding video condition,
all participants will experience an increase in Arkansas abortion restriction knowledge; all
participants received the same informational component.
RQ2. Does support for abortion restrictions differ between experiment and control video
conditions across the time points? We hypothesized that H2) there would be a larger decrease in
support for abortion restrictions for those in an intervention condition compared to the control
video. Those who hear a personal story may be influenced by learning about the negative effect
on those who seek abortions in Arkansas (Currier & Carlson, 2009; Plumm & Terrance, 2009).
Methods
Participants
A convenience sample of Arkansas residents were recruited through social media (e.g.,
Arkansas specific Reddit and craigslist pages, Facebook), word of mouth, email, and listservs to
take part in a paid research study through Qualtrics survey software. Three pre-screening
questions were administered to check for eligibility criteria: participants had to be 1) currently
living in Arkansas, 2) aged 18 or older, and 3) a native English speaker or have attended school
where English was the primary language from K-12. If a participant met the eligibility criteria,
they were administered an informed consent page, and could begin the survey.
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The minimum number of participants required was determined by an a priori power
analysis (G*Power: Faul et al., 2007) with power (1 - β) set at .80, α = .05, two-tailed, and a
medium effect size of .25 (Cohen, 1977, 1988). Approximately 2,400 people clicked on the
recruitment link from a social media platform to learn more about the study. Of those, 691
participants opted to take the survey. During data cleaning, participants were removed for
ineligibility, failing reading checks or incomplete surveys, and failure to complete all three
points of data collection (attrition rate of 33.6%). The exclusion process is described with the
survey flow in Figure 4.1. The full analytic sample of participants who completed all three waves
of data collection (N = 369) comprised 106 participants in the control condition and 263
participants in the intervention conditions (N1 = 62; N2 = 70; N3 = 60; N4 = 71).

Figure 4.1. Sample size and survey flow.
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The majority of the participants identified as female (71.5%), White (84.6%),
heterosexual (89.2%), and “pro-choice” (72.9%). The mean age was 32.07 (SD = 9.44) and
participants reported living in Arkansas for an average of 21.36 years (SD = 12.14). General
knowledge of abortion was evaluated at baseline with 16 items on safety, legality, and
prevalence (based on Bessett et al., 2015; Kavanaugh, Bessett, Littman, & Norris, 2013). We
performed a median split to create three artificial abortion knowledge levels; the scores ranged 0
to 16). Most of the sample (71.0%) exhibited a medium level of abortion knowledge, 14.9% had
a low level (1 SD below the median), and 14.1% had a high level (1 SD above the median).
Demographic frequencies for the sample are reported in Table 4.1.
Procedures
The study was a randomized-controlled trial with a pre-, post-, follow-up design;
participants were randomly assigned to one of five video conditions (see Figure 1 for survey
flow). All participants took the pre-test and were triaged into watching a specific informational
video clip about current restrictions in Arkansas (aimed at increasing participants’ knowledge
about abortion restrictions). The control condition then immediately received a post-test.
After the informational portion, participants in the intervention condition watched one of
four versions of a testimonial video clip. Each testimonial portrayed a woman speaking about her
difficulty obtaining an abortion in Arkansas because of the restrictions. After the testimonial clip,
the intervention condition received the post-test. At the end of the post-test, participants were
asked to provide an email address to receive a $10 e-gift card and the link to the follow-up
survey two weeks later to test for rebound effects (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992; JohanssonLove & Geer, 2003). Participants received another $10 e-gift card after the follow-up survey and
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then their email was removed from the data. The Institutional Review Board at the institution of
data collection approved all procedures.
Intervention Videos
Content. A team of five experts in public health, sociology, media communication, and
an abortion researcher contributed toward creating the video content (e.g., casting, script
development, visual aids), which was guided by several media persuasion strategies. For
example, to establish credibility of the source (Petty & Priester, 1994), the news anchor character
stated that she was a graduate student in public policy who is an expert in reproductive health
policy at the institution of data collection. By localizing the news anchor (e.g., tying her
credibility and narrative to Arkansas), the audience is more likely to pay attention to the
information (Devereux, 2007; Golding & Elliott, 1979; Wahl-Jorgensen & Hanitzsch, 2009).
Further, when explaining the restrictions in Arkansas, she framed the information in
second-person language to create personal relevance (e.g., “if you’re under 18, you have to get
permission from a parent…”; Burnkrant & Unnava, 1989). The first author created a visual aid
graphic per each restriction description, which were projected during the news story to enhance
comprehension (e.g., Lee, Lee, Liao, & Wang, 2015). There were two conceptual portions of the
video: informational and testimonial (see Script for complete wording).
Informational portion. This portion consisted of a news anchor, “Michelle,” briefly
informing participants about the safety, legality, and types of abortion. She describes the
magnitude with which restrictions have been passed in recent years, particularly in Arkansas.
Then she outlines and explains the legislative restrictions that augment the behaviors of patients
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and doctors for abortion provision. The news anchor ends the clip describing how these
restrictions have affected accessibility (i.e., the number of facilities) in Arkansas.
Testimonial portion. This portion begins with an introduction by the news anchor. Then
the character, “Mia,” describes her economic troubles and experience becoming unexpectedly
pregnant and seeking an abortion. She details the obstacles that made obtaining an abortion in
Arkansas more difficult because of restrictions (e.g., lack of insurance coverage, necessitated
travel and waiting period increasing costs). She concludes the video by stating that these
restrictions made it harder for her to obtain an abortion. The four versions varied by race of the
woman giving the testimonial (i.e., Black or White) and situation that lead to the pregnancy (e.g.,
rape or consensual sex). All versions of the intervention testimonial were similar in terms of
length and wording (Ryffel & Wirth, 2016).
Production. The investigators hired three actors (i.e., one news anchor and two
testimonial women) from the theater department at the institution of data collection to deliver the
video content. As part of the larger study, we were interested in understanding the role of race
and perceived pregnancy responsibility on attitudes toward abortion access. We manipulated
both of these factors in the testimonial video clips. They were manipulated in order to target and
increase empathy for women who seek abortions in Arkansas. However, for the purpose of this
study, we were solely interested in examining the effect of administering a personal story on
knowledge retention and support for abortion restrictions. As such, we will compare participants
who received the control—with no testimonial—to participants who received any intervention or
any video with a testimonial.
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Measures
Knowledge of and support for abortion restrictions. Authors compiled a list of 18
abortion restrictions in the 10 most common restriction categories in the U.S. (Nash et al., 2017)
to measure Knowledge of Abortion Restrictions (KAR) and Support for Abortion Restrictions
(SAR). Before administration, we pilot tested the survey instrument with a convenience sample
of researchers (n = 14) to assess for clarity and readability. During the experiment, these
measures were administered at all three data collection points (pre-test, post-test, and follow-up).
Item examples included “Before an abortion, doctors must tell women that it possible for the
abortion pill to be reversed” and “Abortions have to be administered by a licensed doctor (not a
nurse practitioner or other healthcare provider).” The full list of items is included in Tables 4.4
and 4.5.
To assess KAR scores, for each item, participants were instructed to indicate, “based on
what they know or have heard,” which restrictions apply to Arkansas (e.g., select “Yes, current
law in Arkansas” or “No, not a current law in Arkansas”). Items were coded dichotomously for
accuracy (i.e., 0 for incorrect or 1 for correct) and were aggregated to yield a score of 0-18, with
higher scores indicating greater knowledge of abortion restrictions in Arkansas.
To measure SAR scores, participants were instructed to indicate the extent that they
agreed that each restriction should be a law in Arkansas [on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree)]. Each item had a consistent stem of “It should be a law
in Arkansas that…” An example branch included “A woman must wait 48 hours after required
counseling before the abortion can be performed.” Total scores were aggregated and could range
from 18-90, with higher scores indicating greater support for restrictions on abortion in
Arkansas.
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Marlowe-Crowne desirability scale-short form (Ballard, 1992; Reynolds, 1982). To
assess the degree to which participants’ self-report data may be susceptible to social desirability
bias, we administered this scale in the pre-test. The short form is 11 items rated “true” or “false”
as it pertains to the participant; half are reverse coded. An example item is “I have never been
irked when people expressed ideas very different from my own.” Low scores indicate that
participants may be more willing to answer truthfully even when answers might meet social
disapproval, whereas high scores may mean participants are highly concerned with social
approval.
Source-credibility scale (Ohanian, 1990). Two weeks after participants had watched the
video, they were asked to evaluate their actor (i.e., source) on a series of 9-point bipolar scales.
The assessment comprised 15 items on attractiveness, trustworthiness, and expertise. Participants
were shown a picture of the actor(s) that applied to their assigned video condition and rated the
particular actor on each item. Lower scores indicate more perceived credibility of the source;
total scores ranged from 15 to 135 and subscale scores ranged from 9 to 45 on each subscale.
Confounding factors. The follow-up survey included three questions about personal
experiences in the 2 weeks after post-test. We asked if they sought out any media relevant to
abortion or abortion restrictions, and if they knew anyone who sought an abortion in the last two
weeks. We also asked if they knew any of the actors to account for biases related to familiarity.
Analyses
All data were downloaded from Qualtrics Survey Software into SPSS 24 for analyses.
First, we ran analyses to check data quality. We ran chi square analyses on demographic
variables and independent samples t-tests on the pre-test outcome variables. These comparisons
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were conducted to evaluate group differences between the video conditions and assess for
accurate randomization. Then, we ran univariate comparisons between participants who
completed all three points of data collection and those who dropped out after post-test. Last, we
conducted t-tests and univariate comparisons on source credibility scores, social desirability
scores, and confounding factors. We accounted for Type I error by using a Bonferroni correction
in all analyses with multiple comparisons.
Following descriptive measures, repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with
a multivariate approach were used to examine differential changes across times on KAR scores
(RQ1) and SAR scores (RQ2) between intervention and control groups. When the interaction
was significant, we explored the simple effects by examining differences between time points
(i.e., pre-test and post-test, post-test and follow-up, pre-test and follow-up) with a Bonferroni
correction. When the interaction effect was not significant and the main effects were significant,
we conducted a post-hoc univariate tests to assess simple effects. We reported partial eta-squared
(ηp2) as a measure of effect size for the analyses of variance. A value of .01 indicates a small
effect size, .06 medium, and .14 large (Cohen, 1988).
Results
Baseline
First, we ran chi-square analyses to assess differences in demographic variables by video
condition (see Table 4.2). There were no significant differences between the control and
experimental group by sex, abortion experience, or level of abortion knowledge. There were
significant differences by race, [X2(2, N = 369) = 11.443, p = .001], income level, [X2(2, N =
369) = 11.942, p = .003], education, [X2(3, N = 369) = 22.352, p < .001], and abortion identity,
[X2(2, N = 369) = 19.043, p < .001]. Post hoc pairwise Fisher’s exact tests with a Bonferroni
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correction indicated, in the intervention group, there were significantly higher proportions of
people who were White (p = .001), low-income (p = .008), had a college degree (p < .001), and
identified as “pro-choice” (p < .001). In the control, there were significantly higher proportions
of people who were non-White (p = .001), high-income (p = .002), had completed a GED/high
school education or less (p = .002), and identified as “pro-life” (p < .001).
Next, we examined baseline differences by our dependent variables (i.e., KAR and SAR
scores). KAR scores violated the normality assumption (p = .006). With equal variances not
assumed, there were no significant differences between the control group and experimental
group on KAR scores, [t(159.03) = -1.31, p = .193], at baseline. SAR scores upheld the
normality assumption (p = .765). With equal variances assumed, there were no significant
differences between the control group and experimental group on total SAR scores, [t(367) =
.466, p = .642], at baseline. Because there were no differences in our dependent variables at
baseline, we did not account for differences in demographics but address them in the discussion.
Additionally, we compared baseline KAR and SAR scores by participant abortion identity (i.e.,
“pro-life,” “pro-choice,” “other). There were no differences in KAR scores by abortion identity,
[F(2, 366) = 1.08, p = .339]. There were significant differences in SAR scores by abortion
identity, [Welch’s F(2, 84) = 50.77, p < .001]. “Pro-life” participants had significantly higher
support for abortion restrictions than “pro-choice” or “other” (p < .001).
We also made comparisons on demographic characteristics and our dependent variables
between participants who completed all three time points and those who dropped out after the
post-test (N = 192). There were no differences by sex, abortion experience, or income. However,
there were differences by level of abortion knowledge [X2(2, N = 556) = 25.510, p < .001], race
[X2(1, N = 556) = 36.147, p < .001], education [X2(3, N = 553) = 24.741, p < .001], and [X2(2, N
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= 556) = 59.883, p < .001]. Post hoc comparisons indicated people with a low knowledge of
abortion, people who are non-White, and “pro-life” individuals had a higher drop-out rate (all p’s
< .001). People with a medium level of abortion knowledge and people with some college
education had a higher rate of completing the study (all p’s < .001). There were no differences on
KAR scores [F(1, 554) = 2.893, p = .09), but those who continued on throughout the entirety of
the study had significantly lower baseline SAR scores than those who dropped out [F(1, 554) =
13.547, p < .001). This difference is discussed in the limitations.
Source-credibility. We assessed the degree that participants found the information
sources (actors) to be credible on a scale of 15--135, with lower scores indicating higher
perceived credibility (Ohanian, 1990). The mean credibility score was 49.57 (SD = 22.11) for
Michelle (the news anchor), 64.09 (SD = 22.99) for the White testimonial woman, and 62.80 (SD
= 27.71) for the Black testimonial woman. Paired-samples t-tests indicated participants found
Michelle to be significantly more credible overall compared to both the testimonial actors who
were White, [t(131) = -7.24, p < .001], and Black, [t(130) = -6.16, p < .001]. Univariate
comparisons indicated there were no significant differences in perceived credibility between the
two testimonial actors, [F(1, 261) = .169, p = .682].
Social desirability. We assessed the degree that participants’ self-report data may be
susceptible to social desirability bias on scale of 0--11, and found the mean score was 5.03 (SD =
2.15) indicating a need to conform to social desirability as measured by this scale was only a
moderate factor. There were no differences in social desirability scores between the control and
intervention conditions, [t(367) = .083, p = .934].
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Confounding factors. Only 47 participants (12.7%) reported seeking out media on
topics related to abortion and abortion restrictions in Arkansas in the two weeks between the
post-test and follow-up survey. Six participants reported familiarity with an actor. Additionally,
only 33 participants (8.9%) reported a personal experience with abortion occurring during the
two-week period. There were no differences in follow-up KAR or SAR scores among those who
reported seeking out related media [FKAR(1, 362) = .003, p = .954], [FSAR(1, 362) = .035, p =
.851], or those who reported familiarity with an actor [FKAR(1, 367) = 1.24, p = .265], [FSAR(1,
367) = 1.05, p = .305]. However, those who reported abortion experience during that time had
significantly lower follow-up KAR scores [F(1, 367) = 13.09, p < .001] and higher SAR scores
[F(1, 367) = 14.173, p < .001] than those who did not. With the small sample size, the difference
in KAR and SAR scores between these individuals could have had a small impact on the effect
of the interventions across the study.
Descriptive Statistics
Knowledge of abortion restrictions. Mean KAR scores at baseline were 9.68 (SD =
1.76), indicating that out of 18 restrictions, people correctly identified a little over half. As
expected, scores increased at post-test (M = 12.32, SD = 2.44). On average, people correctly
identified 2-3 more restrictions from pre-test to post-test (MGain= 2.64, SD = 2.49). Scores
decreased slightly two-weeks later (M = 11.21, SD = 1.95); People correctly identified on
average one less restriction at follow-up than they did at post-test (MGain = -1.10, SD = 2.16).
However, overall gains across the study, from pre-test to follow-up, indicated they correctly
identified 1-2 more restrictions at follow-up than they did at baseline (MGain = 1.53, SD = 2.27).
The top three restrictions correctly identified as applying to Arkansas at pre-test were
“Minors must get a parent’s permission before they can get an abortion” (88.1%), “Medicaid
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(insurance for people who are low-income) can only cover abortions in cases of the rape and
incest or if the woman’s life is in danger” (71.8%), and “A woman cannot get a dilation and
extraction abortion which is often performed after the 20th week of pregnancy” (71.8%). On
average, accuracy percentages increased by 13.4% after watching the video. However, one
restriction, “A woman cannot get an abortion after 20 weeks of pregnancy unless her life or
health is in danger,” increased 71.3% in accuracy from pre-test to post-test. See Table 4.3 for
descriptive values and Table 4.4 for accuracy frequencies across the study.
Support for abortion restrictions. At baseline, average SAR scores were 60.40 (SD =
19.12) on a range of 18 to 90 with high scores indicating high endorsement of restrictions.
People began the study highly endorsing about 58% of the restrictions listed. After watching the
video, the average decreased to 56.41 (SD = 21.43), suggesting the magnitude of people’s
support for restrictions decreased from pre-test to post-test (GainM = -3.99, SD = 8.75). However,
at the two-week follow up, support had gone up slightly (M = 57.53, SD = 21.57). The average
score gain from post-test to follow-up was 1.12 (SD = 8.24). Overall, gain scores across the
whole study from pre-test to follow-up indicated a decrease in magnitude of support for abortion
restrictions, albeit small (M = -2.87, SD = 10.06). Despite this decrease, many participants
indicated support for most restrictions in Arkansas (i.e., selected either strongly agree or agree it
should be a law in Arkansas).
At pre-test, the top three restrictions with the highest support were “Abortions have to be
administered by a licensed doctor (not a nurse or other healthcare provider)” (endorsed by
76.7%), “Before an abortion, doctors must tell women that the abortion can cause negative
psychological effects” (endorsed by 74.0%), and “Facilities that provide abortions have to adhere
to ambulatory surgical standards (e.g., hallways have to be a certain width, requires extra
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nursing staff, has to be within a certain distance to a hospital)” (endorsed by 72.6%). These three
restrictions, licensed doctor, negative psychological effects, and ambulatory surgical standards,
had the highest support at follow-up as well, although the percentages declines slightly (i.e.,
66.2%, 66.3%, and 66.9% respectively). On average, support for restrictions percentages
decreased by 3.4% across the study. The restriction with the biggest decrease across the study
was “Abortions have to be administered by a licensed doctor (not a nurse or other healthcare
provider)” with a 10.5% decrease from pre-test to follow-up. See Table 4.3 for descriptive values
and Table 4.5 for frequencies at the opening (e.g., pre-test) and close of the study (e.g., followup).
Repeated Measures
Knowledge of abortion restrictions. First, we examined if there were differences in
KAR scores by video condition across the three time points (RQ1). Our findings suggest there
was a statistically significant interaction between the effects of time and video condition, [F(2,
366) = 8.51, p < .001; Wilks’ λ = .96, ηp2 = .04]. This significant interaction indicates there were
differences in knowledge scores across the study by intervention or control. However, the overall
effect size was small. Simple effect comparisons indicated those in the intervention condition
had significantly higher KAR scores than those in the control at post-test, [F(2, 366) = 151.94, p
< .001, ηp2 = .454] and at follow-up, [F(1, 367) = 25.96, p < .001, ηp2 = .066]. Specifically, 1)
pre-test knowledge scores (M = 9.62) were significantly lower than post-test (M = 12.09) and
follow-up scores (M = 10.93), 2) post-test scores were significantly higher than pre-test and
follow-up scores, and 3) follow-up scores were significantly higher than pre-test but significantly
lower than post-test scores (all p’s < .001). Thus, hypothesis 1 was not supported because
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knowledge scores for those in the intervention video condition were significantly higher than
those in the control video condition (see Figure 4.2 for graphical illustration).

Figure 4.2. Graphic illustration of results of repeated-measures of variance that examined the
effect of time (pre-test, post-test, and follow-up) and video condition (control and intervention)
on Knowledge of Abortion Restrictions scores.
Support for abortion restrictions. Next, we examined if there were differences in SAR
scores by video condition across the three time points (RQ2). Our findings suggested that the
interaction between the effects of time and video condition was not statistically significant, [F(2,
366) = 2.93, p = .055; Wilks’ λ = .98, ηp2 = .02], indicating there were no differences in support
scores across the study by video condition. There was a main effect for time [F(2, 366) = 27.123,
p < .001; Wilks’ λ = .871, ηp2 = .13], such that there were significantly higher SAR scores at pretest (M = 60.40, SD = 19.11) than post-test (M = 56.41, SD = 21.43) and follow-up (M = 57.53,
SD = 21.57). Post-test scores were significantly lower than pre-test and follow-up, and follow-up
scores were significantly lower than pre-test but significantly higher than post-test. The effect for
video condition was also not significant, [F(1, 367) = 1.10, p = .296, ηp2 = .003], therefore,
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hypothesis 2 was not supported because there were no differences in SAR scores by video
condition (see Figure 4.3 for graphical illustration).

Figure 4.3. Graphic illustration of results of repeated-measures mixed analyses of variance that
examined the effect of time (pre-test, post-test, and follow-up) and video condition (control and
intervention) on Support for Abortion Restrictions scores.
Discussion
The purpose of the study was to evaluate the effectiveness of a video intervention
intended to increase awareness of abortion restrictions in Arkansas and decrease Arkansans’
support for these restrictions. Overall, Knowledge of Abortion Restrictions (KAR) scores
significantly increased after watching the informational video (at post-test) and declined slightly
two-weeks later (at follow-up); there was still an increase in knowledge from baseline to the twoweek follow-up. Additionally, for KAR scores, there was a significant interaction between time
and video condition, although the effect size was small. Contrary to our hypothesis, knowledge
scores of those who received an intervention video were significantly higher at post-test and
follow-up than those in the control.
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Overall, Support for Abortion Restrictions (SAR) scores decreased after watching the
video; SAR scores decreased from pre-test to post-test and slightly increased two weeks later at
follow-up. However, there were no significant differences in SAR scores by video condition.
This finding was inconsistent with our hypothesis.
Knowledge of Abortion Restrictions
We intended for the informational portion to increase knowledge of abortion restrictions
over time and we achieved those results. The effect size was small and, thus, the implications for
these results should be approached with caution. A strength of this study was that people
received evidence-based information from a person who they perceived as credible—sourcecredibility for the news anchor was high. Opposing what we expected (e.g., no differences
between video conditions), participants who received the intervention condition (i.e., watched a
personal testimonial following the news story) had significantly higher knowledge scores
compared to those who received the control condition. There are several possible explanations
for these findings.
First, it may be that those in the intervention condition had higher overall KAR scores
because they received repeat information on restrictions specific to Arkansas. For example, the
news story described 48-hour waiting periods as a restriction in Arkansas. Then, the woman in
the testimonial described her experience waiting 48 hours to get her abortion. The reiteration
could have led to better knowledge retention for those that watched a testimonial in addition to
the news video compared to those who only watched the news video.
Second, differences in demographic characteristics of our sample could have affected
knowledge retention between control and intervention conditions. In the intervention condition,
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there were proportionally more people who identified as White, low-income, “pro-choice,” and
with a college degree. In contrast, there were more participants in the control who identified as
non-White, higher-income, “pro-life” and who had not attended college. Those who identify as
“pro-choice” and who are more highly educated may have been more open to learning about
abortion restrictions. Research shows these demographic factors are associated with permissive
attitudes toward abortion (e.g., Smith & Son, 2013; Strickler & Danigelis, 2002; Wang, 2004).
The same can be said for people who are low-income; they may have been able to identify with
the economic struggles described by the woman in the testimonial (Woodhams et al., 2016).
Educated “pro-choice” people also may have also started the study with knowledge about
abortion restrictions. Thus, the effect size might have been small because the magnitude of
knowledge gain may have been affected by this.
To our knowledge, there is no recent evidence-backed reason as to why race might affect
knowledge retention about abortion. Research on race and abortion attitudes indicates varied
trends, but suggests African American or Black people have more permissive attitudes toward
abortion than White people, citing an impact from the Reproductive Justice movement (Forward
Together, 2019; Strickler & Danigelis, 2002). However, older literature suggests that racial
differences are confounded by other demographic factors (e.g., religion, gender; Hall & Ferree,
1986; Lynxwiler & Gay, 1994; Secret, 1987). Thus, especially with our small non-White sample
size, the difference in race between video conditions could have had little effect on the difference
in knowledge scores across the study. Interestingly, these demographic differences did not have
an effect on support for restrictions by video condition (discussed in the next section).
Last, people in the experimental condition could have had better retention because they
incorporated facts and feelings they learned from the video. When knowledge is increased,
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people are more inclined to empathize with another person’s situation and want to lessen their
struggles (Currier & Carlson, 2009; Plumm & Terrance, 2009). Therefore, people who heard a
testimonial may have been more open to hearing the story because their awareness of the
restrictions had increased. Then, in turn, connecting what they learned to their feelings for the
testimonial could have reinforced what they had learned. When people are more educated about
the legislative environment associated with a particular issue, an intervention may be more
effective in shifting attitudes about the legislation. As such, it may be important for educators
and researchers to be thorough in providing context when using testimonial interventions.
However, another contribution to people’s support for restrictions may be related to their
personal experiences. In the two weeks between post-test and follow-up, the 33 people who
reported either a primary or secondary abortion experience had significantly higher support for
restrictions and significantly lower knowledge. One would expect that if they had experienced
these obstacles first hand, they would have higher knowledge and lower support for restrictions.
It is possible these experiences were not positive or our participants were not intimately involved
in the process. Thus, their knowledge did not increase and they remained supportive of
restricting access. We did not assess for more information about these recent experiences so we
cannot glean potential reasons for having higher support and lower knowledge scores. These
differences suggest personal experiences may be just as important on people’s support for
restrictions.
Support for Abortion Restrictions
Although the intervention video increased knowledge, there were no differences in
support for restrictions by video condition. We predicted that a story demonstrating the real-life
implications of restrictions in Arkansas would decrease support for these laws compared to a
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video that only disseminated information (i.e., no testimonial). The testimonial did not have the
hypothesized effect.
Disregarding video condition, results indicated that support for restrictions at the end of
the study was significantly lower than those at baseline. However, support for restrictions at
follow-up remained higher than anticipated. An explanation may be that even though the
majority of participants identified as “pro-choice,” people may want to restrict abortion access or
may not understand how restrictions truly impact people’s lives. Adjusting attitudes on this
subject may require a larger cultural shift.
This cultural shift necessitates the widespread debunking of the myth that restrictions are
mechanisms of health and safety for women seeking abortions (Weitz, Moore, Gordon, & Adler,
2008). To illustrate the way these restrictions perpetuate this myth, we describe several examples
of the laws that were addressed in the informational portion of our video. For each, the news
anchor described the Arkansas restriction and briefly explained the consequence of this mandate.
Yet, these examples retained support from over half of the sample at the end of the study.
For example, the news anchor stated that in Arkansas “[an] abortion has to be performed
by a licensed doctor, which means if you usually go to a health professional like a nurse
practitioner, you have to go to a different place.” At the conclusion of the study, 66.2% of the
sample agreed that requiring abortions to be provided by a licensed physician should be a law in
Arkansas. Ostensibly, it seems positive that abortions should only be provided by “licensed
physicians”. However, as a result, advanced practice clinicians (i.e., certified nurse-midwives,
nurse practitioners (NP), and physician assistants (PA)) are unable to provide either procedural
or medication abortions in states with this law. This mandate is in effect in many states despite
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the fact that these providers have the necessary and relevant skills to provide these services with
the same risk of complications compared to physicians (Taylor et al., 2009; Weitz et al., 2013).
Preventing these health professionals from providing abortion services limits locations
that can offer abortion care. These laws further divide those who are able to afford abortions and
those who are not. Often, low-income individuals and women of color are more likely to receive
care at public health departments or community health centers, where NPs and PAs provide the
majority of healthcare services (Grumbach, Hart, Mertz, Coffman, & Palazzo, 2003; Schacht,
2008; Taylor et al., 2009; Weitz et al., 2013). Therefore, these populations are particularly
negatively impacted by these laws because they do not typically have access to physicians. It is
possible that this outcome is not obvious with a basic interpretation of restrictions, among people
with privilege who do not have to think about what categories of health professionals they have
access to. Two-thirds of our sample reported being mid-income or higher and the majority
identified as White, therefore such privilege may apply to many of our participants. The
implications of this mandate are complicated and may be difficult for someone to fully
appreciate on their own. Perhaps more explicit linking of these restriction to real life implications
is necessary in the video beyond what was already provided.
Another example of a restriction painted as a health and safety measure is parental
involvement laws. In the video, the news anchor describes this Arkansas law as: “If you’re under
18, you have to get permission from a parent. Research shows it delays the procedure or teens
may travel to states without these laws to get an abortion.” Parental permission was endorsed by
60.1% of the sample at the conclusion of the study. People may support parental laws for reasons
such as minors having a guardian to accompany them to doctor’s appointments, ensure they
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understand any procedures, and provide emotional support (American College of Pediatricians,
2016).
Often, regardless of laws, minors do involve parents in their medical decisions. However,
Blasdell (2002) points out that if a minor decides not to involve their parents, their decision is
due to safety or necessity (e.g., threat of domestic violence, getting kicked out). In the years
following the implementation of these laws (i.e., 1974-1988), the overall number of teen
abortions did decrease dramatically (Blank et al., 1996). But rates of abortions after 13 weeks
and teens traveling to another state to obtain an abortion also increased (Blasdell, 2002; Dennis,
Henshaw, Joyce, Finer, & Blanchard, 2009). Therefore, these laws often result in either
increased financial and logistical burden on minors to obtain an abortion while avoiding
involving their parents, forced birth, or risk to their safety.
For these reason and others, the leading medical groups in the U.S. (e.g., American
Public Health Association, American Medical Association, the American Academy of Pediatrics)
publicly oppose parental involvement laws (American Civil Liberties Union, 2018). Laypersons
may endorse this restriction because they feel minors should involve their parents in the decision
to have an abortion. But such restrictions privilege minors who have positive relationships with
their parents and penalize those who do not (e.g., victims of incest).
A final example is biased counseling laws. Regarding this topic, the news anchor states:
“During the counseling session, doctors are required to tell patients that it is possible for a
medication abortion to be reversed after the first dose of pills, which is not backed up with
medical evidence.” Then, later she goes on to say “…other states require doctors to talk about
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the link between abortion and breast cancer or negative mental health outcomes. None of this
information is evidenced by medical research.”
In spite of this information, at the end of the study, 66 percent of the sample agreed
physicians should be required to give pre-counseling information on negative psychological
outcomes following abortion. Fifty-five percent agreed counseling should include the link with
abortion and increased risk of breast cancer (54.5%). And 59.5% agreed doctors in Arkansas
should tell women about the reversal of a medication abortion. If people think that abortion
really does increase breast cancer, depression, and can be reversed, then doctors being required
to tell patients about these risks seems positive. However, these claims are not supported by
methodologically sound evidence (e.g., Charles, Polis, Sridhara, & Blum, 2008; Grossman et al,
2015; Grossman & White, 2018; Guttmacher Institute, 2017g; National Academy of Sciences,
2018). As these messages continue to be perpetuated by politicians and trusted doctors who are
required to say them, people will continue to doubt whether women should freely make decisions
about their bodies.
Even though support for abortion restrictions in Arkansas decreased over the study, they
remained problematically high. Until there is a cultural shift that debunks these myths, there will
continue to be difficulties decreasing support for restrictions. Because these laws are marketed as
helpful to women who seek abortions, an opposing stance “appears unsupportive of women”
(Weitz et al., 2008, p. 87). With the norming of “call-out culture” (Mendes, Ringrose, & Keller,
2018, p. 1) with respect to sexism and gender discrimination (e.g., the #MeToo movement),
some people may feel pressured to conform to a societal norm in which they support (or appear
to support) women. In a culture of hostility toward women’s reproductive choice, it seems to be
hurting the cause to oppose efforts that inform women of the full spectrum of risks associated
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with abortion and ensure they are provided with an opportunity to consider their options. If these
laws appear to protect and help women, people end up simultaneously supporting abortion access
and the laws that would restrict access (Bowman & Sims, 2017). It is important that people
realize that with these restrictions, women will only continue to have theoretical access to
abortion, not practical access. And it is imperative that people, especially those who live in
hostile states like Arkansas, work to understand and abolish the mechanisms that obstruct access
to bodily autonomy.
Limitations and Future Research
Using a randomized-controlled design, this study examined the effects of an innovative
media intervention on abortion knowledge and endorsement of abortion restrictions in Arkansas.
Although the design was rigorous, there are several limitations worth mentioning. The sample
consisted of current residents of Arkansas who volunteered to participate in a study about
attitudes toward abortion. Therefore, although they were randomly assigned to conditions, they
were not randomly selected from the population and therefore findings are not fully
generalizable to the population of Arkansas. Participants who continued on throughout the
entirety of the study had significantly lower baseline SAR scores that those who dropped out.
Thus, it is possible that participants who self-selected to complete the study were already either
engaged with the abortion movement. It is also possible people who are more supportive of
restricting abortion (higher SAR scores) may have seen the videos and dropped out because they
did not like messages that pointed out negative outcomes to abortion restrictions. We offered
compensation to increase motivation so even people who were indifferent or opposed abortion
would be more inclined to participate in the study. Future research should assess efficacy of
these video interventions with people randomly selected from the Arkansan population.
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As with limitations of media interventions, it is possible participants did not watch or pay
attention to the whole video even though the survey settings made it so they could not leave the
page until the entirety of the video had played. Also, there was a risk that people could have
looked up answers to the knowledge questions, as it was administered online, or accuracy scores
could have been partially a function of random guessing. However, a very small amount of
people reported seeking related media in the two weeks between pre-test and follow-up and there
were no differences in outcome scores between those who did and did not report seeking out
related media. We cannot infer causality from the effect of the videos. This was an exploratory
study with a potential to have implications for future research and intervention work. However,
effect sizes were small and implications should be approached with caution.
Finally, we did not ask participants who reported abortion experience if they had personal
experience with any legislative restrictions. Future research should address this directly to assess
if they were aware of restrictions based on personal experience. Even more, we did not
specifically ask if participants believed each restriction was helpful or harmful to women. In
order to glean the reasoning behind their support, future research should address this gap.
Conclusion
Overall, the empathy-based media intervention increased participants’ knowledge and
decreased support for abortion restrictions across the study. A personal testimonial in addition to
an information portion significantly changed knowledge over time but did not affect support for
restrictions. To increase knowledge of abortion restrictions, it seems there is the potential for
success with a video intervention including a credible news source followed by a personal
testimonial. Future educational initiatives could use this model.
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Targeting support for restrictions, though, may require a different strategy. Endorsement
of individual abortion restrictions remained moderately high in the sample, potentially because
people lack the understanding of the magnitude of how these restrictions impact women in
Arkansas, fully appreciate the implications of each restriction on own’s own, or actually want
abortion to be further restricted. As these restrictions do not actually help women or protect their
autonomy and instead make it more difficult to receive abortion care, it is important for people to
understand that supporting restrictions is contradictory to supporting access. Future interventions
should work to de-mystify abortion regulations so that people who prioritize reproductive choice
understand that these restrictions are unnecessary. In order to understand the contradictory nature
of supporting restrictions and supporting access, one has to be aware of what restrictions are in
place, the structural factors that contribute to their occurrence, and the outcomes that take place
as a result.
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Appendices
Table 4.1
Participant Demographics (N = 369)
Characteristic

N (%)

Sex

Characteristic

N (%)

Sexual Orientation

Male

104 (28.2)

Heterosexual

329 (89.2)

Female

264 (71.5)

Gay/Lesbian

14 (3.8)

Bisexual

20 (5.4)

Queer

6 (1.6)

Race
White or Caucasian
Black or African
American

312 (84.6)
24 (6.5)

Education Level

Latino/a

12 (3.3)

High school graduate/GED

39 (10.6)

Asian or Asian American

4 (1.1)

Some college/associate degree

104 (28.2)

Bi- or Multi- racial

8 (2.2)

College degree

183 (49.6)

Graduate degree

41 (11.1)

Income Level
Low

23 (6.2)

Political Party

Lower-Middle

102 (27.6)

Republican

120 (32.5)

Middle

126 (34.1)

Democrat

139 (37.7)

Upper-Middle

57 (15.4)

Libertarian

58 (15.7)

High

61 (16.5)

None

39 (10.6)

Relationship Status

Abortion Identity

Married

218 (59.1)

“Pro-Life”

66 (17.9)

In a relationship

68 (18.4)

“Pro-Choice”

269 (72.9)

Single and not dating

43 (11.7)

Neither

13 (3.5)

Single and dating

28 (7.8)

Both

18 (4.9)

Abortion Experience (self
and/or others)

Sexual Assault Experience (self
and/or others)

Yes

275 (74.5)

Yes

306 (82.9)

No

65 (17.6)

No

47 (12.7)

Not Sure

29 (7.9)

Not Sure

16 (4.3)
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Table 4.2
Chi-Square Results for Demographic Characteristics and Video Condition (N=369)
Control
28.7%
n = 106
n

%

Intervention
71.2%
n = 263
n
%

Sex
Male

33

31.7

71

68.3

Female

73

27.7

191

72.3

Abortion Experience

144

Yes

86

31.3

189

68.7

No

14

21.5

51

78.5

Not Sure

6

20.7

23

79.3

Abortion Knowledge Level
Low

19

34.5

36

65.5

Medium

70

26.7

192

73.3

High

17

32.7

35

67.3

Race
White

79

25.3

233

74.7

Non-White

27

47.4

30

52.6

144

c2
1.01

Cramer’s V
.052

3.43

.096

1.83

.070

11.44**

.176

Table 4.2 (Cont.)
Control
28.7%
n = 106
n

%

Intervention
71.2%
n = 263
n
%

Income
Low

25

20.0

100

80.0

Medium

34

27.0

92

73.0

High

47

39.8

71

60.2

Education

145

HS or less

21

51.2

20

48.8

Some College

39

37.5

65

62.5

College degree

35

19.1

148

80.9

Graduate degree

11

26.8

30

73.2

Abortion Identity
“Pro-Life”

33

50.0

33

50.0

“Pro-Choice”

62

23.0

207

77.0

Other

11

32.4

23

67.6

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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c2
11.94**

Cramer’s V
.180

22.35***

.246

19.04***

.227

Table 4.3
Descriptive Statistics and Repeated-Measures ANOVAs for KAR scores and SAR scores Examining by Intervention Across Three Time
Points
Control
n = 106
Measure
a

M

SD

Intervention
n = 263

Time

Treatment

Time´Treatment

SD

F (h2)

F (h2)

F (h2)

151.94*** (.45)

25.96*** (.07)

.956*** (.04)

M

KAR

b

Pre-test

9.47

2.07

9.76

1.61

Post-test

11.57

2.81

12.62

2.21

Follow-up

10.25

2.42

11.60

1.57

SAR

27.12** (.13)
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Pre-test

61.13

18.70

60.11

19.31

Post-test

58.14

21.57

55.72

21.38

Follow-up

60.25

21.36

56.44

21.59

1.10 (.003)

2.93 (.02)

Note. aKAR = Knowledge of Abortion Restrictions (range of 0-18 with high scores indicating high knowledge); bSAR = Support for
Abortion Restrictions (range of 18-90 with high scores indicating more support for restrictions)
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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Table 4.4
Knowledge of the Main Types of Abortion Restrictions in the U.S. at Pre-test, Post-test, and Follow-up
Correctly identified
whether it was a
law in Arkansas at
Pre-test
N (%)

Correctly identified
whether it was a
law in Arkansas at
Post-test
N (%)

Correctly identified
whether it was a law
in Arkansas at
Follow-up
N (%)

Minors must get a parent’s permission before they can get an abortion

325 (88.1)

361 (97.8)

330 (89.4)

For women having an abortion at 20 weeks of pregnancy or later, doctors
have to counsel that that a fetus can feel pain

279 (75.6)

311 (84.3)

290 (78.6)

A woman must wait 48 hours after required counseling before the abortion
can be performed.

221 (59.9)

325 (88.1)

302 (81.8)

Medicaid (insurance for people who are low-income) can only cover
abortions in cases of the rape and incest or if the woman’s life is in danger

265 (71.8)

322 (87.3)

308 (83.5)

Abortions have to be administered by a licensed doctor (not a nurse or
other healthcare provider)

317 (85.9)

332 (90.0)

339 (91.9)

Doctors may not prescribe the abortion pill through telemedicine (e.g.,
online video session) for people who live far away

246 (66.7)

255 (69.1)

245 (66.4)

Before an abortion, doctors must tell women that it is possible for the
abortion pill to be reversed

214 (58.0)

308 (83.5)

296 (80.2)

A woman cannot get an abortion after 20 weeks of pregnancy unless her
life or health is in danger

78 (21.1)

341 (92.4)

321 (87.0)

A woman cannot get a “Partial-birth” abortion

250 (67.8)

256 (69.4)

218 (59.1)

A woman cannot get a dilation and extraction abortion which is often
performed after the 20th week of pregnancy

265 (71.8)

321 (87.0)

307 (83.2)

Restriction
Applies to Arkansas
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Table 4.4 (Cont.)
Correctly identified
whether it was a
law in Arkansas at
Pre-test
N (%)

Correctly identified
whether it was a
law in Arkansas at
Post-test
N (%)

Correctly identified
whether it was a law
in Arkansas at
Follow-up
N (%)

Minors must tell a parent before they can get an abortion but they don’t
need permission.

251 (68.0)

278 (75.3)

251 (68.0)

Before an abortion, doctors have to counsel that there may be a link
between breast cancer and abortion

94 (25.5)

69 (18.7)

57 (15.4)

Before an abortion, doctors must tell women that the abortion can cause
negative psychological effects

80 (21.7)

94 (25.5)

65 (17.6)

A woman must wait 24 hours after required counseling before the abortion
can be performed.

167 (45.3)

292 (79.1)

266 (72.1)

A woman must wait 72 hours after required counseling before the abortion
can be performed.

238 (64.5)

310 (84.0)

284 (77.0)

A woman must get an ultrasound (a scan to produce a picture of the
pregnancy) before an abortion

88 (23.8)

147 (39.8)

93 (25.2)

Private health insurance companies (e.g., Blue Cross Blue Shield, United
Healthcare) can require people to pay more or buy special insurance to
cover abortion

246 (66.7)

117 (31.7)

86 (23.3)

Facilities that provide abortions have to adhere to ambulatory surgical
standards (e.g., hallways have to be a certain width, requires extra nursing
staff, has to be within a certain distance to a hospital)

75 (20.3)

106 (28.7)

80 (21.7)

Restriction
Does not apply to Arkansas

148

148

Table 4.5
Support for the Main Types of Abortion Restrictions in the U.S. at Pre-test and Follow-up
Agreed it
should be a
law in
Arkansas at
Pre-test
N (%)
211 (57.2)

Neutral at
Pre-test
N (%)
54 (14.6)

Disagreed
it should be
a law in
Arkansas at
Pre-test
N (%)
104 (28.2)

Agreed it
should be a
law in
Arkansas at
Follow-up
N (%)
221 (60.1)

Neutral at
Follow-up
N (%)
32 (8.7)

Disagreed it
should be a
law in
Arkansas at
Follow-up
N (%)
115 (31.3)

For women having an abortion at 20 weeks of
pregnancy or later, doctors have to counsel that that a
fetus can feel pain

211 (57.2)

50 (13.6)

108 (29.3)

210 (56.9)

31 (8.4)

128 (34.7)

A woman must wait 48 hours after required
counseling before the abortion can be performed.

194 (52.6)

53 (14.4)

122 (33.1)

187 (50.7)

35 (9.5)

147 (39.8)

Medicaid (insurance for people who are low-income)
can only cover abortions in cases of the rape and
incest or if the woman’s life is in danger

205 (55.6)

36 (9.8)

128 (34.7)

220 (59.8)

25 (6.8)

123 (33.4)

Abortions have to be administered by a licensed
doctor (not a nurse or other healthcare provider)

283 (76.7)

42 (11.4)

44 (11.9)

243 (66.2)

48 (13.1)

76 (20.7)

Doctors may not prescribe the abortion pill through
telemedicine (e.g., online video session) for people
who live far away

180 (48.8)

53 (14.4)

136 (36.9)

143 (38.8)

46 (12.5)

180 (48.8)

Before an abortion, doctors must tell women that it is
possible for the abortion pill to be reversed

229 (62.1)

77 (20.9)

63 (17.1)

219 (59.5)

39 (10.6)

110 (29.9)

Restriction
Minors must get a parent’s permission before they can
get an abortion.

149

149

Table 4.5 (Cont.)
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A woman cannot get an abortion after 20 weeks of
pregnancy unless her life or health is in danger

218 (59.1)

41 (11.1)

110 (29.8)

208 (56.4)

51 (13.8)

110 (29.8)

A woman cannot get a “Partial-birth” abortion

192 (52.2)

78 (21.2)

98 (26.6)

177 (48.1)

63 (17.1)

128 (34.8)

A woman cannot get a dilation and extraction abortion
which is often performed after the 20th week of
pregnancy

211 (57.2)

55 (14.9)

103 (27.9)

207 (56.3)

45 (12.2)

116 (31.5)

Minors must tell a parent before they can get an
abortion but they don’t need permission.

148 (40.1)

56 (15.2)

165 (44.7)

116 (31.4)

55 (14.9)

198 (53.7)

Before an abortion, doctors have to counsel that there
may be a link between breast cancer and abortion

233 (63.1)

58 (15.7)

78 (21.1)

201 (54.6)

47 (12.8)

120 (32.6)

Before an abortion, doctors must tell women that the
abortion can cause negative psychological effects

273 (74.0)

43 (11.7)

53 (14.4)

244 (66.3)

36 (9.8)

88 (23.9)

A woman must wait 24 hours after required
counseling before the abortion can be performed.

186 (50.4)

60 (16.3)

123 (33.3)

166 (45.0)

39 (10.6)

164 (44.4)

A woman must wait 72 hours after required
counseling before the abortion can be performed.

162 (43.9)

33 (8.9)

174 (47.2)

146 (39.6)

28 (7.6)

195 (52.8)

A woman must get an ultrasound (a scan to produce a
picture of the pregnancy) before an abortion

210 (56.9)

36 (9.8)

123 (33.3)

213 (57.7)

24 (6.5)

132 (35.8)

Private health insurance companies (e.g., Blue Cross
Blue Shield, United Healthcare) can require people to
pay more or buy special insurance to cover abortion

178 (48.2)

55 (14.9)

136 (36.9)

187 (50.8)

44 (12.0)

137 (37.2)

Facilities that provide abortions have to adhere to
ambulatory surgical standards (e.g., hallways have to
be a certain width, requires extra nursing staff, has to
be within a certain distance to a hospital)

268 (72.6)

45 (12.2)

56 (15.2)

247 (66.9)

51 (13.8)

71 (19.2)
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CHAPTER 5: MANUSCRIPT 2
Do race and pregnancy situation affect empathy for women who seek abortions in Arkansas?: A
randomized-controlled video intervention
Abstract
CONTEXT: Despite the safety and prevalence of U.S. abortions, people who seek them
encounter barriers from two main sources: legislation and stigmatization. Empathy induction
may reduce these barriers, especially in highly restrictive states like Arkansas. This study
examines factors that contribute to empathy induction among Arkansans who watched a video
intervention.
METHODS: A sample of Arkansas residents (N = 369) completed an online survey comprising a
pre-test, video intervention, post-test, and two-week follow-up. There were five video conditions,
varying by actor’s race and pregnancy narrative. The surveys assessed baseline Empathic
Concern and post-video feelings of empathy. Chi-squared analyses were used to assess
differences in six empathy characteristic scores (e.g., moved, tender) by video condition.
Hierarchical regressions examined factors (e.g., video condition) contributing to post-video
empathy sum scores.
RESULTS: Participants who watched a testimonial where the woman was raped had higher
individual empathetic feeling scores. Post-test empathy sum scores were a function of
respondents’ sex, experience with abortion and sexual assault, baseline Empathic Concern, and
video condition. The testimonial depicting a Black woman who was raped induced the most
empathy at post-test. In the two-week follow-up, only personal experiences with abortion and
sexual assault, sex, and baseline Empathic Concern predicted empathy sum scores.
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CONCLUSIONS: Prior personal experiences and internalization of abortion stigma can affect
empathy induction. People were more empathetic for the woman who experiences rape rather
than consensual sex. The hierarchy of abortion narratives may influence perceptions of abortion
seekers. Future interventions to shift attitudes toward abortion seekers should incorporate
personal experiences and a variety of abortion narratives to normalize abortion experiences and
reduce stigma.

Key words: abortion, empathy, video intervention, Arkansas
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Introduction
Despite its high prevalence and low risk, abortion remains a contentious topic in the U.S.
(Dreweke, 2017; Guttmacher Institute, 2017a; Guttmacher Institute, 2017f; Jones & Jerman,
2017b). People who seek abortions face numerous barriers stemming from two main sources:
restrictive legislation and stigma. Midwestern and Southern states, such as Arkansas, have
particularly high rates of these laws restriction abortion (Nash et al., 2017). Stigmatization is
another source of impediment. People often conceptualize abortion seekers as either worthy or
unworthy patients, depending on circumstances, and perpetuate these conceptualizations in
interactions with others. This stigma can affect abortion seekers’ decisions or make their
reproductive journey more difficult (e.g., Norris et al., 2011).
Together, state laws and stigmatization delay abortions, making them more difficult to
get, expensive, and riskier than abortions obtained earlier in pregnancy (Bitler & Zavodny, 2001;
Jones & Weitz, 2009). Those who are denied abortion access suffer many negative outcomes
compared with those who obtain a sought after abortion. These outcomes include increased
depression and anxiety, decreased career or education advancement, and increased poverty
(Foster et al., 2015; Foster et al., 2018; Gipson, Koenig, & Hindin, 2008; Upadhyay et al., 2015).
As such, focusing on abolishing these barriers is a way to reduce negative health outcomes for
people who seek reproductive care.
A possible mechanism to reduce support for legislative barriers and abortion stigma is to
create empathy for those who seek abortions. Indeed, empathy induction has been a successful
tactic in shifting people’s attitudes toward stigmatized populations (e.g., Batson et al., 1997;
Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Nook et al., 2016; Wang et al., 2014). Video-based interventions
have been effective in shifting attitudes towards health behaviors as well (e.g., Blas, et al., 2010;
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Braverman, 2008; Roberto et al., 2000). Therefore, the current study examines the efficacy of an
empathy-based video intervention with residents of Arkansas, a state categorized as hostile
towards reproductive health access (Nash et al., 2017). We also examined contributing factors
toward feelings of empathy (i.e., sex, personal experiences, baseline Empathic Concern) for
Arkansans who seek abortions.
Barriers to Abortion Access
Arkansas is among the top three states in the U.S. with the most legislative abortion
restrictions passed between 2011 and 2015 (Guttmacher Institute, 2016b). Additionally, the
Arkansas state legislature introduced more anti-abortion bills than any other state during the
2017 legislative session (Center for Reproductive Rights, 2018). It is considered an “extremely
hostile” state (Guttmacher Institute, 2017k; Nash et al., 2017) with barriers stemming from two
sources: legislative restrictions and stigmatization.
Legislative barriers. In recent years, state legislatures have introduced myriad laws
restricting access to reproductive health services, including abortion and contraception; the
Center for Reproductive Rights (2018) estimates that 2,556 bills of this nature have been
introduced in the U.S. since 2011, and 370 have been made law. The ten most common types of
abortion restrictions include: 1) mandating parental involvement, 2) requiring pre-abortion
counseling, 3) mandating waiting periods, 4) mandating ultrasounds, 5) prohibiting coverage
from federal funding, 6) inhibiting coverage from private funding, 7) regulating medication
abortion, 8) micromanaging abortion facilities, 9) restricting abortions based on viability, and 10)
preparing for the overturn of Roe v. Wade (Nash et al., 2017). At data collection for this study,
Arkansas had laws in 8 of the 10 major categories (Guttmacher Institute, 2017k; Nash et al.,
2017).
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As a result, Arkansas only has three facilities in the state that provide abortion services
(Cartwright, Karunaratne, Barr-Walker, Johns, & Upadhyay, 2018) for approximately 600,000
women of reproductive age (i.e., 15-44; March of Dimes, 2019). Because these clinics are
located in two cities across the entire state, women’s ability to seek and access an abortion is
severely limited. Additionally, with only three clinics total in the state, when women go to one of
these facilities, their private choices become public. If abortion was more accessible in Arkansas
(e.g., health professionals were not hindered in providing abortions in hospitals and other
healthcare settings), women would be afforded more privacy in making these reproductive
choices.
Stigmatization. Many studies have examined sources and outcomes of stigma that
abortion seekers face (e.g., Kimport, Foster, & Weitz, 2011; Kimport, Weitz, & Freedman, 2016;
Norris et al., 2011). These studies often collect stratified data with representation from people in
the South and Midwest. However, if there are Arkansans in these samples, they are combined
with other Southerners or Midwesterners. Arkansans do not have the same experiences as other
Southerners or Midwesterners. Lawmakers in Arkansas enacted more anti-abortion laws than any
other state in 2017 (Center for Reproductive Rights, 2018), but convenience samples of
Arkansans suggest the majority support abortion legality; it is unknown to what extent
Arkansans understand the practical impact that abortion restriction have on individual women
(Jozkowski, Crawford, & Hunt, 2018; Parry, 2017). To study how Arkansans feel about abortion,
additional research is needed.
There is limited research specifically examining Arkansans’ internalized stigmatization
toward women who seek abortions. Instead, we can examine national data to assess sources of
stigmatization. Often, attitudes toward abortion are influenced by a variety of internal biases;
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there are three specific biases that are consistently related to abortion attitudes: 1) beliefs about
women and their role in motherhood, 2) beliefs about race, and 3) perceived pregnancy
responsibility (e.g., Hans & Kimberly, 2014; Kumar, 2013; Kumar et al., 2009; Norris et al.,
2011).
Beliefs about women. Most people who seek abortions face prejudices related to the
general societal pressures of women. Kumar and colleagues (2009) posit that women who seek
abortions are marked as “inferior” (p. 628) by violating the three ideals of
womanhood/femininity: women must have sex only for procreation, women must aspire to
become mothers, and women must act on their instinct to nurture the vulnerable. Likewise,
Ellison (2003) argues that stigmatizing women who have abortions is a form of “structural
violence” (p. 323) and therefore perpetuates that there are “good” and “worthy” women (e.g.,
married women who become pregnant and have babies) and socially deviant women (e.g., those
who are not married, those who end their pregnancies).
Beliefs about race. While all women experience gender pressure, women of color face
even greater stigma compared with White women. Kumar (2013) points out that “socially
excluded” women (e.g., women of color) already experience stigmatization and discrimination
without seeking an abortion. Therefore, scholars should be careful not to lump every inequality
in as “abortion stigma.” There are women who are already at a social disadvantage when they
“enter the abortion landscape” (Kumar, 2013, p. e330) and their obstacles are exacerbated as
they navigate an abortion experience. For instance, young women of color experience prejudice
and discrimination as a result of racism. Paradoxically, these women, who experience the most
barriers to access, have the highest rates of abortion (Guttmacher Institute, 2017a; Jones &
Jerman, 2017b; Jones & Kavanaugh, 2011).
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The Hyde Amendment is an example of a barrier that heavily affects women of color.
This law prohibits federal funding from covering abortion care, which overwhelmingly affects
low-income women of color. Women of color are more likely to be use Medicaid due to
socioeconomic inequality stemming from racism (i.e., 30% of Black women and 24% of
Hispanic women aged 15–44 are enrolled in Medicaid, compared with 14% of White women;
Boonstra, 2016; Frohwirth, 2014). Also, because of racial prejudice, people perceive that the
state has the right and responsibility to intervene in the reproductive decisions of women of color
on behalf of their fetuses and children (Harrison, 2016). For example, pregnant women of color
are more likely to be policed by hospitals for engaging in behaviors that are detrimental to the
fetus (e.g., drug use) even though pregnant White women are just as likely to engage in the same
behaviors.
Perceived pregnancy responsibility. Another internal bias that contributes to
stigmatization is the circumstances under which a woman became pregnant and consequently
their perceived responsibility for the pregnancy. Overwhelmingly, the U.S. public supports
abortion under at least some circumstances (Smith & Son, 2013), yet, many people harbor
conflicting attitudes. People conceptualize abortion seekers as worthy or unworthy based on
women’s characteristics or circumstances (Hunt, Marcantonio, Jozkowski, & Crawford,
forthcoming; Jozkowski, Crawford, & Hunt, 2018; Smith & Son, 2013). For instance, people
conceptualize a worthy abortion seeker when there is a “good” reason and an unworthy abortion
seeker when there is a “bad” reason. Rape is a pregnancy circumstance often supported by the
public as an “acceptable” or understandable reason for abortion (Mikolajczak & Bilewicz, 2015;
Smith & Son, 2013). A woman who is pregnant as a result of consensual sex, a “bad” reason,
will likely be judged more harshly for seeking an abortion than a woman who was raped. Likely,
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people will assume the woman who became pregnant as a result of consensual sex had some
control over her risk of pregnancy compared with someone who may not have had a choice
(Hans & Kimberly, 2014).
In this study, we aimed to examine the impact of restrictions and factors that contribute to
stigmatization of women (e.g., race, perceived pregnancy responsibility) as they relate to
empathy induction for Arkansan women who seek abortions.
Empathy
Those who have sought or obtained an abortion report experiencing stigma and
discrimination from their partners, family, friends, and the larger society (Norris et al., 2011).
This stigma can result from a lack of understanding, or empathy, about women’s decisions to
obtain an abortion. Empathy is the result of perspective-taking that “occur[s] when people can
seemingly understand the underlying reasons for the behavior of someone other than themselves”
(Plumm & Terrance, 2009, p. 191). As such, targeting empathy may increase people’s
understanding of abortion seekers’ circumstances. In turn, their attitudes about people who seek
abortions may shift.
There are two primary types of empathy: trait and state (Batson, Turk, Shaw, & Klein,
1995; Haegerich & Bottoms, 2000; Plumm & Terrance, 2009). Trait empathy results from an
individual’s similarity with the population in question (e.g., personal characteristics such as
gender and race), whereas state empathy is a result of an individual’s ability to position take with
another person. It is difficult to manipulate or target trait empathy as it requires sharing similar
characteristics with another person; however, researchers can increase people’s ability to
experience state empathy.
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A person’s life experiences can facilitate higher levels of state empathy. For example,
facing discrimination or knowing someone who has been raped can lead to an increased chance
of shifted attitudes for populations in need of empathy (Batson et al., 1997; Galinsky &
Moskowitz, 2000; Glynn & Sen, 2015; Moyer & Haire, 2015; Wang, Tai, Ku, & Galinsky, 2014;
Wiener, Felman Wiener, & Grisso, 1989). Literature indicates women are more likely than men
to have higher empathy (Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983; Hoffman, 1977). Taken together, we
hypothesized women who have had a personal abortion experience seem to be most likely feel
empathy for abortion seekers.
Researchers have designed interventions using empathy induction techniques to change
people’s attitudes toward stigmatized populations. For instance, interventions have been
conducted to increase empathy for homeless individuals (Batson et al., 1997; Nook et al., 2016;
Wang et al., 2014), individuals who have committed homicide (Batson et al., 1997; Plumm &
Terrance, 2009), and individuals with illness or disability (Batson et al., 1997; Lor et al., 2015).
These interventions increased people’s empathy toward these vulnerable populations and
successfully shifted people’s attitudes toward these groups. Therefore, empathy appears to be an
underlying cognitive construct that can influence attitudes.
There is limited research using empathy as a tool to adjust people’s attitudes toward
women who seek abortions (Norris et al., 2011). The few empathy interventions focused on
abortion have targeted either health professionals (e.g., Pace et al., 2008; Turner and colleagues,
2008) or specifically aimed for conflict resolution among “pro-life” vs. “pro-choice” populations
(LeBaron & Carstaphen, 1997), but not the individuals who experience abortion.
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Strategies to Induce Empathy
To induce empathy, experiments have had success with testimonials, or stories of
personal experiences told by members of the group in question. In these experiments,
participants have either watched videos, listened to audio tracks, or read these stories. Then they
were instructed to think about how the other person might be feeling to elicit an empathetic
response (Davis, 1996; Haegerich & Bottoms, 2000; Plumm & Terrance, 2009). Specifically,
audio- or video-based testimonials appear to have resulted in longer lasting attitude changes than
written testimonials or education initiatives alone (Batson et al., 1997; Blas, et al., 2010;
Braverman, 2008; Parker et al., 1996; Roberto et al., 2000). Further, some interventions that
involved interacting with and hearing the narratives of people who obtain and work in abortion
care generated successful attitude change (LeBaron & Carstaphen, 1997; Pace et al., 2008).
The Current Study
The goal of this study was to examine the effectiveness of a video-based intervention that
used empathy induction as a tool to adjust people’s views on Arkansas women who seek
abortions. All participants received the same educational information about abortion restrictions
in Arkansas. For participants randomized to the intervention arm, we tested two variables across
four conditions in the intervention—race and pregnancy circumstance. For race, participants in
the intervention condition either viewed a Black or White woman discussing her difficulties
obtaining an abortion in Arkansas. For pregnancy circumstance, participants in the intervention
condition heard one of two stories: the woman became pregnant through consensual sex or as a
result of a rape. We aimed to see if these two intervention variables affected feeling the six
empathy characteristics (e.g., sympathetic, moved, tender; Batson et al., 1997). Then we aimed
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to test which factors, including testimonial version, predicted empathy sum scores for women
who seek abortions in Arkansas.
RQ1. First, we examined if people felt the six empathy characteristics differently
depending on the race of the woman in the video. We hypothesized that people who viewed the
Black woman’s testimonials would have lower scores on the six empathy characteristics than
those who viewed the White woman given internal racial biases against women of color.
RQ2. Second, we examined if people felt the six empathy characteristics differently
based on perceived pregnancy responsibility. We hypothesized that participants who viewed the
testimonial where the woman became pregnant as a result of rape would have higher scores on
the six empathy characteristics than participants who heard the woman became pregnant as a
result of consensual sex.
RQ3. Last, we examined if other personal experiences/traits contributed to empathy sum
scores. Particularly, we aimed to see whether watching a certain testimonial would affect
empathy sum scores above and beyond personal experiences/traits. The variables we evaluated
were participants’ sex, previous experience with abortion, previous experience with sexual
assault, baseline Empathic Concern (how naturally empathetic one is), social desirability scores
(to what degree participants feel pressure to act according to what is socially acceptable), and
assigned video condition. Specifically, we hypothesized that people who 1) are female, 2) have
personal experiences with abortion, 3) have personal experiences with sexual assault, 4) have
higher level of baseline Empathic Concern, 5) people with high social desirability scores, and 6)
viewed the video with a White woman who was raped would have the highest empathy sum
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scores. We examined participants’ race in another model but it was not significant and was not
included in the final model.
Methods
Participants
A sample of Arkansas residents (N = 369) completed an online survey that entailed a pretest, intervention, post-test and two-week follow-up. We recruited participants through targeted
social media advertising in Arkansas (e.g., Arkansas specific Reddit and Craigslist pages,
Facebook), word of mouth, email, and listservs. Eligibility criteria included currently living in
Arkansas, being at least 18 years old, and being a native English speaker or attending school
where English was the primary language from K-12. The minimum number of participants
required was determined by an a priori power analysis (G*Power: Faul et al., 2007) with power
(1 - β) set at .80, α = .05, two-tailed, and a medium effect size of .25 (Cohen, 1977, 1988). All
group sizes used in analyses exceeded this minimum (n = 34 per group). Twenty-four hundred
people opened the introductory page and 556 qualified for the study.
After data were collected, we removed individuals for failing reading checks, incomplete
surveys, and failure to complete all three points of data collection (attrition rate of 33.6%); See
Figure 5.1 for attrition rates and final sample size in each condition. The final analytical sample
included 369 participants who completed all three waves of data collection (N = 263 in
intervention conditions and N = 106 in control condition).
The majority of the sample identified as female, White, heterosexual, and “pro-choice.”
The mean age was 32.07 (SD = 9.44) and, on average, participants had lived in Arkansas for
21.36 years (SD = 12.14). The majority of the sample reported having a personal experience with
abortion and sexual assault. In other words, either they or someone they knew had had an
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abortion and/or had experienced a sexual assault before. Frequencies of demographic data are
reported in Table 5.1.

Figure 5.1. Sample size and survey flow.
Procedures
The study followed a randomized-controlled pre-test, post-test, follow-up (PPF) design.
After completing the pre-test, participants were randomly triaged into watching one of five video
clips. All clips began with the same informational portion about current legislative restrictions on
abortion in Arkansas. Participants were then either assigned to the control condition (i.e., moved
into post-test questionnaire) or one of the four testimonials. A testimonial depicted a woman
discussing the difficulty she had in seeking an abortion in Arkansas because of state restrictions.
Following the testimonial, participants in the intervention conditions received the post-test. In
closing, we asked all participants to provide their email to be sent the two-week follow-up survey
and financial compensation (i.e., one $10 e-gift card). Two weeks later, participants received the
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follow-up survey via email to test for rebound effects (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992; JohanssonLove & Geer, 2003). Participants received an additional $10 e-gift card as incentive for
participating in the follow-up survey. The Institutional Review Board at the institution of data
collection approved all procedures.
Intervention Videos
Content. Several media persuasion strategies guided the content development of the
videos (e.g., casting, script development, visual aids). For example, to establish credibility of the
woman giving the testimonial as a source of information (Petty & Priester, 1994), the news
anchor introduces her as someone “who is here to tell us a personal story about her experience
with these Arkansas laws.” By tying her to the state where participants currently live, the
audience is more likely to pay attention to the information (Devereux, 2007; Golding & Elliott,
1979; Wahl-Jorgensen & Hanitzsch, 2009). A team of five experts in media communication,
public health, sociology, and abortion research reviewed the script for clarity and wording. The
two video portions are briefly described below. See the Appendix A for the full script.
Informational portion. The informational portion aimed to increase awareness of the
myriad abortion restrictions in Arkansas via a news story. All participants watched this clip. The
news anchor introduces herself and briefly provides context about the safety, legality, and types
of abortion. Then she describes the major legislative restrictions on abortion in Arkansas, each
with an accompanying reiterative graphic. The news anchor ends the clip specifying how these
restrictions have diminished access to abortion services.
Testimonial portion. There were four intervention groups, each watching a different
version of the testimonial. All four testimonials were similar in length and wording (Ryffel &

164

Wirth, 2016). Participants either watched a Black woman or a White woman give one of two
different pregnancy scenarios: consensual sex or rape. In constructing the testimonials, we aimed
to maximize the empathy people would feel for the character. In the consensual version, the
woman, “Mia,” describes her experience becoming unexpectedly pregnant and seeking an
abortion. She states that she did not know the person by whom she became pregnant and “didn’t
tell anyone about it for a long time.” She outlines the time it took for her to realize she was
pregnant and details the restrictions that made obtaining an abortion in Arkansas more difficult
(e.g., lack of insurance coverage, necessitated travel and waiting period increasing costs). She
describes her economic troubles such as “living paycheck to paycheck,” struggling to afford rent
and groceries, and having to use all of the money in her bank account to pay for the abortion. She
divulges that she had to ask a friend for money for the bus ride to the clinic 3 hours away and
had to sleep in the bus station for two nights during the 48-hour waiting period. She concludes
with the statement “I don’t regret the abortion. I felt relieved. It wasn’t the right time.”
In the rape testimonial, the woman, “Mia” begins saying “Last year, I was raped. I was
coming out of work and someone attacked me the parking lot. I didn’t know the guy and I didn’t
tell anyone about it for a long time.” In the same words as the consensual version, she outlines
the time it took for her to realize she was pregnant. She also details the same restrictions and
economic troubles that made it more difficult for her to seek an abortion. In this version, she says
“I also knew I definitely did not want to have the baby of the person who raped me” and “My
insurance wouldn’t cover me because I didn’t report the rape. I didn’t want people to know.” She
details the ordeal of getting to the clinic and having to sleep in the bus station, just like the other
version. She concludes with a statement of certainty: “I don’t regret the abortion. I felt relieved. I
just wanted to put the rape behind me.”
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Measures
First, we pilot tested the pre-test, post-test, and follow-up instruments with a convenience
sample of graduate and undergraduate researchers (n = 14) to assess for clarity, readability, and
length. The pre-test measures of interest in this study included: screener questions to assess
eligibility, demographic questions (e.g., sex, experience with abortion and sexual assault), and
one subscale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI)-- Empathic Concern (Davis, 1980). The
post-test had an assessment of empathy feelings (Batson, 1991; Drwecki et al., 2011) to evaluate
immediate effects after the videos (i.e., control (0), White woman, rape testimonial (1), White
woman, consensual sex (2), Black woman, rape (3), Black woman, consensual sex (4)).
Participants took the feelings of empathy assessment again in the two-week follow-up
assessment in addition to a source-credibility scale (Ohanian, 1990) assessing for confounding
factors.
Feelings of empathy. Participants indicated to what extent they experienced six empathy
characteristics (Batson, 1991; Drwecki et al., 2011) after viewing their assigned video and again
at the two-week follow-up. At post-test, they were asked “After hearing the news story, to what
extent did you experience feeling…” At follow-up, instructions included, “A few weeks ago, you
watched a news story about abortion laws in Arkansas. When thinking about this video clip,
what are your current feelings?” The six characteristics consisted of tender, softhearted, warm,
compassionate, moved, and sympathetic on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very
much). Scores were aggregated to form a total score (ranging 6 to 42) in addition to analyzing
each feeling score separately (ranging 1 to 7). The empathy characteristics were found to be
reliable at post-test and follow-up (6 items; α = .916, α = .914 respectively). In analyzing the
scores of the individual characteristics, we collapsed the seven point Likert scale (1 = not all to 7
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= very much) into three categories: lack of [feeling] (scores of 1, 2, and 3), neutral on [feeling]
(scores of 4), and positive report of [feeling] (scores of 5, 6, and 7).
Sex. In the pre-test, participants were asked one question about their sex. They could
have responded with male (1), female (2), or other (3) and specified their answer.
Experience with abortion and sexual assault. In the pre-test, participants were asked to
report personal experiences with abortion and sexual assault. First, they were asked, “Have you
or anyone you know had an abortion?” and “Have you or anyone you know experienced sexual
assault?” For both questions, participants could have answered yes (1), no (2), or I’m not sure
(3).
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980). The IRI is a 28-item measure
consisting of four 7-item subscales, “each tapping some aspect of the global concept of empathy”
(Davis, 1983, p. 113). The current study used one subscale related to the study aims: Empathic
Concern which “assesses ‘other-oriented’ feelings of sympathy and concern for unfortunate
others” (Davis, 1983, p. 114). An example item on the Empathic Concern subscale was “I often
have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me.” Each item was rated on a 5point Likert scale ranging from 1 (does not describe me well) to 5 (describes me very well).
Higher scores indicated a higher self-reported tendency to experience empathy. The Empathic
Concern scale was found to be reliable (7 items; α = .789).
Source-credibility scale (Ohanian, 1990). At the end of the follow-up survey,
participants were asked to evaluate the actor(s) in the video they watched. Participants were
shown a picture of the actor(s) of their assigned video condition and scored them on a 9-point
bipolar scale on three subscales: attractiveness, trustworthiness, and expertise. The scale was 15
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items with a total score range of 15 to 135, with lower scores indicating more perceived
credibility of the source. The source-credibility scale was found to be reliable (15 items; α =
.957).
Analyses
All data were downloaded from Qualtrics Survey Software into SPSS 24 for analyses.
First, we ran univariate analyses on the pre-test Empathic Concern scores to assess group
differences between the five video conditions. As part of assessing for confounding factors, we
examined differences in the actors’ perceived credibility score with univariate comparisons. We
accounted for Type I error by using a Bonferroni correction in all analyses with multiple
comparisons (α = .05/5 = .01).
RQ1 and RQ2. We examined each of the six empathy characteristics (sympathetic,
moved, compassionate, tender, warm, soft-hearted) by the manipulated variables in the
testimonials (race and perceived pregnancy responsibility), using chi-squared analyses. For race,
we compared White woman’s testimonials vs. Black woman’s testimonials. For perceived
pregnancy responsibility, we compared testimonials in which the woman was raped vs.
testimonials in which the woman had consensual sex. Additionally, we performed post-hoc
pairwise Fisher’s exact tests. We reported Cramér’s V as a measure of effect size for all
significant chi-square results. A φ-value of .10 indicates a small effect size, .30 medium, and .50
large (Kline, 2004).
RQ3. To assess what factors contributed to empathy sum scores toward women who seek
abortions, we conducted two hierarchical regressions testing six predictors (i.e., video condition,
sex, abortion experience, sexual assault experience, social desirability, and baseline Empathic
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Concern)—one at post-test and one at follow-up. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons were conducted
to assess significant differences in our factors of interest.
Results
At baseline, participants had a medium to high tendency for Empathic Concern (M =
25.03 SD = 5.20; range 5-35). Regarding the six feelings of empathy, the mean total score was
31.81 (SD = 7.59) at post-test and 30.11 (SD = 8.32) at follow-up. The scores ranged from 6 to
42 indicating relatively high feelings of empathy for the woman giving the testimonial. Mean
scores of the six empathy characteristics at post-test and follow-up are reported in Table 5.2.
There were no significant differences between groups on Empathic Concern scores at
baseline, [F(4, 364) = 2.312, p = .057], indicating an effective randomization. As part of as
assessing for confounding factors, we examined differences in the actors’ perceived credibility
score. Univariate comparisons indicated no significant differences between the Black actor and
White actor in total score, p = .682, Attractiveness, p = .991, Trustworthiness, p = .631, or
Expertise, p = .534.
Effects of Interventions
RQ1 and RQ2. There were no significant differences in empathy characteristic scores by
race at post-test or follow-up. However, at post-test, there were differences on empathy
characteristic scores by perceived pregnancy responsibility (α = .05/3 = .017). There were no
significant differences by video condition for individual Sympathetic scores, Moved scores,
Compassionate scores, or Warm scores. There were significant differences for Tender scores,
[X2(2, N = 263) = 12.19, p = .002] and Soft-hearted scores, [X2(2, N = 263) = 8.11, p = .017]. See
Table 5.3 for chi-square results.
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We calculated post hoc pairwise Fisher’s exact tests for post-test feelings to identify
which video condition was associated with difference empathy measures. Participants who
watched a testimonial in which the woman was raped had a positive report (scores of 5, 6, 7) of
feeling Tender (p = .001) and Soft-hearted (p = .011) compared with those who watched a
testimonial where the women became pregnant from consensual sex. Participants who watched a
consensual testimonial reported feeling neutral (scores of 4) on the Tenderness scale (p = .026)
compared to those who watched a rape testimonial. Last, participants who watched a consensual
testimonial reported feeling a lack of (scores of 1, 2, 3) Tenderness (p = .022), and a lack of Softheartedness (p = .016) compared to those who watched a rape testimonial.
At the two-week follow-up there were no significant differences on empathy
characteristic feelings.
RQ3. First, we examined what factors would predict feelings of empathy at post-test and
two-week follow-up. We first entered baseline Empathic Concern, social desirability score, and
sexual assault experience as our independent variables as controls because of their high
correlations with the dependent variable. Then we added experience with abortion, sex, and, last,
video condition. Our findings suggest that all of our independent variables, except social
desirability, predicted empathy sum scores after watching the video, at post-test, [F(6, 357) =
15.636, p < .001]. The model accounted for 20.8% of the variance in empathy sum scores (R2 =
.208, adjusted R2 = .195); see Tables 5.4 and 5.5. Post hoc comparisons suggested higher
empathy sum scores among those who watched the testimonial of a Black woman who was raped
(compared with those who did not watch a testimonial; p < .001).
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Next, we examined if our factors of interest predicted empathy at the two-week follow-up
entering independent variables in the same order. Only four factors were predictive of empathy
sum scores: baseline Empathic Concern, sex, sexual assault experience, and abortion experience,
[F(6, 357) = 12.659, p < .001], accounting for 17.5% of the variance (R2 = .175, adjusted R2 =
162); see Table 5.4 and 5.6.
Discussion
This study aimed to adjust feelings of empathy for women who seek abortions in
Arkansas via a randomized-controlled video experiment. Our results suggest that several prior
experiences and feelings can affect the empathy induced by the intervention. In examining the
empathy characteristic scores (e.g., tender, soft-hearted), there were only differences by
perceived pregnancy responsibility; people who watched a rape testimonial reported higher
scores on several emotions compared to the consensual testimonial. There were no differences in
empathy characteristic scores by race of the video subject. In assessing contributions to the
empathy sum scores, only one video condition was related to greater feelings of empathy for the
actor; this condition depicted the Black woman who became pregnant by rape. However, these
results were only sustained at post-test; there was no impact of video condition on empathy at the
two-week follow-up. Interestingly, we found that personally experiencing or knowing someone
who experienced sexual assault or abortion increased empathy for our actor at both post-test and
follow-up.
Effect of Race on Empathy
There were no differences when we compared scores on each individual emotion (e.g.,
moved, tender) between those who watched a White woman’s testimonial and those who
watched a Black woman’s testimonial. Generally, people were on the high end in reporting these
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feelings (i.e., 5, 6, 7, with 7 being I experienced this feeling “very much”). The lack of
differences by race could have been a function of the homogeneity of our sample. Over half of
participants had a college degree or higher and reported being liberal or strongly liberal.
Research shows that education and liberal opinions are often associated with social tolerance
(Kozloski, 2010). It may be that people in our study are more attuned to discrimination and
therefore, the woman’s race did not affect individual empathetic emotions for her.
Although there was no effect of race in individual feeling scores, there was one
testimonial--the Black woman who was raped--that had a significant effect on total empathy
score (i.e., all of the feelings scored together). We hypothesized that individuals would have
more empathy for the White actress because of internalized racial bias against Black women.
However, the Black woman induced more empathy. If the education and liberal opinions of our
sample are associated with higher social tolerance, perhaps feeling more empathy for the Black
woman was related to understanding women of color experience marginalization and are
afforded less privilege and means than White women in society (e.g., Boonstra, 2016; Jones &
Kavanaugh, 2011).
Alternatively, our participants’ empathy for the Black woman who was raped could have
manifested from a feeling of supervision or authority. Baker (2015) argues that White Americans
favor giving aid to people of color as a function of an “underlying racial paternalism” (p. 93).
That is, instead of feeling empathy because the system of reproductive circumstances is stacked
against her, people may have felt she needed help because of internalized prejudice. Indeed,
some scholars attest that health care professionals intercede for pregnant women of color more
than pregnant White women to ensure they are maintaining their pregnancy to certain standards
(e.g., testing for drug use; Harrison, 2016). In the case of a pregnant woman of color seeking an
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abortion, feeling “moved” or “sympathetic” may stem from thinking her situation--being in
poverty, being Black, and being raped--warrants an “acceptable” reason for termination. If this
sense of paternalism is a contributor in our sample, educational initiatives may need to address
cognitive processes behind abortion attitudes related to underlying racism in addition to shifting
empathy.
Effect of Perceived Pregnancy Responsibility on Empathy
As we predicted, people who watched a testimonial with a rape narrative had higher
individual empathy scores compared with those who watched a consensual narrative. Rape
survivors are typically viewed as less at fault for their pregnancy and worthier of pregnancy
termination than those who had consensual sex (Ludlow, 2008; Mikolajczak & Bilewicz, 2015;
Smith & Son, 2013). Again, in examining total empathy scores, it was only the Black woman
who was raped that induced significantly higher scores. Though there were no differences when
looking solely at race, perhaps the combination of the rape scenario and race were what created
the more empathetic combination.
This finding, though unexpected, contributes to Ludlow’s (2008) argument that abortion
narratives are subconsciously hierarchized. That is, people in abortion care and advocacy easily
talk about the abortions from rape and trauma because they are more “acceptable” reasons for
pregnancy termination; these scenarios induce empathy. People often do not feel sorry for
abortion seekers when they perceive them to have been in control of the situation resulting in
pregnancy or if they do not have an “acceptable” reason for ending a pregnancy (Hans &
Kimberly, 2014; Ludlow, 2008). Thus, these narratives (e.g., lack of finances, readiness) are not
often spoken about even though they are the norm (Ludlow, 2008). If educators and advocates
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only use narratives of people who seek abortions out of trauma or emergency, empathy may be
learned for certain pregnancy situations and not others.
Effect of Personal Experiences and Traits on Empathy
Past experiences of abortion and sexual assault experience affect empathy scores. Our
results are consistent with research that having a previous relevant experience will increase
empathy (e.g., Glynn & Sen, 2015; Moyer & Haire, 2015; Wiener, Felman Wiener, & Grisso,
1989) and knowing just one person who is part of a stigmatized population can affect attitudes
toward that population (DellaPosta, 2018). Many of the people in our study had abortion
experience and therefore, may have empathized with the testimonial woman because they were
linking her experience to theirs.
This is an important implication for future interventions with empathy for abortion
seekers—focusing on people and experiences that are personal to them. However, abortion is an
easily concealable event. A safe and complete abortion allows for some invisibility because there
are no visibly obvious lasting outcomes, which permits women to keep it to themselves (Kumar
et al., 2009). With the prevalence of abortion, chances are, most people know someone who has
had an abortion (Dreweke, 2017; Guttmacher Institute, 2017a). Yet, the people who may have
the least permissive attitudes toward abortion seekers may not know they know someone who
has had one. Individuals who have had an abortion may be hesitant to share this with people in
their lives that are unsupportive of reproductive choice, especially if their stories involve seeking
an abortion for an “unacceptable” reason (e.g., not wanting to have a child, multiple abortions).
This lack of transparency affects the empathy people are conditioned to feel. On the
chance that people do hear stories from friends and family who have had abortions, but only
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trauma abortion narratives, their capacity for empathy may be skewed. If they hear the story of a
person who sought an abortion because they did not use a condom, they may differentiate which
pregnancy scenarios are worthy of termination. Therefore, it is important that people and
partners with any abortion story share more openly. This could create more empathy among their
networks and normalize the experiences of many abortion seekers without an “acceptable”
reason. There are some advocacy projects (e.g., Shout Your Abortion, the Sea Change Program,
1 in 3 Campaign) that have focused on sharing complete or untold abortion narratives via an
online media platform. However, few of these projects have the format (e.g., means of data
collection) to track the impact these stories have on the people who view them. Combining
lessons learned from this project with the strategies used in those videos could normalize the
open sharing of abortion narratives. Normalizing abortion narratives could lessen stigma so the
general population could connect their personal experiences to testimonial interventions and
educational initiatives.
Limitations
This study had many strengths including its randomized-controlled design, innovative
approach to intervention, and focus on abortion seekers in Arkansas. However, there were also
several limitations to note. The sample, although randomly assigned to conditions, were not
randomly selected from the population of Arkansas and therefore, not fully generalizable to all
Arkansans. There is the possibility of self-selection bias. However, we offered compensation for
participants to increase motivation so even people who were indifferent about abortion would be
more inclined to participate.
As with experimental interventions, we cannot infer causality from the effect of the
videos. It may be of note that the Black testimonial actor was a Master of Fine Arts student,
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whereas the White testimonial actor was a third-year undergraduate student. Although they both
had similar levels of acting experience (i.e., involvement in numerous productions), there may be
a difference in the perceived quality of their acting. It could have been that the actor who was
Black was more effective at inducing empathy than the actor who was White. However, there
were no significant differences in source credibility and if this was the sole factor, there should
have been a significant difference in empathy for those who watched the Black woman who had
consensual sex as well.
Additionally, there may be limitations related to social desirability bias and the format of
online media interventions. Participants may not have watched or paid attention to the whole
video. However, the survey settings prevented participants from leaving until the entire video
had played.
Implications and Future Directions
Findings from this study have implications for future research and intervention work.
First, we encourage health educators and researchers to use video-based testimonials in their
programs and studies to lend a story to their statistics. Utilizing personal experiences may
enhance the effects of interventions. Making this issue personal will increase empathy and make
it easier to perspective-take. Research indicates that empathy induction can increase prosocial
behavior (e.g., willingness to engage with stigmatized populations; Wang, Tai, Ku, & Galinsky,
2014). Lessening stigma for people who seek abortions triggers a feedback loop so they will be
more comfortable to share their stories, people they interact with will hear their story, making
individuals in their network more susceptible to empathy-based interventions and shifting
attitudes.
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To apply the implications from this study, future research should intervene with people
who are opposing, unsure, or ambivalent about abortion. Educators and researchers should focus
on those who do not think they know anyone who has had an abortion, then reveal that they most
likely do know someone who had an abortion to further explore the effect of personal
experiences and empathy induction.
Second, it is important to be strategic with the abortion narratives used in this work.
“Socially acceptable” narratives (e.g., rape) create an emotional buy in so it may be wise to start
with those stories. But it is also important to address other mundane reasons for abortion (e.g.,
finances) so as to not further perpetuate stigmas of “worthy” and “unworthy” abortions. A
woman of color was effective in inducing empathy in this study. However, the majority of this
sample were White women. In the future, researchers should examine trait empathy among
women of color and men to see if race and perceived pregnancy responsibility are viewed
differently among these populations.
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Appendices
Table 5.1
Participant Demographics (N = 369)
Characteristic

N (%)

Sex

Characteristic

N (%)

Sexual Orientation

Male

104 (28.2)

Heterosexual

329 (89.2)

Female

264 (71.5)

Gay/Lesbian

14 (3.8)

Bisexual

20 (5.4)

Queer

6 (1.6)

Race
White or Caucasian
Black or African
American

312 (84.6)
24 (6.5)

Education Level

Latino/a

12 (3.3)

High school graduate/GED

39 (10.6)

Asian or Asian American

4 (1.1)

Some college/associate degree

104 (28.2)

Bi- or Multi- racial

8 (2.2)

College degree

183 (49.6)

Graduate degree

41 (11.1)

Income Level
Low

23 (6.2)

Political Party

Lower-Middle

102 (27.6)

Republican

120 (32.5)

Middle

126 (34.1)

Democrat

139 (37.7)

Upper-Middle

57 (15.4)

Libertarian

58 (15.7)

High

61 (16.5)

None

39 (10.6)

Relationship Status

Abortion Identity

Married

218 (59.1)

“Pro-Life”

66 (17.9)

In a relationship

68 (18.4)

“Pro-Choice”

269 (72.9)

Single and not dating

43 (11.7)

Neither

13 (3.5)

Single and dating

28 (7.8)

Both

18 (4.9)

Abortion Experience (self
and/or others)

Sexual Assault Experience (self
and/or others)

Yes

275 (74.5)

Yes

306 (82.9)

No

65 (17.6)

No

47 (12.7)

Not Sure

29 (7.9)

Not Sure

16 (4.3)

Social Desirability M (SD)

5.04 (2.16)
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Table 5.2
Mean Scores of Empathy Characteristics for Women who seek Abortions/Woman in Video at
Post-test and Follow-Up
Post-test

Follow-Up

M

SD

M

SD

Sympathetic

5.54

1.32

5.44

1.45

Moved

5.15

1.46

5.04

1.46

Compassionate

5.58

1.31

5.35

1.42

Tender

5.21

1.59

5.03

1.58

Warm

5.05

1.72

4.81

1.67

Soft-hearted

5.30

1.60

4.93

1.57

Sum Score

31.81

7.59

30.11

8.32

Note. Empathy characteristic subscale scores range from 1-7 and sum scores range from 6-42.
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Table 5.3
Chi-Square Results for Post-test Empathy Characteristic Scores and Perceived Pregnancy Responsibility Video Condition (N = 263)
Rape Testimonial
46.4%
(n = 122)
n
%
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Sympathetic
No
Neutral
Yes
Moved
No
Neutral
Yes
Compassionate
No
Neutral
Yes
Tender
No
Neutral
Yes
Warm
No
Neutral
Yes
Soft-hearted
No
Neutral
Yes

5
4
113

25.0
25.0
49.8

Consensual Testimonial
53.6%
(n = 141)
n
%
15
12
114

28.6
33.3
51.3

20
24
97

71.4
66.7
48.7

5
10
107

27.8
40.0
48.6

13
15
113

72.2
60.0
51.4

11
7
104

28.9
25.9
52.5

27
20
94

71.1
74.1
47.5

17
10
94

32.7
35.7
51.6

35
18
88

67.3
64.3
48.4

26.5
38.9
51.3

25
22
94

7.672*

Cramer’s V
.171

7.937*

.174

3.364

.113

12.192**

.215

7.230*

.166

8.106*

.176

75.0
75.0
50.2

8
12
102

9
14
99

c2

73.5
61.1
48.7

180

Table 5.4
Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations for Empathy Sum Scores and Predictor Variables (N = 364)
Variable

M

SD

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

Post-test Empathy
Sum Score

31.82

7.617

.165**

.066

-.351***

-.245***

.260***

.045

Follow-up
Empathy Sum
Score

30.43

7.821

.184***

.114*

-.351***

-.224***

.211***

-.070

1. ECa

24.99

5.174

--

.183***

-.025

.143**

-.016

.088*

2. Social
Desirability

5.04

2.163

--

.021

-.013

-.094*

-.093*

.423***

-.280***

.167

--

-.360***

.146

--

.136

Predictor variable
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3. SA Expb

--

4. Abortion Expc
5. Sex
6. Video Condition

--

Note. aEC = Empathic Concern; bSA Exp. = Sexual Assault Experience; cAbortion Exp. = Abortion Experience. Three correlation
types are reported per variable type: Pearson r, point-biserial, and phi correlation. Means and standard deviations are only reported for
continuous variables.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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Table 5.5
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Post-test Empathy Sum Scores with Empathic Concern, Social Desirability, Sexual
Assault Experience, Abortion Experience, Sex, Video Condition (N = 364)
Variable

B

SE B

ß

p

Step 1

R2
.150***

EC a

.217

.073

.148**

.003

Social Desirability

.164

.174

.047

.348

SA Exp. b

-5.234

.731

-.348***

<.001

Step 2

.179***
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EC a

.260

.073

.177***

<.001

Social Desirability

.133

.172

.038

.440

SA Exp. b

-4.400

.756

-.293***

<.001

Abortion Exp. c

-2.282

.637

-.182***

<.001

Step 3

.198***

EC a

.251

.072

.170**

.001

Social Desirability

.187

.171

.053

.275

SA Exp. b

-4.017

.759

-.267***

<.001
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Table 5.5 (Cont.)
Variable

B

SE B

ß

p

Abortion Exp. c

-1.718

.659

-.137**

.009

Sex

2.549

.866

.151**

.003

Step 4

R2

.208***
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ECa

.235

.072

.160**

.001

Social Desirability

.227

.171

.065

.184

SA Exp. b

-4.226

.762

-.281***

<.001

Abortion Exp. c

-1.774

.656

.152**

.007

Sex

2.557

.862

.101*

.003

Video Condition

.514

.246

-.137**

.037

Note. aEC = Empathic Concern Score; bSA Exp. = Sexual Assault Experience; cAbortion Exp. = Abortion Experience.
ß = Standardized coefficient; B = Unstandardized coefficient; SE B = Standard error; R2 = variance explained by the model.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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Table 5.6
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Follow-up Empathy Sum Scores with Empathic Concern, Social Desirability, Sexual
Assault Experience, Abortion Experience, Sex, Video Condition (N = 364)
Variable

B

SE B

ß

p

Step 1

R2
.138***

EC a

.241

.075

.160**

.001

Social Desirability

.329

.180

.091

.069

SA Exp. b

-4.825

.755

-.313***

<.001

Step 2

.164***
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ECa

.283

.075

.187***

<.001

Social Desirability

.299

.178

.083

.094

SA Exp. b

-4.021

.783

-.261***

<.001

Abortion Exp. c

-2.202

.660

-.171**

.001

Step 3

.175***

EC a

.275

.075

.182***

<.001

Social Desirability

.340

.178

.094

.057

SA Exp. b

-3.727

.791

-.242***

<.001

Abortion Exp. c

-1.770

.686

-.138*

.010

Sex

1.955

.902

.113*

.031
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Table 5.6 (Cont.)
Variable

B

SE B

ß

p

Step 4

R2
.175***

EC a

.279

.075

.185***

<.001

Social Desirability

.331

.179

.091

.066

SA Exp. b

-3.678

.798

-.238***

<.001

Abortion Exp. c

-1.757

.688

-.137*

.011

Sex

1.953

.903

.113*

.031

Video Condition

-.120

.258

-.023

.641
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Note. aEC = Empathic Concern Score; bSA Exp. = Sexual Assault Experience; cAbortion Exp. = Abortion Experience.
ß = Standardized coefficient; B = Unstandardized coefficient; SE B = Standard error; R2 = variance explained by the model.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
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CHAPTER 6: OVERALL CONCLUSION
This study aimed to shift the way people think about abortion via a YouTube video, a medium
many people use to get their information (Pew Research Center, 2017). In conceptualizing this
project, I was inspired by the campaign and website Shout Your Abortion (see Figures 6.1 and
6.2). It is a space for people to share abortion stories through text and videos to describe and
normalize abortion experiences. Some video narratives portray people who had fulfilling and
empowering experiences obtaining an abortion. Some narratives portray guilt or coming to terms
with their abortion decision. No matter the story, they all contribute to the Shout Your Abortion
motto: Abortion is normal.

Figure 6.1. Shout Your Abortion motto. Source: shoutyourabortion.com

Figure 6.2. Shout Your Abortion video narratives. Source: shoutyourabortion.com
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After completing the project, I learned of other advocacy endeavors that focus on telling
the untold and complete stories of abortion—some in the form of written word or video diary
(e.g., The Sea Change Program, Echoing Ida, the 1 in 3 project). Each operates under the idea
that the more exposure to abortion stories in the public, the more abortion stigma can be broken
down. However, I questioned the primary audience of these websites—most people who visit
them are probably not people looking to challenge their anti-choice ideology. Research shows
people do not seek out media that conflicts with their beliefs (Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng,
2009). In order to reach a broader audience, I used what I learned from my health education
coursework and research experience to create and distribute an intervention using Shout Your
Abortion-style narratives.
Living in Arkansas, I recognized a unique opportunity to test this intervention in one of
the most restrictive states for abortion access in the U.S. (Center for Reproductive Rights, 2018;
Guttmacher Institute, 2016b; Nash et al., 2017). Nationwide, research indicates that people are
underinformed about abortion legislation (e.g., Bessett et al., 2015; Kavanaugh, Bessett &
Littman, 2013; Cockrill & Weitz, 2010; PerryUndem & Vox Media, 2016; White et al., 2016).
My intervention specifically addressed how these legislative restrictions affect people living in
the state of Arkansas. I did not want to administer an intervention showing abortion narratives if
the audience members were unaware of the abortion landscape in their state. Thus, there had to
be an informational component first. Inspired by Shout Your Abortion, I created videos to
increase awareness of restrictions in Arkansas and show narratives of women’s experiences
seeking an abortion amid these restrictions in Arkansas.
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Overall Findings and Implications
The purpose of the intervention videos was to decrease support for abortion restrictions
by increasing knowledge and shifting empathy in Arkansas residents. The purpose of the study
was to examine the efficacy of the intervention on Arkansans’ knowledge and support of
restrictions and empathy for abortion seekers. In executing this project, five findings emerged
with potential implications for future intervention work.
Finding 1: Watching a testimonial helped knowledge retention. Contrary to our
hypothesis, those who viewed an empathy-based intervention video had significantly higher
knowledge scores at post-test and follow-up than those in the control. Giving people information
in combination with a story that reiterated facts in another way (e.g., what a 48-hour waiting
period means for someone who lives 3 hours from a clinic) may have reinforced knowledge
retention. As such, it may be important for educators and researchers to use a narrative when
administering informational interventions.
Finding 2: Disregarding video condition, support for restrictions was higher than
expected. We predicted that a story demonstrating the real-life implications of abortion
restrictions in Arkansas would decrease support for these laws compared to a video that only
disseminated information (i.e., no testimonial). Results indicated that support for restrictions did
decrease across the study. However, there were no differences in support scores by testimonial
and, instead, support for restrictions at follow-up remained higher than anticipated. Adjusting
attitudes on this subject may require a larger cultural shift, especially in hostile states like
Arkansas. Future interventions might focus on debunking the myth that restrictions are
mechanisms of health and safety for women seeking abortions (Weitz, Moore, Gordon, & Adler,
2008).
188

Finding 3: The rape narratives were more effective in inducing empathy than the
consensual-sex narratives. In designing our testimonials, we aimed to see if factors that
contributed to the pregnancy played a role in empathy for abortion seekers. People who watched
a testimonial with a rape narrative had higher individual empathy characteristic scores (e.g.,
warm, tender) compared with those who watched a consensual-sex narrative. This finding
contributes to Ludlow’s (2008) argument that abortion narratives are subconsciously
hierarchized. Those in abortion care and advocacy easily talk about the abortions from rape and
trauma because they are more “acceptable” reasons for pregnancy termination; these scenarios
induce empathy (Hans & Kimberly, 2014; Ludlow, 2008; Martin, Hassinger, Debbink, & Harris,
2017; Smith & Son, 2013). Thus, “unacceptable” narratives (e.g., lack of finances, readiness) are
not often spoken about even though they are the norm (Ludlow, 2008). If educators and
advocates only use narratives of people who seek abortions out of trauma or emergency,
empathy may be learned for certain pregnancy situations and not others. People leading
interventions, discussions, and advocacy initiatives must work to share all abortion narratives
equally.
Finding 4: The testimonial portraying a Black woman who was raped created the
most empathy. Although there was no effect of race of the actor in individual feeling scores,
there was one testimonial--the Black woman who was raped--that had a significant effect on total
empathy score (i.e., all of the feelings scored together). Our sample was highly education and
leaned more liberal than conservative; if the education level and liberal opinions of our sample
were associated with higher social tolerance (Kozloski, 2010), perhaps feeling more empathy for
the Black woman was related to understanding Black women’s societal marginalization (e.g.,
realizing that the experiences of women of color are different than the experiences of White
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women; Boonstra, 2016; Jones & Kavanaugh, 2011). Alternatively, the empathy from our
participants for the Black woman who was raped could have manifested from an “underlying
racial paternalism” (Baker, 2015, p. 93). If this sense of paternalism was a contributor in our
sample, educational initiatives may need to address cognitive processes related to underlying
racism behind abortion attitudes in addition to shifting empathy.
Finding 5: Personal experiences are key to inducing empathy about abortion.
Finally, factors that consistently predicted empathy induction at post-test and follow-up were
past experiences with abortion and sexual assault experience. Many of the people in our study
had abortion experience and therefore, may have empathized with the woman in the testimonial
because they were linking her experience to theirs. Focusing on experiences that are personal to
them is imperative to inducing empathy for abortion seekers.
However, abortion is an easily concealable event and stigma contributes to a lack of
transparency among people who have had abortions (Norris et al., 2011). This affects the
empathy people are conditioned to feel. Health education programs should encourage dialogue
so that people and partners with an abortion story will share their experiences more openly. This
could create more empathy among networks and normalize the experiences of many abortion
seekers without an “acceptable” reason, especially because these experiences are among the most
common (Ludlow, 2008). Normalizing abortion narratives could lessen stigma so the general
population could connect their personal experiences to the reproductive rights movement.
Contributions to the Field
There are many reproductive health research teams across the country that focus on
abortion (e.g., ANSIRH, Ibis Reproductive Health, Bixby Center, Texas Policy Evaluation
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Project). Many of these teams track outcomes of abortion restrictions or conduct qualitative
interviews to understand the experiences of people who have sought or obtained abortion care.
Findings from these studies have been used to inform policy and improve provision of abortion.
For example, the Turnaway Study, conducted by the ANSIRH team, headed by Diana
Greene Foster, PhD, conducted 8,000 interviews with women from 2010 to 2015. They recruited
participants from abortion facilities across the country. All the women in the study sought
abortions; some were able to obtain them and some were turned away. Of the “turnaways,” some
women were able to obtain an abortion at a different location or time; some carried their
pregnancies to term because they were past the gestational limit. This study’s findings offered
empirical evidence that women who are forced to keep a pregnancy after seeking an abortion
report health and wellbeing hardships compared to women who were able to obtain an abortion
(e.g., Foster, Biggs, Ralph, Gerdts, Roberts, & Glymour, 2018; Foster, Steinberg, Roberts,
Neuhaus, & Biggs, 2015; Upadhyay, Biggs, & Foster, 2015). Further, it demonstrates that
denying women abortion care has serious consequences, which can be cited when arguing the
harm of abortion restrictions.
Although the current study was not as large-scale (or well-funded) as studies from these
abortion research teams, it does offer several additions to the field and a jumping off point for
subsequent studies. The first addition is in its innovative design. It is the first video-based
intervention experiment, to our knowledge, that focused on abortion restrictions and empathy.
Advocacy projects (e.g., Shout Your Abortion, the Sea Change Program, 1 in 3 Campaign) have
also focused on sharing complete or untold abortion narratives as a way to induce empathy via an
online media platform. However, few of these projects have the format (e.g., means of data
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collection) to track the impact these stories have on the people who view them. We were able to
compare data from baseline, to after viewing a video, to two-weeks later.
Second, this study used a state-specific sample and asked state-specific restriction
questions. Other surveys have focused on state-specific restrictions, but did not have a statespecific sample. For example, the Vox Media Poll (2015) asked about attitudes towards Texas
restrictions in the time leading up to the Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt (2016) Texas
court case. However, their sample was a nationally representative group of U.S. residents.
Although their data were representative of people’s attitudes across the U.S., asking someone
who does not live in Texas about laws in Texas may yield attitudes about restrictions that are
abstract or hypothetical. Asking an Arkansan about Arkansas laws encourages critical thinking
about restrictions that could actually affect them.
With this project, we also incorporated race and perceived pregnancy responsibility into
the dialogue about social inequalities regarding abortion. Using an intersectional lens to the
analyses and discussion, we aimed to assess underlying biases that are discussed less often in
conversations about abortion access. Scholars have made a concerted effort to draw attention to
the racial inequalities within reproductive access (e.g., Kumar, 2013; Price, 2011). Regarding
pregnancy circumstance, rape is a commonly accepted exception to abortion restrictions
(Guttmacher Institute, 2017d; Mikoajczak & Bilewicz, 2015; Nash et al., 2017; Smith & Son,
2013). However, the intersection of race and perceived pregnancy responsibility had yet to be
explored.
We assumed an implicit bias against Black women would result in higher empathy for the
White woman who told her abortion narrative. But prejudice may have contributed to different
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results than we anticipated—that of underlying racial paternalism. This also fits in with
hierarchizing abortion narratives (e.g., having more empathy for women who are raped). In both
topics, people differentiate circumstances under which they support abortion and circumstances
under which they do not (i.e., circumstantial caveats; Hunt, Marcantonio, Jozkowski, &
Crawford, forthcoming; Jozkowski, Crawford, & Hunt, 2018; Smith & Son, 2013). In order to
induce empathy, it is important to draw attention to these caveats so people may realize there are
conflicts within their attitudes. Yet, having any caveat with abortion attitudes perpetuates
paternalism—that one can inflict their opinion on an abortion seeker’s circumstances. This leads
to, arguably, the crux of shifting people’s attitudes toward abortion: how do we get people to
trust and support women unconditionally? How do we get rid of caveats? Empathy and education
may be strategical components to achieving this goal. However, one must pay special attention to
incorporating social inequalities, addressing internal biases related to racism and abortion
narrative hierarchy, and drawing on one’s personal experiences.
Future Directions
I aim to publish and present the subset of data I analyzed from this project. First, I plan to
submit abstracts to the American Public Health Association and the Society of Family Planning
annual meetings with data from these two manuscripts. I intend to submit the first manuscript
(knowledge and support for restrictions) to Sexuality Research and Social Policy because of its
restriction focus. The second manuscript (empathy) is intended for Perspectives on Reproductive
Health.
I have two projects in progress with colleagues from Arkansas and Michigan. Concurrent
with the dissertation, I have been working with a University of Arkansas Masters student on her
thesis. We are using these data to analyze the role of Social Dominance Orientation on abortion
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attitudes (scale modified from Batson et al., 1997) and Empathic Concern. She will complete her
thesis and we will prepare a manuscript from this analysis.
Additionally, I met with a collaborator from the University of Michigan, Sara
McClelland, PhD, who is familiar with the Inclusion of Other in the Self (IOS) scale (Aron,
Aron, & Smollan, 1992). We are planning to write a paper together on the video’s effect on
affinity people feel for a woman who has had an abortion using the IOS scale. We plan to submit
an abstract to the Forum with these data as well.
In planning outcomes from this study, a secondary aim was to examine how attitudes
may affect voting behaviors and encourage individuals to act by supporting progressive
candidates. Findings indicated a lack of awareness and high support of restrictive laws in
Arkansas, which can certainly influence people’s voting intentions. I plan to analyze these data
for a future manuscript.
I received a 2018-2019 HHPR graduate student research grant to collect more data on this
project. I plan to re-administer the experiment to gather a different sample. Since the first
experiment was administered, changes in the make-up of the Supreme Court have increased
threats to Roe v. Wade. Closer to the election year I intend to compare abortion influence on
voting intention data from the first wave of data collection to the second wave.
Finally, I am looking forward translating these data to a more applied approach. On my
interview at Western Washington University, the job I accepted for the fall, I met with the person
who coordinates the health peer education program. She used to work for Planned Parenthood
and is very interested in collaborating on research. I hope we can use the findings from this
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study, to work with peer educators and community members to create an abortion education
program.
Research Trajectory
This project inspired subsequent projects and identified gaps within the current abortion
literature. I have two projects planned for the immediate future. To build on the support for
abortion restrictions finding of this project, I plan to conduct in-depth interviews exploring
people’s perceptions of abortion legislation--do they think restrictions harm or help abortion
seekers? Additionally, I am interested in where people’s perception of abortion experiences
come from. I have experience with content analysis of media. There is one study by Sisson and
Kimport (2014) that examines how abortion is portrayed in tv and movies. However, I plan to
expand on that study and use a coding framework inspired by our consent in the media project
(Jozkowski, Canan, Rhoads, & Hunt, 2016) to examine how abortion and other reproductive
practices are portrayed in the media.
Last, I hope to make connections in my new community and work with clinics to collect
data and inspire new projects. I am interested in conducting reproductive health research in
Washington state. Perhaps I will even find a way to compare the two states as living in one of the
most restrictive and then one of the most supportive (see Figure 6.3).
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Figure 6.3. Infographic of the most restrictive and supportive states in 2017. Source:
Guttmacher.org, circles added by the author for emphasis.
Lessons Learned and Personal Reflection
In contemplating my professional and personal growth over five years (seven years at the
University of Arkansas), I think of the mistakes and deviations from my plan (satirically
illustrated in Figure 6.4), the people that have helped me, and the things I thought went wrong,
only to discover they went right all along.

196

Figure 6.4. Illustration of a PhD plan vs. reality. Source: Twitter.com
The dissertation process. I learned three primary lessons from the execution of this
project: kindness will get you further, things will go wrong, and knowing people/networking is
vital to success. This project exposed the internal workings of my institution to which I was
previously oblivious. There are gatekeepers to successful execution of research and, first, one
must identify these key stakeholders. Accessing grant funds required the help of our
departmental administrative assistant, Shari Witherspoon, and multiple people in the office for
Research and Sponsored Programs. To use the funds to buy incentives, there were several steps
and forms that I would not have known about had it not been for these personnel. I learned there
are some tasks within a structure that I could not do on my own. To complete a project, one
needs patience, organization, kindness, and persistence.
Creating specialized media (i.e., the videos) was another lesson in patience. The person
from Production Services who initially agreed to shoot my intervention videos backed out
suddenly. I had been in contact with this person for several months and his estimates were
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accounted for in my grant budget. It was through Dr. Jean Henry, a faculty mentor with a brother
in IT, that I found the freelance video production specialist I hired.
I learned how to make a casting call. I had to troubleshoot when only White women
replied with interest. It was through one of the actors I hired that I was put in touch with an actor
of color who was interested in working on the project. Moreover, because my actors were in
other shows on campus, organization and, again, persistence were imperative to scheduling the
video shoots. One actor did not show up one day and one actor did not have her part memorized.
So I problem-solved.
In addition to the administrative lessons learned, personally, I found the dissertation
process to be isolating. I am able to reflect on the misery I felt in the beginning now that I see a
light at the end of tunnel. The elation of the project being funded was eclipsed by a lack of
confidence and motivation. It was an ambitious project. But, perhaps, the most debilitating part
of the dissertation process was, for me, its conjunction with the job search and trying to figure
out what kind of academic I wanted to be.
The doctoral process. I started studying sexuality when I was an undergraduate student
at Kansas State University. It was in a class during my sophomore year where I first saw a
Sexual Health Peer Educators (SHAPE) presentation. Three undergrads talked about condoms
and risky behaviors; they were so funny and confident, blowing up a condom and putting it over
their head to demonstrate the durability of condoms. The audience was in an uncomfortable hush
and then erupted into laughter. I joined SHAPE to gain confidence and to make people laugh and
think. I became the co-president and simultaneously interned in the health promotion department
of the student health center my senior year of college.
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I started looking at Masters of Public Health Programs in states north of me. I wanted to
get out of Kansas and go somewhere where sex education was valued and funded. But, life is
funny and my aunt, who works for the University of Arkansas, is very persuasive. I went South
instead. I started at the University of Arkansas in 2012 in the Master’s program. I was awarded a
graduate assistantship to teach health classes and began working with my mentor, Dr. Kristen
Jozkowski, who was just starting her career at the University of Arkansas. Over seven years, I
gained experience teaching college students and conducting sexuality research.
Teaching progression. I taught classes for six years—starting with introductory level
classes like Medical Terminology. For the first few semesters, I used the pre-made textbook
lectures and was learning the material along with my students. I remember reading my student
evaluations and crying. But I also took some of the student feedback and improved the course
materials and my teaching approach. Students told me they wanted more engagement with the
health terminology, so I created a group presentation assignment where they had to present
words to their peers. Students told me I was funny, so I began making the lectures my own,
incorporating anecdotes, pictures, and pneumonic devices.
I grew as a teacher when I co-instructed a senior-level health class, Applied Health
Behavior Theory, with my mentor, Dr. Jozkowski. The course material was challenging and
abstract. At first, I was intimidated—especially sharing the front of the room with an actual
professor. When it was my turn to lecture, I used my strengths to reconstruct the presentations in
a way that made sense to me, which helped me master the material. The students responded
positively to my approach and I took over the class in subsequent semesters. Dr. Jozkowski’s
organization and model for the class demonstrated a quality higher level class that I was able to
personalize.
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Diversifying my teaching dossier with courses like Human Sexuality, Personal Health
and Safety, and Public Health Internship built my confidence and confirmed my passion for
teaching. Two student evaluation comments I am most proud of were: “I feel significantly more
prepared to enter into the public health workforce because of the things I learned in this course”
(Applied Health Behavior Theory) and “Everyone felt safe and open sharing their stories because
you cultivated an environment of respect and tolerance. We were enthusiastic to speak up
because you made it clear that we would be heard!” (Human Sexuality).
Research progression. Simultaneously with my teaching progression, I learned to be a
researcher. I had the unique opportunity to begin my research journey as Dr. J was beginning her
career as a professor and mentor at the University of Arkansas. Our first project together was
analyzing in-depth interviews with college students. We read the interviews separately and then
met in her office to discuss our findings. From these interviews, I realized my penchant for
identifying themes in qualitative data, which inspired my master’s thesis. For my thesis project, I
conducted a salient belief elicitation (SBE; Middlestadt et al., 1996). I was able to understand
SBE on a deeper level because of its foundation in Reasoned Action Approach, a theory Dr. J
taught me. I was then able to effectively explain the Reasoned Action Approach in my theory
classes. Additionally, I taught this technique to an undergraduate honors’ student, undergraduate
research assistants, and doctoral students.
Skilled researchers must also adequately disseminate their work. My first solo research
presentation introduced my thesis data to the department research seminar. I was nervous,
sweating, and not natural or smooth. Prior to the presentation, I practiced for our undergraduate
research assistants. One of them told me I said “uh” so much he wanted to “strangle me.” I
remember Dr. J telling me there was no shame in having a notes sheet. For my next
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presentations, I wrote out what I was going to say and my performance improved. I don’t
remember when it clicked for me that giving research presentations was just like giving a lecture
in class. For some reason, I hadn’t connected the two skills. I gave more presentations—in
seminar, at conferences, for university events. Dr. J told me at my last presentation for the
department seminar it was the best presentation she had seen me give.
In cultivating skills as an individual researcher, I also learned the importance (and fun) of
collaboration. Over seven years, I was able to observe inter-group dynamics change with the flux
of graduate students in and out of Dr. J’s lab. The first research group iteration comprised
myself, Kelley Rhoads, and Sasha Canan. With Dr. J, the four of us embarked on an intensive
content analysis project, where we analyzed mainstream movies and coded sexual scenes for
variables related to consent. It was the most fun I ever had collecting data.
Sasha and Kelley graduated and two new doctoral students, Tiffany and Malachi, joined
the lab. They were from counseling psychology and clinical psychology programs respectively;
with their background, came a hunger and competitiveness for publications and productivity. I
felt inadequacy, anxiety, and had started viewing research more from the lens of how it could
advance my career rather than a way to examine aspects of sexuality. I admit it was this
competitiveness that pushed me as a researcher. I applied for and got several grants to fund an
ambitious dissertation experiment, worked with others to publish papers, and presented annually
at conferences. I liked the collaboration and creativity of research, giving feedback, and having
critical conversations about gender, feminism, and societal programming. It was the pressure of
producing for admiration, prominence, and rank that made me question what kind of
environment in which I would excel. Specifically, I was unsure if I would thrive in a “publish or
perish” academic position.
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Searching for an academic position. Articulating these experiences, I realize now that I
always wanted to be a teacher first. I solidified my identity in Arkansas. It was my charge to give
young adults of the Midwest and South the comprehensive sex education most were deprived of
as kids. I wanted them to question the anti-feminist messages that many may have been exposed
to during their upbringing, to cultivate their confidence so they would take ownership of their
sexuality and health. But I struggled coming to terms with that. I was influenced by the hierarchy
of Research I universities and the prestige that comes with being a researcher first. I was worried
I would lose the research skills I gained in the seven years I worked under Dr. J if I sought a
teaching-heavy position. It was hard to figure out my next step when I was searching for a job
and confidently market myself. This indecisiveness, in addition to the gendered nature of
interviewing, made the search feel hopeless. As a woman raised in the Midwest, I was
encouraged to be humble--not to brag.
Everyone thinks a PhD will go according to plan. I thought, “others may take extra years
and run into problems that extend their doctoral work, but that’s not me.” It was. Even if I had
finished my dissertation “on time,” there was no job. I read articles about how competitive the
tenure-track job market was. It was true. It did not help that I applied everywhere but had my
heart set on being in the middle of the country--where I felt I was needed.
In the end, I applied to 37 jobs in 14 months, had 13 phone/skype interviews, and went on
6 on-site interviews. The first three on-sites were in my fourth doctoral year. Getting a job during
that round would have put me on track for what I had planned in terms of my theoretical vision
for my career. But, there were no good fits. I began to panic. “What will I do? Will I move back
in with my parents?” I went through the stages of academia grief. “Do I really want to be part of
the Ivory Tower? It is not easily accessible for people and there are so many privileged students
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who do not take college seriously. Am I helping the right people? Maybe I’ll just get a 9-5 job.
I’ll work in a health department. Something stable.” I applied for a few jobs outside of academia.
But, I talked with a friend, who came from a socially disadvantaged upbringing, and he
changed my mind. He told me college opened doors for him that would never have been opened
otherwise. He reminded me of why I wanted to be a college professor. I applied for a fifth year
of doctoral funding and took a second crack at the academic job market. I went on another three
on-site interviews and felt I hit my stride. I figured out how to talk about myself. And I found a
school that was a good fit. I will be starting as a tenure-track Assistant Professor of Community
Health Education at Western Washington University in the Fall of 2019.
Accepting that job sparked another, slightly smaller, existential crisis. “I can’t go to
Washington. It’s a blue state.” There was another grieving process—of my former identity: being
a sexual health educator in a place where I felt I was needed. That is not to say that there is not
work to be done in Washington. But my identity came from going to conferences, like the Forum
on Family Planning, and seeing all of the sexuality research and abortion provision from people
on the coasts. I took pride in knowing that I was doing the work in a place with one procedural
abortion provider and no mandated sex education. I felt as though I would be abandoning my
post. But it’s time for a change and I have to give myself permission to make a difference in a
new area.
My graduate work and academic career so far have taught me many things about how the
world works. When at social events making small talk with new people, every day comes with a
choice when asked “what do you study?” My interactions change depending on what I say. Do I
say “abortion?” “Sexuality?” “Public health?” I usually settle on “women’s health.” But then I
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kick myself because this statement brings to mind babies and menstruation and eating right for
your figure--everything that Women’s Health magazine has made it to be. It’s safe. But yet it’s
an act of self-preservation. If you come in hot with a “I study ABORTION” it can shut the
conversation down pretty quickly. That’s not what I want. I never want to shut people down. I
want to open them up and have meaningful conversations free of coercion, shame, and stigma.
Studying sexuality and abortion has taught me about the power of language. Of pronouns.
Of the constant recalibration of inclusive terms. It has taught me about reading the room. It has
taught me about inclusivity--the problem with the phrase “women who seek abortions.” It has
taught me about power and intersectionality. It has pushed me to be a better activist, academic,
and person. It has taught me to be more empathetic. It has taught me to check my privilege in my
life and in my career. It has taught me who I am and who I want to be. And that is something I
will carry with me, no matter where I live.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: Video Script Content Tables
Cognitive (Knowledge) Portion

230

Wording of Video

Corresponding
survey portion

Corresponding visual graphic

Citation for
statement in
wording of
video

Evidence-based
reasoning for shifting
attitudes toward
abortion with knowledge

“News anchor” introduces
self

-

-

-

Establishing credibility of
the source influences an
audience member’s
digestion of the persuasive
messages (Petty &
Priester, 1994)

Hello, my name is Michelle. I
am an educator at the
University of Arkansas in the
public policy program with a
focus on reproductive health
laws. Today I am going to talk
about laws that restrict
abortion in Arkansas.

Abortion, which is when a
pregnancy is ended so that it
does not result in the birth of a
child, has been legal in all 50
US states for over 40 years.

Arkansas residents will be
familiar with the
University of Arkansas
and specifying that she has
training/education on RH
laws makes her qualified
to speak on this subject.
Based on what you
know or have heard, is
it currently legal for a
woman to get an
abortion in all 50

(Roe v Wade,
410 US 113,
1973)

230

Knowledge of abortion is
low (Bessett et al., 2015;
Kavanaugh, Bessett &
Littman, 2013) which can
lead to misperceptions of

states in the U.S./in
Arkansas?

231

There are a few types of
abortion- the most common
two are Medication, which is
a combination of pills that can
only be taken up to 10 weeks
of pregnancy and Aspiration,
which involves a procedure
using gentle suction, 92% of
which take place before 13
weeks of pregnancy.

• There is more than
one type of abortion.

Even though abortion is legal
in all 50 states, in recent years,
states have passed many laws
to restrict abortion. In the last
7 years, states passed 338 new
abortion restrictions. Arkansas
is in top three states with the
newest laws restricting
abortion access.

Based on what you
know or have heard, is
it easy for women to
obtain an abortion in
your state?

To get an abortion in
Arkansas, there are several
rules that patients and doctors
must follow …

Based on what you
know or have heard,
which of the following
laws regarding
abortion apply to
Arkansas?

(Jerman, Jones,
& Onda, 2016;
Kulier et al.,
2011)

•Based on what you
know or have heard,
what is a
medication/aspiration
abortion?

the safety of abortion.
White and colleagues
(2016) noted the impact of
misperceptions of safety of
abortion on support for
abortion legislation. That
is, those who are
misinformed are more
likely to support abortion
legislation under the
pretense that it makes
abortion safer for women.

(Guttmacher
Audiences value
Institute, 2016b;
information with
Nash et al., 2017) geographic proximity over
news in distant locations
(Devereux, 2007; Golding
& Elliott, 1979; WahlJorgensen & Hanitzsch,
2009)
-

-

231

Research indicates that
knowledge of state-level
legislation on abortion is
low (Lara et al., 2015;
White et al., 2016) and
people have low awareness
of their impact, believing

that laws make abortion
safer (Weitz et al., 2008;
White et al., 2016).

232

Each statement includes
what the law is and why its
effect hinders the people
who face them -especially low- income
individuals because they
are the majority of
abortion patients (75%;
Jerman et al., 2016). These
statements aim to 1)
increase knowledge and 2)
encourage audience
members to start thinking
about their effect on more
vulnerable populations.
However, they are not as
pointed as the testimonial
on empathy-induction.
If you’re under 18, you have
to get permission from a
parent. Research shows it
delays the procedure or teens
may travel to states without
these laws to get an abortion.

•Minors must get their
parents’ permission
before they can get an
abortion

(Blasdell, 2002;
Bitler &
Zavodny, 2001;
Guttmacher
Institute, 2017c)
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Potential effect on
vulnerable populations:
Barrier for minors (often
who have limited
resources or resources
controlled by other people)
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You have to go in for a
required counseling session
and then wait 48 hours
before you can get an
abortion, which means going
into a clinic twice and
increasing costs associated
with travel and lodging.

•A woman must wait
48 hours after required
counseling before the
abortion can be
performed

(Guttmacher
Institute, 2017g;
Joyce et al.,
2009; Karasek,
Roberts, &
Weitz, 2016)

Potential effect on
vulnerable populations:
Increasing costs for travel
and lodging (especially
burdensome for lowincome individuals)

Sometimes, doctors use
telemedicine to provide care
for people who live far away
from a clinic. This is a way to
meet with a doctor over video
conference so you don’t have
to travel to see the doctor in
person. But in Arkansas,
doctors aren’t allowed to use
telemedicine to provide the
abortion pill, which means
they must meet the doctor in
person and…

•Doctors may not
prescribe the abortion
pill through
“telemedicine” (e.g.,
online video session)

(Guttmacher,
2017a; Jones &
Kooistra, 2011)

Potential effect on
vulnerable populations:
Increase travel and cost for
people who live far from a
clinic (especially lowincome individuals who
live in rural areas) &
misinformation to women
from people they trust

Before an abortion,
doctors must tell
women that it is
possible for the
abortion pill to be
reversed*

Almost half (46%) of over
1000 voters across the
country reported they did
not think there was a law
that would make doctors
give medically inaccurate
information (PerryUndum,
2016)

During the counseling session,
doctors are required to tell
patients that it is possible for a
medication abortion to be
reversed after the first dose of
pills, which is not backed up
with medical evidence.
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So in order to get an abortion,
you must go to the facility at
least twice and the abortion
has to be performed by a
licensed doctor, which means
if you usually go to a health
professional like a nurse
practitioner, you have to go to
a different place.

•Abortions must be
performed by a
licensed doctor

(Grumbach, Hart,
Mertz, Coffman,
& Palazzo, 2003;
Schacht, 2008;
Taylor et al.,
2009; Weitz et
al., 2013)

Potential effect on
vulnerable populations:
Displace individuals who
do not normally go to
physicians (especially lowincome and women of
color, as they are more
likely to be cared for by
NPs and PAs in public
health departments or
community health centers
(Taylor et al., 2009; Weitz
et al., 2013))

In Arkansas, if you are 20
weeks pregnant or later, you
cannot get an abortion unless
your life is endangered or were
a victim of rape or incest.

•A woman cannot get
an abortion after 20
weeks of pregnancy
unless her life or
health is endangered

(Guttmacher
Institute, 2017j)

Potential effect on
vulnerable populations:
“Nearly 99 percent of
abortions occur before 21
weeks, but when they are
needed later in pregnancy,
it’s often in very complex
circumstances” (Planned
Parenthood, 2018).
Prohibition after 20 weeks
ignores complex
circumstances of those
who are likely vulnerable.
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The safest and most common
procedure for abortion after
20 weeks, called dilation and
extraction, is not allowed in
Arkansas. You may have
heard people call this a “partial
birth” abortion but that is not a
medical term or an actual
procedure.

•A woman cannot get
a “Partial-birth”
abortion

If you are approved to get an
abortion after 20 weeks in
Arkansas, doctors are
required to give you
information about pain the
fetus might feel in a
counseling session. Other
states require doctors to talk
about about the link between
abortion and breast cancer or
negative mental health
outcomes. None of this
information is evidenced by
medical research.

•Required counseling
before the abortion
must include
information on alleged
fetal pain (to women
who are at least 20
weeks pregnant)

(di Mauro &
Joffe, 2007;
Guttmacher
Institute, 2017j)

•A woman cannot get
a dilation and
extraction abortion
which is often
performed after the
20th week of
pregnancy

We differentiate between
the two terms to see if
support differs based on
language.
In large national polls, 6070% of the samples
reported they thought
“partial birth” abortions
should be banned, but only
45-50% reported support
for “bans at 20 weeks”
(Bowman & Sims, 2017)

(Vandewalker,
2012)

Potential effect on
vulnerable populations:
Misinformation to women
from people they trust
(physicians)
Almost half (46%) of over
1000 voters across the
country reported they did
not think there was a law
that would make doctors
give medically inaccurate
information (PerryUndum,
2016)
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Lastly, Medicaid (state
insurance for low-income
people) will not cover
abortion in Arkansas unless
your life is endangered or were
a victim of rape or incest. This
limits reproductive options for
women who are poor.

•Public funding such
as Medicaid can only
cover abortions in
cases of the woman’s
life is endangered,
rape and incest

(Bitler &
Zavodny, 2001;
Guttmacher
Institute, 2017d;
Nash et al., 2017;
Roberts et al.,
2014)

Potential effect on
vulnerable populations:
Directly impacts lowincome women

Because of these restrictions,
many places that offered
abortion services have closed.
Now there are only 4 clinics in
2 cities in the state that can
offer abortion services to the 1
million women that live in
Arkansas.

Based on what you
know or have heard, is
it easy for women to
obtain an abortion in
your state?

(Jones & Jerman,
2017a; United
States Census
Bureau, 2016)

Ends on note of scarcity
for people in Arkansas
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Affective (Testimonial) Portion
Intro by
news anchor

States have passed these laws with the reasoning they are
making it safer for women. But these laws don’t actually
improve safety, they only make it harder for women who
seek an abortion to get one, which can delay getting care, and
cost more time and money.

Weitz and colleagues (2008) comment that some people report
being in favor of certain laws because they believe they benefit
women’s health (e.g., lessens the harm of abortion on women’s
mental health outcomes). This statement clarifies that there are
outcomes that are not related to safety.
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The largest group of women who get abortions in the US are Sharing stories and hearing others’ perspectives have been
in their 20’s and low-income like Mia, who is here to tell us a effective in creating empathy (LeBaron & Carstaphen, 1997)
personal story about her experience with these Arkansas
The testimonials actually specify common abortion patient
laws.
demographics (Jerman et al., 2016) unlike the knowledge
portion, which only implies who may be vulnerable populations.
The story told by the testimonial woman reinforces what the
audience is told about laws in Arkansas (e.g., they increase
costs, make it more difficult- especially for vulnerable
populations).
The words of the testimonial are similar. The phrases that are the
same are meant to build empathy for this individual, especially
indicating that she is low-income. The phrases that are different
(in bold) by pregnancy circumstance, are meant to build more
empathy for the rape victim and use the consensual sex
condition as a foil (contrasts with and emphasizes and enhances
the qualities of another).
Rape

Consensual

Evidence-based reasoning for building an empathetic
character

Last year, I was raped. I was
coming out of work and someone
attacked me the parking lot. I
didn’t know the guy and I didn’t

Last year, I became pregnant. I
didn’t really know the guy and I

The rape condition is more empathetic because it was a
“stranger attack,” and implies she had a lack of control over the
pregnancy (Hans & Kimberly, 2014)
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tell anyone about it for a long
time.

didn’t tell anyone about it for a
long time.

Majority of people support abortion in cases of rape
(Mikoajczak & Bilewicz, 2015; Smith & Son, 2013). People
have empathy for rape victims, especially if they know someone
who has been raped (Wiener, Felman Wiener, & Grisso, 1989)
We posit people will assume consensual sex was under the
control and blame the woman for the pregnancy and have less
empathy for her (Hans & Kimberly, 2014)
Not knowing the guy prevents the audience from assuming it
could be a partner or friend and not telling anyone implies she
felt shame or embarrassment and did not feel positive about the
pregnancy.
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By the time I found out I was
pregnant, I was about 8 weeks
along. You count from the first day
of your last period so by the time
you find out you’ve missed a
period, you’re already 4-5 weeks
pregnant. I rarely get my period on
time so I didn’t even know I was
pregnant until I took a test around 8
weeks.

By the time I found out I was
pregnant, I was about 8 weeks along.
You count from the first day of your
last period so by the time you find out
you’ve missed a period, you’re
already 4-5 weeks pregnant. I rarely
get my period on time so I didn’t even
know I was pregnant until I took a
test around 8 weeks.

Meant to get the audience to realize that some people do not
know they are pregnant right away and to target the
misconception that women wait until the last minute to change
their minds about the pregnancy. Increase empathy by implying
this is something (gestation) that is happening to her without her
knowledge.

I live paycheck to paycheck. I can
barely make rent and groceries. I
knew I didn’t have the money to
support a baby as well.

I live paycheck to paycheck. I can
barely make rent and groceries. I
knew I didn’t have the money to
support a baby as well.

Increase empathy by indicating she is low-income and
comparing price of abortion to total price of supporting a
baby/child
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Also, to increase empathy for this woman, it implies she had an
abortion earlier in the pregnancy and more people support an
earlier abortion than a later abortion (Ludlow, 2008; Norris et
al., 2011)

I also knew I definitely did not
want to have the baby of the
person who raped me.

Increase empathy for rape victim
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My insurance wouldn’t cover me
because I didn’t report the rape. I
didn’t want people to know.

My insurance wouldn’t cover it.

Increase empathy for low-income individuals because Medicaid
will not cover abortion but further empathy for rape victim
because even though there is an exception for rape, she does not
want to tell anyone.

It was about $500. I had to use all
the money in my bank account. By
the time I got the money together
and asked about an appointment, I
was almost 9 weeks pregnant. I live
in the middle of nowhere so the
closest clinic is 3 hours away. I had
to take off work, and ask a friend
for money for the bus ride to the
doctor.

It was about $500. I had to use all the
money in my bank account. By the
time I got the money together and
asked about an appointment, I was
almost 9 weeks pregnant. I live in the
middle of nowhere so the closest
clinic is 3 hours away. I had to take
off work, and ask a friend for money
for the bus ride to the doctor.

Increase empathy for low-income women by informing audience
about actual cost of procedure (Roberts et al., 2014) and
detailing steps taken in order to make this experience feasible.

But then they make you wait 48
hours to get it done which means I
had to take two more days off work.
I had nothing left to even get a hotel
so I slept in the bus station.

But then they make you wait 48 hours
to get it done which means I had to
take two more days off work. I had
nothing left to even get a hotel so I
slept in the bus station.

Increase empathy for low-income women by reiterating cost and
effect of 48 waiting period

I was sure of my decision and just
wanted to get this taken care of as
soon as possible, in the safest way

I was sure of my decision and just
wanted to get this taken care of as
soon as possible, in the safest way

Increase empathy for low-income women who have to follow
these rules to get the care they need
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With increased knowledge, one can better take a person’s
perspective and even change attitudes (Currier & Carlson,
2009). Plumm and Terrance (2008) state that in order to take
another person’s perspective, one must also learn about the
“contextual and structural constraints” that contribute to that
person’s perspective (p. 189).

possible. But these laws made
everything go so much slower and
so much more expensive because I
had to take time from work and stay
extra days.

possible. But these laws made
everything go so much slower and so
much more expensive because I had
to take time from work and stay extra
days.

I don’t regret the abortion. I felt
relieved. I just wanted to put the
rape behind me.

I don’t regret the abortion. I felt
relieved. It wasn’t the right time.

Most common psychological outcome is relief (Bradshaw &
Slade, 2003)
Increase empathy for rape victim by reiterating that the
pregnancy was out of her control
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Appendix C: Online Survey Materials
PART A: Survey Introductory Page
Welcome to the Study!
Thank you for clicking through to our survey!
Before deciding whether or not to participate, please read more about the nature of this study.
If I Decide to Participate, What Will be Expected of Me?
This study is open to anyone who is over the age of 18 and lives in Arkansas. Those who decide
to participate in this study will be asked to complete an online survey about attitudes toward
abortion.
In just a moment, we will ask you to read the study consent form. If after reading this consent
form you agree to participate in the study, you will be asked to click through to the survey. This
survey should take 30 minutes to complete. All information collected will be kept confidential to
the extent allowed by law and University policy.
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PART B: Informed Consent Page
INFORMED CONSENT STATEMENT
Mary E. Hunt MS & Kristen N. Jozkowski PhD
University of Arkansas
INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE:
You are invited to participate in a research study about your attitudes toward abortion.
You are being asked to participate because you are aged 18 or older and live in Arkansas.
Who are the researchers?
Mary E. Hunt, MS
Department of Health, Human Performance, and Recreation
University of Arkansas
Email: sexstudy@uark.edu
Kristen N. Jozkowski, PhD
Department of Health, Human Performance, and Recreation
University of Arkansas
Email: sexstudy@uark.edu
Who will participate in this study?
If you participate in this study, you will be one of approximately 450 individuals
participating in the study. You must be at least 18 years old to participate and currently
live in Arkansas.
What am I being asked to do?
Your participation will require the following: provide thoughtful answers to an online
survey and watch a short video clip.
What are the possible risks or discomforts?
There are no anticipated risks for participating in this study. If you feel uncomfortable at any
time while completing the survey, you can leave a question unanswered or can end your
involvement in the study.
What are the possible benefits of the study?
You may benefit from self-awareness from your responses and you will be contributing to
increasing the body of knowledge about attitudes toward abortion. Additionally, you may enter
your email address to receive a gift card.
How long will the study last?
This survey should take about 30 minutes to complete (a 15-20 minute pre-test, a short video
clip, a 5-10 minute post-test).
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Will I have to pay for anything?
No, there will be no cost associated with your participation.
What are the options if I do not want to be in the study?
Participation is completely voluntary. If you do not want to be in this study, you may refuse to
participate; you can stop the survey at any time if you do not wish to participate.
How will my confidentiality be protected?
All information will be kept confidential to the extent allowed by applicable State and Federal
law. Your responses will be anonymous.
Will I know the results of the study?
At the conclusion of the study, you will have the right to request feedback about the results. You
may contact the principle researcher, Mary Hunt at sexstudy@uark.edu.
You may also contact the University of Arkansas Research Compliance office listed below if you
have questions about your rights as a participant, or to discuss any concerns about, or problems
with the research.
The University of Arkansas Research Compliance:
Ro Windwalker, CIP
Institutional Review Board Coordinator
Research Compliance
University of Arkansas
109 MLKG Building
Fayetteville, AR 72701
(479) 575-2208
irb@uark.edu
I have read the above statement and I understand the purpose of the study as well as the potential
benefits and risks that are involved. I understand that participation is voluntary. I understand that
significant new findings developed during this research can be shared with the participant. I
understand that no rights have been waived by consenting to participate in this study. By clicking
to the next page and filling out the survey, I am implying my consent to participate in this study.
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Appendix D: Survey Instrument
PRE-TEST
Directions: Please select the response choice that most accurately describes you. Please
answer honestly and completely.
•

What is your age in years (e.g., 25)?

•

Are you a current resident of Arkansas?
o Yes
o No
Is English your native language?
o Yes
o No

•

*Follow up if No is chosen: did you attend school where English was the primary language from
K-12?
• Yes
• No
*If below 18, not a current Arkansas resident, or English is not primary language in formative
years, participant will be thanked for their interest and directed to the end of the survey because
of eligibility requirements.
Directions: Please answer the fill in the blank questions below.
Please use the directions below to make an unidentifiable code. This code is purely to help track
your data over the entire survey.
The code entails:
1. The first 4 digits of your phone number
2. The first 2 letters of your name
3. The 2 digits of your birth month
For example, if your phone number is 776-5577, your name is Carl, and your birth month is
June (06), then your code would be: “5577Ca06”.
•
•

What is your current zip code (e.g., 72701)?
What is the zip code of the area where you grew up (i.e., your “hometown”)?

•

How long have you lived in Arkansas in years rounded to the nearest year (e.g., 1 year, 6
years, 30 years)? If less than 1 year, specify how many months (e.g., 3 months).
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Directions: Please select the response choice that most accurate describes you.
•

Are you:
o Male
o Female
o Other: please specify

•

How would you describe your race/ethnicity?
o Asian or Asian American
o Black or African American
o Latino/a
o Middle Eastern or Middle Eastern American
o Native American or American Indian
o Pacific Islander or Alaskan Native
o Bi- or Multi- racial
o White or Caucasian
o Other: Please specify

•

What is your household income before taxes?
o Less than $16,000
o $16,001-$42,000
o $42,001-68,000
o $68,001-94,000
o More than $94,000

•

How would you describe your current relationship status?
o Single and not dating
o Single, but casually seeing someone/hanging out with someone
o In a relationship
o Married
o Divorced
o Widowed
o Other: please specify

•

What is the highest level of education you have completed?
o Less than high school
o High school graduate/GED
o Some college/associate degree
o College graduate
o Graduate degree

•

Are you currently employed at a paid job?
o Yes, full time. What is your job?
o Yes, part time. What is/are your job(s)?
o No, full time student
o No, full time homemaker/caregiver
246

o No, retired
o No, currently unemployed
•

How would you describe your sexual orientation?
o Heterosexual/straight
o Homosexual/gay/lesbian
o Bisexual
o Unsure/questioning
o Queer
o Another orientation. Please specify

•

How often do you attend religious services?
o Once a week or more
o 2-3 times per month
o Once a month
o A few times per year
o Never

•

How important is religion to you personally?
o Very important
o Somewhat important
o Neither important nor unimportant
o Not really important
o Not at all important

•

How would you describe your religious denomination (e.g., Christian-Catholicism,
Christian-Protestantism, Islam, Judaism)?

•

Have you or anyone you know experienced sexual assault?
o Yes
o No
o I’m not sure

The next questions will ask about your political viewpoints:
•

Generally, how would you describe your views on most social political issues (e.g.,
education, religious freedom, death penalty, gender issues, etc.)?
o Strongly Liberal
o Liberal
o Moderate
o Conservative
o Strongly Conservative
o These issues don’t matter to me

•

Generally, how would you describe your views on most economic political issues (e.g.,
minimum wage, taxes, welfare programs, etc.)?
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o
o
o
o
o
o
•

Strongly Liberal
Liberal
Moderate
Conservative
Strongly Conservative
These issues don’t matter to me

What political party to you most identify with?
o Republican party
o Democratic party
o Libertarian party
o Green party or Independent
o Other. Please describe
o I do not identify with a political party

The next few questions will ask about your feelings about abortion:
•

In general, regarding abortion, which of the following do you most identify with?
o Pro-Life
o Pro-Choice
o I do not identify with either
o I identify with both
o I don’t know

•

To what extent do you think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal
abortion?
1- It should definitely not be possible
23456- It should definitely be possible

Previous abortion experience
•

Have you or anyone you know had an abortion?
o Yes
o No
o I’m not sure
*Skip logic, if they answer “yes” or “I’m not sure,” they will be directed to the following
questions. If they answer “no,” they will be directed to the next section
•

Who do you know that has had an abortion? Check all that apply.
o Myself
o My current partner
o A previous partner
o A friend or family member
248

o An acquaintance
•

Where did the abortion take place? Check all that apply.
o A health care facility or clinic
o At home (after an abortion pill had been prescribed by a health care professional)
o At home (by doing something without speaking to a health care professional)
o I don’t know
o Other. Please specify

•

In regard to the abortion(s) from the previous questions, how do you know about it/them?
Check all that apply.
o I was there (I was the one getting an abortion)
o I was there (I went with the person)
o They told me
o I suspect they have but they never told me
o Other. Please specify

Voting behaviors
•

Are you registered to vote?
o Yes
o No
o I cannot vote in America

•

Would you say you follow what’s going on in government and public affairs?
o Most of the time
o Some of the time
o Only now and then
o Hardly at all

•

Where do you get your information on current events from?
o Television: please specify programs
o Online: please specify websites
o Print media: please specify
o Radio or podcasts: please specify
o Other: please specify

•

How would you describe the media sources you listed in the previous question?
o Strongly Liberal
o Liberal
o Moderate
o Conservative
o Strongly Conservative

•

How often would you say you vote in Arkansas state elections?
o Always
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o
o
o
o

Nearly always
Part of the time
Seldom
Never

•

How likely are you to vote in the next Arkansas state elections (e.g., state representatives,
governor)?
o Definitely will vote
o Probably will vote
o Probably will not vote
o Definitely will not vote

•

In making your decision about who to vote for in the next election, will the issue of
abortion be…
o Very important
o Somewhat important
o Not too important
o Not at all important

•

Thinking about how certain issues might affect your vote for Arkansas state positions
such as representatives or governor, would you say a candidate’s position on abortion
would be…
o The single most important factor in your vote
o Very important but not the most important factor
o One of many factors you’ll consider
o Not an important factor in your vote

•

If you agreed with an Arkansas state representative or governor on other issues, but not
on the issue of abortion, do you think you could still vote for that candidate?
o Yes
o No

•

Do you think abortion is…
o A critical issue facing the country
o One among many important issues
o Not that important compared to other issues

Why? (open-ended)
(SDO7 Scale: Personal beliefs about status/power (Ho et al., 2015))
Show how much you favor or oppose each idea below by selecting a number from 1 to 7 on the
scale below. You can work quickly; your first feeling is generally best.
1: Strongly Oppose
2: Somewhat Oppose
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3: Slightly Oppose
4: Neutral
5: Slightly Favor
6: Somewhat Favor
7: Strongly Favor
1. Some groups of people must be kept in their place.
2. It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom.
3. An ideal society requires some groups to be on top and others to be on the bottom.
4. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.
5. Groups at the bottom are just as deserving as groups at the top.
6. No one group should dominate in society.
7. Groups at the bottom should not have to stay in their place.
8. Group dominance is a poor principle.
9. We should not push for group equality.
10. We shouldn’t try to guarantee that every group has the same quality of life.
11. It is unjust to try to make groups equal.
12. Group equality should not be our primary goal.
13. We should work to give all groups an equal chance to succeed.
14. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.
15. No matter how much effort it takes, we ought to strive to ensure that all groups have the
same chance in life.
16. Group equality should be our ideal.
(INTERPERSONAL REACTIVITY INDEX (Davis, 1980))
The following statements ask about your thoughts and feelings in a variety of situations. For each
item, indicate how well it describes you by choosing the appropriate number 1-5.. READ EACH
ITEM CAREFULLY BEFORE RESPONDING. Answer as honestly as you can.
ANSWER SCALE: 1 (Does not describe me well)
well)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

2

3

4

5 (describes me very

I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me.
I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of view.
Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems.
I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision.
When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards them.
I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their
perspective.
7. Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal.
8. If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other people's
arguments.
9. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity for
them.
15. Please select “3”
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10. I am often quite touched by things that I see happen.
11. I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both.
12. I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person.
13. When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a while.
14. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place.
(Attitudes and knowledge about Arkansas abortion restrictions)
•

Based on what you know or have heard, is it currently legal for a woman to get an
abortion in all 50 states in the U.S.?
o Yes, abortion is legal in all 50 states
o No, abortion is not legal in all 50 states (legal in some but not others)
o No, abortion is not legal in any of the 50 states
o I’m not sure

•

Based on what you know or have heard, is it currently legal for a woman to get an
abortion in Arkansas?
o Yes, abortion is legal
o No, abortion is not legal
o I’m not sure

•

Based on what you know or have heard, is it easy for women to obtain an abortion in
Arkansas?
o Yes, it is easy for a woman to get an abortion
o No, it is not easy for a woman to get an abortion
o I’m not sure

•

Would you like to see abortion laws in this country…
o Made more strict (would make abortion more difficult to obtain)
o Made less strict (would make abortion less difficult to obtain)
o Remain as they are

•

Would you like to see abortion laws in Arkansas…
o Made more strict (would make abortion more difficult to obtain)
o Made less strict (would make abortion less difficult to obtain)
o Remain as they are

Based on what you know or have heard, which of the following are current laws in
Arkansas? (yes, current law in Arkansas/no, not a current law in Arkansas)
•
•
•
•

Minors must get a parent’s permission before they can get an abortion*
Minors must tell a parent before they can get an abortion but they don’t need permission.
Before an abortion, doctors have to counsel that there may be a link between breast
cancer and abortion
For women having an abortion at 20 weeks of pregnancy or later, doctors have to counsel
that that a fetus can feel pain *
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•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Before an abortion, doctors must tell women that the abortion can cause negative
psychological effects
A woman must wait a period of time after required counseling before the abortion can be
performed:
o 24 hours
o 48 hours*
o 72 hours
A woman must get an ultrasound (a scan to produce a picture of the pregnancy) before an
abortion
Medicaid (insurance for people who are low-income) can only cover abortions in cases of
the rape and incest or if the woman’s life is in danger*
Private health insurance companies (e.g., Blue Cross Blue Shield, United Healthcare) can
require people to pay more or buy special insurance to cover abortion
Abortions have to be administered by a licensed doctor (not a nurse or other healthcare
provider)*
Doctors may not prescribe the abortion pill through telemedicine (e.g., online video
session) for people who live far away*
Before an abortion, doctors must tell women that it is possible for the abortion pill to be
reversed*
Please select “No, not a current law in Arkansas”
Facilities that provide abortions have to adhere to ambulatory surgical standards (e.g.,
hallways have to be a certain width, requires extra nursing staff, has to be within a certain
distance to a hospital)
A woman cannot get an abortion after 20 weeks of pregnancy unless her life or health is
in danger*
A woman cannot get a “Partial-birth” abortion*
A woman cannot get a dilation and extraction abortion which is often performed after the
20th week of pregnancy*

To what extent do you agree or disagree that this should be a law in Arkansas (1: strongly
disagree to 5: strongly agree)?
“It should be a law in Arkansas that…”
•
•
•
•
•
•

Minors must get a parent’s permission before they can get an abortion*
Minors must tell a parent before they can get an abortion but they don’t need permission.
Before an abortion, doctors have to counsel that there may be a link between breast
cancer and abortion
For women having an abortion at 20 weeks of pregnancy or later, doctors have to counsel
that that a fetus can feel pain *
Before an abortion, doctors must tell women that the abortion can cause negative
psychological effects
A woman must wait a period of time after required counseling before the abortion can be
performed:
o 24 hours
o 48 hours*
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

o 72 hours
A woman must get an ultrasound (a scan to produce a picture of the pregnancy) before an
abortion
Medicaid (insurance for people who are low-income) can only cover abortions in cases of
the rape and incest or if the woman’s life is in danger*
Private health insurance companies (e.g., Blue Cross Blue Shield, United Healthcare) can
require people to pay more or buy special insurance to cover abortion
Abortions have to be administered by a licensed doctor (not a nurse or other healthcare
provider)*
Doctors may not prescribe the abortion pill through telemedicine (e.g., online video
session) for people who live far away*
Before an abortion, doctors must tell women that it is possible for the abortion pill to be
reversed*
Facilities that provide abortions have to adhere to ambulatory surgical standards (e.g.,
hallways have to be a certain width, requires extra nursing staff, has to be within a certain
distance to a hospital)
A woman cannot get an abortion after 20 weeks of pregnancy unless her life or health is
in danger*
A woman cannot get a “Partial-birth” abortion*
A woman cannot get a dilation and extraction abortion which is often performed after the
20th week of pregnancy*

(Attitudes toward stigmatized populations (based on Batson et al., 1997))
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

For most women who seek abortions, it is their own fault that they got pregnant. (1 =
strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree)
Most women who seek abortions could have avoided getting pregnant. (1 = strongly
disagree, 9 = strongly agree)
Our society does not do enough to help women who seek abortions (1 = strongly
disagree, 9 = strongly agree)
Women who seek abortions have no one to blame but themselves for getting pregnant. (1
= strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree)
Our society should do more to protect the welfare of women who seek abortions. (1 =
strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree)
Anyone who seeks an abortion must be inhuman. (1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly
agree)
Anyone who seeks an abortion should be punished. (1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly
agree)
No one would seek an abortion unless she had a moral or mental deficiency. (1 = strongly
disagree, 9 = strongly agree)
Our society should do more to prevent women from getting pregnant when they do not
want to get pregnant. (1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree)
How much do you personally care about the well-being of women who seek abortions? (1
= not at all, 9 = very much)
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•
•

Compared with other health issues we face today, how would you rate the importance of
helping women who seek abortions? (1 = not at all important, 9 = extremely important)
In general, what are your feelings toward women who seek abortions? (1 = extremely
negative, 9 = extremely positive)

(General Knowledge of abortion)
The following questions will ask about your general knowledge of abortion. If you do not know
the answer, provide your best guess.
•

•

•

•

•

•
•

Which has a greater health risk for a woman?
o Having an abortion
o Giving birth to a baby*
o Both have the same risk
What percentage of women in the United States will have had an abortion by the age
of 45?
o 48% of women
o 24% of women*
o 12% of women
o 2% of women
A woman who has an abortion is more likely to have breast cancer than if she were
to continue the pregnancy.
o True
o False*
A woman who has an abortion is more at risk of a serious mental health problem
than if she were to continue the pregnancy.
o True
o False*
A woman who has an abortion is more likely to have difficulty getting pregnant in
the future.
o True
o False*
There is more than one type of abortion.
o True*
o False
How confident are you in your answers to the previous questions about general
knowledge of abortion?
o 1: Very confident
o 2
o 3
o 4
o 5: Not at all confident

BLOCK BREAK
•

Based on what you know or have heard, what is a medication abortion?
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•

Based on what you know or have heard, what is an aspiration abortion?

The next few questions will ask about personal characteristics of women who most commonly
obtain abortions:
•

•

•

•

•
•

•

•

Women who most commonly obtain abortions are in what age group?
o Younger than 20
o 20-29*
o 30-39
o 40 or older
Women who mostly commonly obtain abortions are of what race/ethnicity?
o White*
o Black
o Hispanic
o Asian/Pacific Islander
o Other
Women who most commonly obtain abortions have completed how much education?
o Less than high school
o High school graduate/GED
o Some college/associate degree*
o College graduate
o Graduate degree
Women who most commonly obtain abortions are at what income level?
o Low-income*
o Middle-income
o High-income
Women who most commonly obtain abortions are religiously affiliated.
o True*
o False
Women who most commonly obtain abortions are of what relationship status?
o Married
o Cohabiting, not married
o Never-married, not cohabiting*
o Previously married, not cohabiting
Women who most commonly obtain abortions were using a contraceptive method when
they became pregnant.
o True*
o False
Women who most commonly obtain abortions have given birth before.
o True*
o False

(Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale-Short Form (Ballard, 1992; Reynolds, 1982))
Listed below are a number of statements concerning personal attitudes and traits.
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Read each item and decide whether the statement is true or false as it pertains to you. (Answer
T/F)
1. It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged
2. I sometimes feel resentful when I don’t get my way
3. No matter who I’m talking to, I’m always a good listener
4. There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone
5. I’m always willing to admit it when I make a mistake
6. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget
7. I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable
8. I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from my own
9. There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of others
10. I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me
11. I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone’s feelings
(Video Administration)
You will now watch a short news story about abortion laws in Arkansas (~3-5 minutes). If you
want to put on headphones so as not to disrupt others, please do so at this time. There will be NO
graphic images shown.
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POST-TEST (Control)
UNIQUE IDENTIFIER (only Follow-up Post test 2)
Please use the directions below to make an unidentifiable code. This code is purely to help
track your data over the entire survey.
The code entails:
1. The first 4 digits of your phone number
2. The first 2 letters of your name
3. The 2 digits of your birth month
For example, if your phone number is 776-5577, your name is Carl, and your birth month is
June (06), then your code would be: “5577Ca06”.
After hearing the news story, to what extent did you experience feeling: (POST TEST 1)
A few weeks ago, you watched a news story about abortion laws in Arkansas. When thinking
about this video clip, what are your current feelings? (POST TEST 2)
•

Sympathetic (1 = not at all, 7 = very much)

•

Moved (1 = not at all, 7 = very much)

•

Compassionate (1 = not at all, 7 = very much)

•

Tender (1 = not at all, 7 = very much)

•

Warm (1 = not at all, 7 = very much)

•

Soft-hearted (1 = not at all, 7 = very much)

What aspect of the video caused you to feel the way you did while watching it?

Which picture best describes how you feel about yourself (self) in relation to a woman who has
had an abortion (other)?

258

Why do you feel that way about a woman who has had an abortion?
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POST-TEST (Intervention only)
UNIQUE IDENTIFIER (only Follow-up Post test 2)
Please use the directions below to make an unidentifiable code. This code is purely to help track
your data over the entire survey.
The code entails:
1. The first 4 digits of your phone number
2. The first 2 letters of your name
3. The 2 digits of your birth month
For example, if your phone number is 776-5577, your name is Carl, and your birth month is
June (06), then your code would be: “5577Ca06”.
A few weeks ago, you watched a news story about abortion laws in Arkansas. When thinking
about this video clip, what are your current feelings? (POST TEST 2)
•

Sympathetic (1 = not at all, 7 = very much)

•

Moved (1 = not at all, 7 = very much)

•

Compassionate (1 = not at all, 7 = very much)

•

Tender (1 = not at all, 7 = very much)

•

Warm (1 = not at all, 7 = very much)

•

Soft-hearted (1 = not at all, 7 = very much)

What aspect of the video caused you to feel the way you did while watching it?

Which picture best describes how you feel about yourself in relation to a woman who has had
an abortion?
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Why do you feel that way about a woman who has had an abortion?

Which picture best describes how you feel about yourself in relation to the woman you watched
in the video who told her story about seeking an abortion?

Why do you feel that way about the woman told her story about seeking an abortion?
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POST-TEST CONTINUED (Control and Intervention)
Abortion Knowledge
•

Based on what you heard in the video you watched, is it currently legal for a woman to
get an abortion in all 50 states in the U.S.?
o Yes, abortion is legal in all 50 states
o No, abortion is not legal in all 50 states (legal in some but not others)
o No, abortion is not legal in any of the 50 states
o I’m not sure

•

Based on what you heard in the video you watched, is it currently legal for a woman to
get an abortion in Arkansas?
o Yes, abortion is legal
o No, abortion is not legal
o I’m not sure

•

Based on what you heard in the video you watched, is it easy for women to obtain an
abortion in Arkansas?
o Yes, it is easy for a woman to get an abortion
o No, it is not easy for a woman to get an abortion
o I’m not sure

•

After watching the video, would you like to see abortion laws in this country…
o Made more strict (would make abortion more difficult to obtain)
o Made less strict (would make abortion less difficult to obtain)
o Remain as they are

•

After watching the video, would you like to see abortion laws in Arkansas…
o Made more strict (would make abortion more difficult to obtain)
o Made less strict (would make abortion less difficult to obtain)
o Remain as they are

Based on what you heard in the video you watched, which of the following is a current law
in Arkansas? (yes, current law in Arkansas/no, not a current law in Arkansas)
•
•
•
•
•
•

Minors must get a parent’s permission before they can get an abortion*
Minors must tell a parent before they can get an abortion but they don’t need permission.
Before an abortion, doctors have to counsel that there may be a link between breast
cancer and abortion
For women having an abortion at 20 weeks of pregnancy or later, doctors have to counsel
that that a fetus can feel pain *
Before an abortion, doctors must tell women that the abortion can cause negative
psychological effects
A woman must wait a period of time after required counseling before the abortion can be
performed:
o 24 hours
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

o 48 hours*
o 72 hours
A woman must get an ultrasound (a scan to produce a picture of the pregnancy) before an
abortion
Medicaid (insurance for people who are low-income) can only cover abortions in cases of
the rape and incest or if the woman’s life is in danger*
Private health insurance companies (e.g., Blue Cross Blue Shield, United Healthcare) can
require people to pay more or buy special insurance to cover abortion
Abortions have to be administered by a licensed doctor (not a nurse or other healthcare
provider)*
Doctors may not prescribe the abortion pill through telemedicine (e.g., online video
session) for people who live far away*
Before an abortion, doctors must tell women that it is possible for the abortion pill to be
reversed*
Please select “No, not a current law in Arkansas”
Facilities that provide abortions have to adhere to ambulatory surgical standards (e.g.,
hallways have to be a certain width, requires extra nursing staff, has to be within a certain
distance to a hospital)
A woman cannot get an abortion after 20 weeks of pregnancy unless her life or health is
in danger*
A woman cannot get a “Partial-birth” abortion*
A woman cannot get a dilation and extraction abortion which is often performed after the
20th week of pregnancy*

After watching the video, to what extent do you agree or disagree that this should be a law
in Arkansas (1: strongly disagree to 5: strongly agree)?
“It should be a law that…”
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•

Minors must get a parent’s permission before they can get an abortion*
Minors must tell a parent before they can get an abortion but they don’t need permission.
Before an abortion, doctors have to counsel that there may be a link between breast
cancer and abortion
For women having an abortion at 20 weeks of pregnancy or later, doctors have to counsel
that that a fetus can feel pain *
Before an abortion, doctors must tell women that the abortion can cause negative
psychological effects
A woman must wait a period of time after required counseling before the abortion can be
performed:
o 24 hours
o 48 hours*
o 72 hours
A woman must get an ultrasound (a scan to produce a picture of the pregnancy) before an
abortion
Medicaid (insurance for people who are low-income) can only cover abortions in cases of
the rape and incest or if the woman’s life is in danger*
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Private health insurance companies (e.g., Blue Cross Blue Shield, United Healthcare) can
require people to pay more or buy special insurance to cover abortion
Abortions have to be administered by a licensed doctor (not a nurse or other healthcare
provider)*
Doctors may not prescribe the abortion pill through telemedicine (e.g., online video
session) for people who live far away*
Before an abortion, doctors must tell women that it is possible for the abortion pill to be
reversed*
Facilities that provide abortions have to adhere to ambulatory surgical standards (e.g.,
hallways have to be a certain width, requires extra nursing staff, has to be within a certain
distance to a hospital)
A woman cannot get an abortion after 20 weeks of pregnancy unless her life or health is
in danger*
A woman cannot get a “Partial-birth” abortion*
A woman cannot get a dilation and extraction abortion which is often performed after the
20th week of pregnancy*

(Attitudes toward stigmatized populations (based on Batson et al., 1997))
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

For most women who seek abortions, it is their own fault that they got pregnant. (1 =
strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree)
Most women who seek abortions could have avoided getting pregnant. (1 = strongly
disagree, 9 = strongly agree)
Our society does not do enough to help women who seek abortions (1 = strongly
disagree, 9 = strongly agree)
Women who seek abortions have no one to blame but themselves for getting pregnant. (1
= strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree)
Our society should do more to protect the welfare of women who seek abortions. (1 =
strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree)
Anyone who seeks an abortion must be inhuman. (1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly
agree)
Anyone who seeks an abortion should be punished. (1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly
agree)
No one would seek an abortion unless she had a moral or mental deficiency. (1 = strongly
disagree, 9 = strongly agree)
Our society should do more to prevent women from getting pregnant when they do not
want to get pregnant. (1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree)
How much do you personally care about the well-being of women who seek abortions? (1
= not at all, 9 = very much)
Compared with other health issues we face today, how would you rate the importance of
helping women who seek abortions? (1 = not at all important, 9 = extremely important)
In general, what are your feelings toward women who seek abortions? (1 = extremely
negative, 9 = extremely positive)
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Voting
•

After watching the video, how likely are you to vote in the next Arkansas state elections
(e.g., state representatives, governor)?
o Definitely will vote
o Probably will vote
o Probably will not vote
o Definitely will not vote

•

After watching the video, in making your decision about who to vote for in the next
election, will the issue of abortion be…
o Very important
o Somewhat important
o Not too important
o Not at all important

•

After watching the video, thinking about how certain issues might affect your vote for
Arkansas state positions such as representatives or governor, would you say a candidate’s
position on abortion would be…
o The single most important factor in your vote
o Very important but not the most important factor
o One of many factors you’ll consider
o Not an important factor in your vote

•

After watching the video, if you agreed with an Arkansas state representative or governor
on other issues, but not on the issue of abortion, do you think you could still vote for that
candidate?
o Yes
o No

•

After watching the video, do you think abortion is…
o A critical issue facing the country
o One among many important issues
o Not that important compared to other issues

Why? (open-ended)
•

There is more than one type of abortion.
o True*
o False

Finally, the next few questions will ask about your feelings about abortion:
•

In general, regarding abortion, which of the following do you most identify with??
o Pro-Life
o Pro-Choice
o I do not identify with either
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o I identify with both
o I don’t know
•

To what extent do you think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal
abortion?
1-It should definitely not be possible
23456- It should definitely be possible
•
•
•

Based on what you know or have heard in the video you watched, what is a
medication abortion?
Based on what you know or have heard in the video you watched, what is a surgical
abortion?
How would you describe the news video you watched?
o Strongly Liberal
o Liberal
o Moderate
o Conservative
o Strongly Conservative

Think back to the video you watched and evaluate what you thought of the person who gave the
news story, Michelle.

In your opinion, was she:
(Source Credibility Scale (Ohanian, 1990) (9 point scales))
Attractiveness
Attractive – Unattractive
Classy – Not classy
Beautiful – Ugly
Elegant – Plain
Sexy – Not sexy
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Trustworthiness
Dependable – Undependable
Honest – Dishonest
Reliable – Unreliable
Sincere – Insincere
Trustworthy- Untrustworthy
Expertise
Expert – Not an Expert
Experienced – Inexperienced
Knowledgeable – Unknowledgeable
Qualified – Unqualified
Skilled – Unskilled

Evaluate what you thought of the woman who told her story about seeking an abortion, Mia.
(Intervention 1 & 2)

(Intervention 3 & 4)

In your opinion, was she:
Attractiveness
Attractive – Unattractive
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Classy – Not classy
Beautiful – Ugly
Elegant – Plain
Sexy – Not sexy
Trustworthiness
Dependable – Undependable
Honest – Dishonest
Reliable – Unreliable
Sincere – Insincere
Trustworthy- Untrustworthy
Expertise
Expert – Not an Expert
Experienced – Inexperienced
Knowledgeable – Unknowledgeable
Qualified – Unqualified
Skilled – Unskilled
Did you personally know any of the women in the video?
a. No
b. Yes, please describe
In the 2 weeks between watching the video and now, did you seek any media or resources that
provided you with additional information on abortion, abortion laws, or related topics?
a. No
b. Yes-- please describe
c. I’m not sure
In the 2 weeks between watching the video and now, did you or anyone you know seek an
abortion?
d. No
e. Yes
f. I’m not sure
Thank you for your responses!
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Please enter the email where you wish to receive an Amazon e-gift card. The first 450 people
who completed the survey will receive a $10 gift card.
In 2 weeks, you will be sent a follow-up survey for an additional $10 Amazon e-gift card.
Reminder: Your email address will be used so that we can send you the gift card and to contract
you for one follow-up survey in 2 weeks. After that time, you will get a second gift card for
participation in the follow-up survey. After that, your email will be deleted permanently.

269

